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Executive Summary of Main Findings

- The Oxford team fielded a nationally-representative survey with 3,580 respondents (+18). In addition, it completed 20 focus groups with displaced discussants in different locations across BiH. The study differs in terms of methodology (which follows the BHAS¹ Master Sample), low refusal rates, investment in local research staff training and a rigorous eight-stage quality control programme
- The survey gives a voice to the 'silent majority'
- It reports that people are content in their lives and, personally, feel in control. BiH compares favourably with other transformation countries in this respect. However, respondent's views of BiH as a country, its political actors and institutions are very negative. Beliefs in corruption are widespread and not substantiated by actual recent experiences. Optimism is relatively weak and there is a sense of standstill. Social trust is virtually non-existent
- The relationship between citizens and the political world is dominated by low interest and disengagement
- Identity and religious affiliation do not impact on the way people feel about themselves and society but there are significant statistical effects in institutional, political and constitutional assessments. Particularistic differences are essentially political in nature but do not appear to affect the fabric of BiH society
- Two thirds below the age of 30 wish to emigrate and the motivation of the young to stay in BiH emerges as a key challenge. At the same time, human resources, especially young people, are seen as the key asset of BiH. The greatest weaknesses are unemployment, the political world and corruption. The long-term vision for BiH is EU membership, and the EU is invited to influence the future of the country. Employment and economic progress appear as pre-conditions for achieving long-term goals
- For short-term policy aims, respondents are not interested in de-mining, prosecuting war-criminals, police reform and defence issues. Instead they opt for improvements in their living standards, a unified country and anti-corruption measures
- There is a powerful demand for general and constitutional change but views on change are divisive. A large majority aspires to a new political structure, preferably a centralised system. The status quo, division of BiH, Yugoslavia Mark II and three Entities are not wanted. Most aggregated support and least opposition is gathered by a centralist alternative with strong regions – or the Federal Republic of BiH
- While people intellectually understand that change is needed and the proposed overall direction of change is largely coherent, the vehicles of change are less clear. The population does not appear confident enough to initiate change. Some want to hold on to the certainties of socialist Yugoslavia, e.g. high dependency on state output. It remains unclear that BiH is not just a post-conflict country but also a transformation society
- There is a chasm between people's aspirations and their expectations
- More than eight in ten respondents ascribe to BiH citizenship, though 14% have exclusive identities. The latter tend to oppose EU membership and are more likely to

¹ BiH Agency of Statistics

be violent. Exclusive identifiers may pose a potential risk to change unless they are brought closer into the mainstream

- Overall, return appears as a success: a majority of displaced people returned and migrants appear integrated in mainstream economy and society. However, continued return policies are not part of a long-term vision. Even displaced people no longer prioritise them. Policies, which benefit the whole population, come to the fore
- International institutions are not trusted but respondents know little about them and do not distinguish between them. A small majority supports a continued UN presence and advises the UN to promote human rights, improve living standards and fight corruption. Broadly, UN involvement in politics, education and positive discrimination for disadvantaged groups are not wanted
- A returning Diaspora is seen as an economic asset and its re-integration in BiH is not perceived as competition for existing structures
- Some of the survey results are echoed in the focus groups: the need for employment and economic progress, dependency on institutional output, beliefs in corruption and a lack of information about the UN
- In the groups, the decision to return appears as mainly emotive, the decision to stay more rational. Returnees confirm that institutional assistance helped them to restart their lives. They say that sustainability means jobs, and, to a lesser degree, capital equipment and channels for marketing produce. Non-returnees were able to integrate in host communities. They received little assistance and appear more self-directed
- Group return is more efficient than individual return
- Perceived inequity in assistance-delivery atomises individuals and challenges community solidarity
- Local intermediaries, not the UN, are held responsible for perceived corruption
- The UN is perceived as remote. It is advised to create greater awareness for its structures and policies, minimise its use of local intermediaries and monitor the quality of assistance. In terms of economic progress older participants suggest collective ideas which promote secure employment. Young people propose future-oriented entrepreneurial models and seek improvements in their marketable skills
- The Head of the UN is perceived as a powerful authority and guarantor against corruption. She is advised to enter into direct and meaningful dialogue with policy recipients, improve UN-transparency and support initiatives which lead to more employment and new businesses
- Advice to the MHRR² Minister echoes advice to the UN. Trust in his capacity is affected by negative attitudes to State government. The Minister is asked to safeguard equal rights and encouraged to realise political promises

² BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees



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**Executive Summary of Main Findings
and Key Policy Recommendations**

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Policies

² BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees

The survey establishes two long-term aspirations:

1 - Joining the EU and inviting the EU to help shape the future of BiH

2 - Constitutional change and a new political structure

It is also clear that before long-term aspirations can be realised, short- and mid-term policies are needed to prepare the ground. Not least of all, the potential risks associated with constitutional change require particular attention. There are four short to mid-term development areas.

1 Economic progress, employment opportunities and SMEs

National economic policy goes beyond the scope of this research, though the data produce three concrete ideas and employment opportunities are not seen as coterminous with paid work. First, policy designs could include initiatives which increase the number of SMEs. Second, support for local producers to distribute and market agricultural produce could prove beneficial. Third, as the Diaspora is clearly identified as an economic asset, its return to BiH could be lucrative

2 A comprehensive package for the young

This development area could include initiatives which support small-businesses run by young people, an enhancement to the marketable skills of the young, and grants and loans to meet auxiliary cost of education. The latter could support broader access to tertiary education. Also, fixed-term education abroad, additional vocational training and more room in the media for youth themes are key. Overall, support for greater engagement by the young in public spheres appears vital

3 Reconciliation and social integration

In order to address low social trust and cohesion, the establishment of a Reconciliation Commission may prove a significant formal step. This measure requires complementary support from initiatives which help reduce the divisions between exclusive identifiers and mainstream BiH society. This may also reduce the risk associated with constitutional change

4 Communication, trust, fighting corruption and civic engagement

TV and print are identified as suitable vehicles for developing public information and promoting civic education. The fight against beliefs in corruption and unrealistic negativity about the situation in BiH appear as appropriate starting points. The dissemination of survey results in order to stimulate fact-based public opinion formation emerges as important as the use of deliberative democracy and townhall-meetings to provide institutional contexts for the popular discussion of pertinent themes



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Introduction to the Intellectual Aims of the Study

Introduction

The primary aims of the research, as agreed with UNDP, are to collect, analyse and present comprehensive data on the socio-economic situation of returnees/displaced persons, and on the visions of the future of the population of BiH as a whole, through a variety of methodologies and instruments. To identify lessons learned through an examination of policy outcomes and identify support for wider future policy-making in BiH

The main methodologies used were quantitative analysis of a systematic representative sample survey of the BiH population complemented by qualitative research using focus groups drawn from both youth and adult groups in a spread of regional settings. Both the quantitative survey and the focus group discussions were preceded by 50 in-depth interviews with migrants, which yielded important information for the focus group discussion guide and pre-tested some of the variables for the quantitative survey.

Overall, this permitted dedicated comparative analysis of different types of households together with a data record on return and on visions of the future. At the quantitative level, this research complements a micro-census type programme by the BiH Agency of Statistics (BHAS), which, with the support of the UK government, surveyed around 80,000 BiH households in 2005/06. The BHAS Master Sample provided the methodological basis for this research.

The focus of this report is on policy-driven considerations regarding sustainable return and the determinants of popular visions of the future of BiH, ideas on democratic governance, constitutional changes, international influence and social inclusion. The aim of this report therefore, is to study the 'visions of the future' of the population of BiH and the role of displacement and return in contemporary BiH. One key question is whether policies which support returnees and non-returnees are part of visions of the future, or if in fact, other priorities are more pressing.

The report interprets governance broadly to include issues such as the desired constitutional arrangements for BiH, perceptions of political institutions, and political priorities as well as issues of process, including the perceptions of corruption in the political process. We take social inclusion to embrace issues such as reconciliation, integrating disaffected groups into the mainstream, reducing social tensions, as well as the more conventional senses such as including disadvantaged groups in economic activity, in the political process and in civic life more generally.

A primary aim of this research, therefore, was to allow the people of BiH themselves to 'have a voice' and to express their priorities for the future of the country, their feelings about issues of governance, their concerns over displacement and return, and their own experiences of social inclusion. In other words, we see this research as an important opportunity to give a voice to BiH's 'silent majority', not least of all to provide a fact-based alternative to the political rhetoric which sometimes tends to dominate public discussion. In order to achieve these aims, a set of themes for more detailed examination were agreed with UNDP.

For the focus groups, push and pull factors behind the decision to either return to their old neighbourhoods or to build an existence in the host community are explored together with the actual outcome of that decision, namely perceived gains and losses. Specifically, was the decision to return determined by expectations of assistance in the kin community?

Social integration plays a role as discussants are encouraged to tell the research team to what degree they have been included in whatever community they now live, or, if in fact, they feel excluded in any important way. There have been significant policy initiatives to integrate displaced people and make their lives sustainable. How do discussants define and interpret the terms 'sustainable return' and 'sustainable integration'; are they the key to a durable solution? How do displaced people feel about the quantity and quality of any assistance they may have received, have distribution systems been equitable or have there been incidents of corruption? To turn to visions of the future, how do discussants see the role of the UN, exactly what policy interventions do they think are profitable and what advice do they have for the Head of the United Nations and the Minister of Human Rights and Refugees?

Overarching themes include sectional differences between men and women, returnees and non-returnees, minority and majority returnees and people in different age cohorts. In addition, the research team has conducted group discussions in other transformation societies. How do the groups in BiH differ? Is the research timely or has the world changed around the initial research concepts?

For the quantitative part, the first theme, '*General Well-Being*', focuses on the respondents' own experiences. How do they feel about their lives in BiH and how satisfied are they with their financial situation, their health, and their general well-being? Answering these questions gives us an initial picture of how people experience their lives in BiH today and whether there are particular groups, such as the displaced, who are disproportionately likely to be at a disadvantage and who might therefore be said to be socially excluded. In other words, which are the groups that feel particularly vulnerable? We also focus more specifically on wishes to emigrate, emigration being a particularly consequential reaction to dissatisfaction with the problems in one's country as analysed in Hirschman's classic study *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States* (1970). For Hirschman, exit in the form of migration, voice in the form of protest and collective political action, and loyalty to the existing order are the main likely reactions to decline. In this first section we focus on desires to exit. (We turn to voice and loyalty in later sections.) How do these desires and intentions vary between the displaced, the returnees who were formerly displaced, and those who were never displaced? How do they differ between young and old, and various socio-economic groups?

Survey questions on feelings of well-being have also been asked in the World Values Surveys, and this gives us an opportunity to compare the current situation in BiH with that found in other transformation societies, particularly neighbouring countries and former Eastern-bloc countries. This enables us to calibrate the answers from our respondents and to see whether the level of well-being is more or less what might be expected in a transformation country or, instead, are particularly problematic.

The second theme of '*Trust*' deals with both social trust and trust in institutions. Social trust is often regarded as a key indicator of social cohesion and as a precondition for the smooth functioning of the society and its institutions. Social trust has become a key concept in recent academic and political debates and is one of the core elements of Putnam's theory of social capital which he introduced in his landmark study *Making Democracy Work* (1993) of the differences in the functioning of democracy in the north and south of Italy. Putnam sees declining trust as a major challenge for Western societies generally and as a crucial ingredient in governability. Lack of social trust is likely to be a particular problem in a country such as BiH with its history of conflict.

Political trust focuses on the sentiments of the citizens towards the key institutions of their society and gives us a sense of the legitimacy of the governance arrangements in the eyes of the population. Political trust featured prominently in the classic work of Almond and Verba on *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy* (1963) and is argued to be one of the key ingredients in generating a well-functioning democracy. In their view, a stable democracy requires an appropriate balance between popular participation and popular respect for the institutions of the society. We ask whether trust varies across different institutions, including international as well as domestic ones, and whether the various sections of society differ in their support for specific institutions. How widespread is confidence and trust in the central government in Sarajevo, for example, or is this support localised or sectional in character? Answers to such questions will give some idea of the scope these institutions have in deciding on or implementing policy. As Almond and Verba imply, lack of such trust is likely to mean that groups may take matters into their own hands, leading to a breakdown in democracy.

A further theme is the '*World of Politics*' more generally. Here we explore the other ingredient in the civic culture, namely respondents' own levels of political participation and involvement in the political process. We ask how involved people are in the political process, for example through participation in electoral politics, and what other forms of political participation they have undertaken, or might consider. Given BiH's recent violent past, an important question is how many people would contemplate the use of violence for political ends, and from what groups in society such people tend to be drawn.

We then turn to our respondents' main policy priorities for the future and the demands that they have for their political leaders. What are the concerns that citizens of BiH have as their highest priority – economic concerns, governance issues, and the fight against corruption, or issues of social inclusion and reconciliation such as developing national unity or dealing with war criminals and de-mining? And to which bodies do they attribute responsibility for dealing with these concerns? Answers to these questions give a clear view of respondents' own assessment of what needs to be done to assist the future of BiH.

Longer-term visions of the future are central to the next theme of '*Change and Future*'. We ask what our respondents see as the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary BiH, whether they are content with the status quo or would prefer structural change, and in particular what form of constitution they would like in the longer term. A key question here is whether different sections of society can unite on any particular blueprint for the future or whether all the possible constitutional arrangements that have been proposed would be divisive. Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy has emphasised the importance of finding constitutional arrangements for plural societies that incorporate all the main sectional groups into the political process through various forms of power-sharing arrangement. As he argues in *Majority Rule versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies* (1997) his evidence suggests that simple majoritarian constitutions are not likely to be viable in the long run in such societies. At this stage in BiH the issue is therefore whether there are possible constitutional arrangements that might be acceptable to most groups without entrenching significant minorities.

Given its history of conflict and the manner of its resolution, the international community plays a large role in present day BiH and must be seen as a central part of the current constitutional arrangements. A natural question is therefore to ask how the respondents themselves see this international involvement, whether they wish bodies such as the UN to remain or to leave, and what they feel their role should be. This is the central focus of our next theme '*External Influence and the International Community*'.

A crucial aspect of governance, and one that is likely to be closely related to trust in particular political institutions and international organisations, and desires to preserve or eject such organisations, is the issue of corruption. This provides the focus of our next theme, '*Corruption and Beliefs in Corruption*'. We ask first about people's perceptions of corruption, which institutions and organisations it is particularly likely to affect, and at what levels. But as well as focussing on perceptions we also ask about people's direct experience of corruption in their everyday lives. Following the well-known psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, it could be that peoples' beliefs about corruption are reflections of their attitudes towards those institutions, rather than the other way round, and people's actual experiences of corrupt practices therefore provide a valuable check on their perceptions. Also, the relationship between beliefs in corruption and overall views of BiH will be explored.

Our next theme is '*Self-identification*'. Identification with the nation-state is widely seen by political theorists as a key element promoting national unity and cohesion and providing a basis of legitimacy for the state's institutions and hence being functional for modern democracies. Conversely writers such as Gellner in his key text *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) see alternative identities as a major contributor to separatist nationalist movements. Empirical research in plural societies, such as the UK or Spain, has demonstrated the prevalence of 'dual identities' with many people identifying as, for example, both Scottish and British. Such dual identities do not appear to be at all threatening to national cohesion. Exclusive identities, however, where people reject the over-arching national identity and accept only the minority identity tend to be much more in favour of separatism or partition and to be prepared to act on this basis. A key issue for the future governance of BiH and the social inclusion of all sectors of society is therefore the prevalence of these primary, dual and exclusive identities and their structural location within society. Are there particular groups that lie outside the mainstream and present a challenge of civic incorporation?

A final theme related to governance issues is that of '*Media and media uses*'. The mass media, particularly in the historical past, have played crucial roles in the development of the nation and the formation of what Benedict Anderson evocatively termed the imagined community of the nation (in his classic study *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 1983). Anderson focussed on the role of print capitalism in the emergence of the modern nation state. Our question is how the different mass media are suitable platforms for engaging in meaningful dialogue with the population, which media texts are trusted for news and if sectional differences play a role.

Running through all these themes, but also warranting a separate section in its own right, are the issues of '*Displacement, Diaspora and Return*'. We distinguish here between the displaced who have returned to their origins, the displaced who have not returned, and the non-displaced. We also need to recognise the existence of many people, the Diaspora, who have left BiH temporarily or perhaps permanently. Is their return perceived as profitable for BiH or are they likely to be rejected? The question of the social inclusion of the displaced and of the returnees is one of our most central themes. We can look at this from two perspectives. First we take the perspective of the displaced themselves and their own experiences particularly with respect to finding work, well-being, and social integration. Second we take the perspective of the wider society looking at attitudes towards the displaced and the Diaspora, support for their reintegration, the continuance of current measures, and the priority that these measures should have in competition with other claims on scarce resources. Can we say that issues of displacement and return have

now been dealt with satisfactorily in the eyes of the population or do they remain policy priorities for the future?

While each of these themes will be analysed in its own right using a range of statistical tools, the last section is used to pull all the various themes together and place them in a relational framework. Correspondence analysis is used as a multi-dimensional tool to provide an overall picture.



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Introduction to the Methodology

Section 1

In-Depth Interviews

At the start of the programme the research team implemented 50 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with displaced respondents in a total of 13 locations. The research was based on a semi-structured questionnaire which took around 60 minutes to administer. There was a combination of free-wheeling interaction and structured interviewing, in order to pre-test some of the questions which were later asked in the national survey. In this way the IDIs had a piloting function.

Three main tasks were accomplished with the IDIs. First, the research team and the UNDP Liaison Officer were able to identify key themes and obtain a 'flavour of the field.' Second, it was discovered that there were fewer IDP households than had been assumed at the onset. Third, respondents were less keen to discuss their experiences of forced migration and their evaluations of return policy. Instead, they preferred sharing their views of the future, both for them personally and for the country as a whole.

Section 2

Changes

Consequently, it was decided to alter the focus and methodology of the research programme. The intellectual focus was moved from evaluations of the past to visions of the future and displacement and return was embedded into a wider intellectual framework. Instead of 6,000 short screener interviews with 2,000 full IDP interviews, 3,556 extended interviews with the resident population of BiH were planned. Core themes included (but were not limited to) views on displacement, return and Diaspora, visions of the future, the relationship between citizens and politics, views of corruption, general well-being, media uses, international influence and constitutional preferences. Most IDP-specific themes were re-allocated to a new total of 20 focus groups.

Section 3 ¹

The Quantitative Survey

3.1 How this survey is different

- It follows the BHAS ² Master Sample with ca. 80,000 households (see below) and is the first non-BHAS national survey of BiH to do so
- It places emphasis on a truly random selection of households and respondents. Interviews are allocated proportionately to corresponding population estimates
- The research team received a week's training in the latest survey and interviewing techniques
- The research team worked hard to keep refusals to a minimum
- It operated an eight-stage quality control routine

¹ This section should be read in conjunction with the technical report for the quantitative survey

² BiH Agency of Statistics

- It was able to make use of original cartographic material (EAs) kindly supplied by BHAS and the Republic of Srpska Institute of Statistics
- It targeted all the Cantons of the FBiH and all statistical regions of the RS. It also included Brcko District

3.2 Sampling

The quantitative survey completed 3,580 interviews. In its sampling routine, the research team followed the BiH Agency for Statistics and RS Agency of Statistics and their Master Sample exercise of 2003-6 involving around 80,000 households in 1,409 non-empty EAs. However, the allocation of interviews to geographical sub-units (Entities/Brcko, Cantons/Regions, Municipalities EAs and target households) was not on the basis of equal probabilities but by PPS-method³ using BHAS population estimates for all units except for EAs. The Federation of BiH is estimated to represent 59.9% of the population and was therefore allocated the corresponding number of interviews (2,175 was the actual number of completed interviews), The Republica Srpska (RS) is estimated to represent 38.1% of the population, and, in the event, produced 1,331 actual interviews. The remaining 74 interviews went to Brcko (1.9%). The sampling error for this survey is 1.64% on the basis of a 95% confidence interval ($p < 0.05$). On average (mean) it took exactly 50 minutes to administer an interview. The standard deviation for this mean score is 10.0.

In EAs the allocation of interviews was computed by the application of actual household numbers as quantified by the BHAS Master Sample. BHAS kindly assisted the selection of households at EA-level. For each household on the (primary) list, an alternative household was also selected (reserve list) in order to provide a fall-back solution for unavailable/unoccupied dwellings. 2,361 households were chosen from the BHAS primary list, 746 from the reserve list. In 332 cases neither the household on the primary nor on the reserve list were available. Therefore, interviewers followed instructions and approached the neighbours of the target household on the primary list. In cases (141) where neither selection by primary or reserve list nor replacement by neighbouring households was possible, interviewers were instructed to select households by means of a random route, random interval method.

3.3 Refusals and Non-Availability

As stated above, refusals were kept to a minimum. Researchers were trained in techniques for convincing potential respondents to co-operate and there were significant financial rewards for not giving up. In the event, a total of 11.9% (net) of target respondents refused to be interviewed. In FBiH there were 13.0% refusals, in the RS 10.3%, and in Brcko 8.1%. A total of 80 households were not available because the occupants had moved, eight households were found to be unoccupied, in 376 (or 11.4%) cases the target person was not available after call-backs and in 84 cases other types of non-availability were identified. The survey operated a call-back system which re-visited temporarily unavailable targets for up to three times. There was no replacement of unavailable respondents within the same household. Instead a new household was selected.

³ Probability proportionate to its size

3.4 Training

The training session was organised in a central location and was attended by 51 candidate fieldworkers and all research managers. All fieldwork candidates had a minimum experience of 300 interviews. The training took one week and involved 40 hours of tuition and seminars.

The primary aims included:

- Updating fieldworkers' knowledge of social research and strengthening their theoretical perspectives on research
- Discussing practical aspects of the research, especially in view of the BiH research environment
- Strategising for high response, low refusal and uniform approaches in interviewing techniques
- The reduction of bias in survey research
- Introducing all researchers to the aims of the study in general and the research instruments and sampling techniques in particular
- Building a team by bringing together fieldworkers, quality control staff and the research management into one location

All researchers were furnished with a fieldwork manual, which summarised the central issues of the training and was used by all fieldworkers as a reference document.

3.5 The fieldwork team

A total of 46 researchers fielded the study. There were six team leaders and seven supervisors, two of whom worked as both interviewers and supervisors for logistical reasons.

Teams were allocated to six areas: Banja Luka, Bihac, Zenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar. In addition, a special forces team consisting of four first-rate researchers covered difficult-to-reach areas in the south and the west of the country. Teams travelled together at most times.

3.6 Quality Control

Quality control was implemented as an eight-stage process

- During the training, all researchers were introduced to Oxford Research International's quality philosophy. They spent a great deal of time familiarising themselves with the survey questionnaire, its logic and consistency and the support materials, including documents for the implementation of quality control. In mock sessions, researchers practised the survey questionnaire and were monitored by their supervisors and team leaders

- Following the training sessions, interviewers received additional on-the-job coaching. Each interviewer was asked to accompany his/her supervisor and conduct an interview with a respondent. This was achieved without supervisor intervention. The performance of each interviewer was discussed with the rest of the area team in order to instruct and correct. Only if an interviewer made no mistakes and implemented all the instructions from the training manual was he/she permitted to participate in the survey
- On average 27.2% (or 951) interviews were back-checked by supervisors or management. This average did not vary greatly between teams (32.8% for the special forces team and 25.1% in Banja Luka). Supervisors administered a back-check questionnaire with a limited number of questions from the survey to see if there was congruity between the completed survey questionnaire and the back-check answers. When differences occurred, the case was investigated
- Interviewers checked their work at the end of the day, resolving inconsistencies and calling with respondents where errors were detected. At the end of this process they signed the completed questionnaire and passed it to their supervisor
- Supervisors were furnished with consistency checks (e.g. respondents who are not aware of the DPA cannot comment on its effectiveness) and other quality control documentation, including the correct selection of households. They checked the completed questionnaire of each of their interviewers, resolved inconsistencies, signed it and passed it on to their team leader
- Team leaders checked each completed questionnaire including selection of households, consistency and handwriting. Team leaders reported progress to the research team on a daily basis and sent completed questionnaires to the research team for further checks and data entry
- Each questionnaire which arrived from the field was visually checked for inconsistencies and quality of hand-writing. Where problems were detected, team leaders were instructed to repeat interviews at the original location
- Data entry was completed on the basis of a double-entry method. Each questionnaire was thus entered twice by separate teams. The two data files were merged and differences resolved. Statisticians checked the data files for inconsistencies, out of range values and potential fakes

Section 4 ⁴ ***The Focus Groups***

The research team operated a total of 20 groups in ten locations across BiH. The research team was headed by a Moderator who guided group discussion, greeted and seated discussants to create familiarity, and explained the rules of interaction. The Moderator was instructed to mingle with discussants during the interval in order to stimulate additional debate.

The Assistant Moderator registered discussants, checked selection criteria, declined access for unsuitable discussants and assisted the Moderator in initial contact management. The Assistant Moderator kept a written record of the groups, recorded

⁴ This section should be read in conjunction with the technical report for the focus groups

pertinent quotations and assisted the Moderator in identifying core themes. Moreover, the Assistant Moderator recorded observations, especially themes and questions which received either lively discussion or muted responses.

The research team was supported by recruiters who either contacted candidate discussants over the telephone or in person. Additionally, the research team was assisted by logistical support. Such support decided how the research team moved forward, organised venues and refreshments, paid discussants for their travel expenses and liaised with local officials. Logistical support also made sure the recording equipment worked at all times.

At each group one or more observers monitored the discussion. Several groups were observed by the UNDP Liaison Officer and the Project Manager.

4.1 Locations

Groups were held in Kotorско, Doboj, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Travnik, Foca, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Pale and Ilijas.

4.2 Recruitment of discussants and selection criteria

All participants experienced forced migration and were displaced within the borders of Ex-Yugoslavia. Most discussants were displaced within BiH.

There were two modes of recruitment. One was via the Master Sample file, kindly provided by the RS Institute of Statistics and BHAS. The Master Sample file contains ca. 80,000 addresses in 1,409 Enumeration Areas. The displacement status and contact details (many also include telephone numbers) of each case is included in this file. This provided an immensely useful resource for recruiting discussants to the groups. The other method was based on personal contact, not least of all to avoid skewing the groups systematically towards people who can afford a land-line telephone. In Gorazde, Pale and Ilijas the recruitment team also recruited via IDP and youth organisations. In Sarajevo, half of the groups were recruited via in-location-interception.

4.3 Key Group Characteristics

Table 4.3 Status, Location, Gender and of Discussants

Code	Return Status	Location	Urban/Rural	Participants
Returnees:				
FG1A	Majority returnees	Doboj	R	Mixed Gender
FG1A	Majority returnees	Doboj	R	Mixed Gender
FG1A	Majority returnees	Sarajevo	U	Mixed Gender
FG1A	Majority returnees	Sarajevo	U	Mixed Gender
FG1A	Majority returnees	Gorazde	R	Mixed Gender
FG1A	Majority returnees	Gorazde	R	Mixed Gender
FG1B	Minority returnees	Travnik	R	Mixed Gender
FG1B	Minority returnees	Travnik	R	Mixed Gender
FG1B	Minority returnees	Foca	R	Mixed Gender
FG1B	Minority returnees	Foca	R	Mixed Gender
FG1D	Majority returnees	Tuzla	R	Women only
FG1D	Majority returnees	Tuzla	R	Women only
Non Returnees:				
FG2A	Non-returnees	Banja Luka	U	Mixed Gender
FG2A	Non-returnees	Banja Luka	U	Mixed Gender
FG2B	Non-returnees	Doboj	U	Women only
Youth Groups:				
FGYG1	Non-returnees	Pale	U	Mixed Gender
FGYG2	Non-returnees	Pale	U	Mixed Gender
FGYG3	Returnees	Ilijas	U/R	Mixed Gender
FGYG4	Returnees	Ilijas	U/R	Mixed Gender
FGYG5	Mixed-status returnees	Sarajevo	U	Mixed Gender

4.4 Debriefs

Immediately after each group the research team ran rigorous debriefs. In the first instance the research team discussed the overall atmosphere in each group, and as an exercise in intuitive analysis gave each group an appropriate name. The Assistant Moderator proposed concrete ideas regarding the group characteristics, key moments during the discussion (e.g. lively or muted response to particular questions) and key discussants and their input. Most of all, the research team utilised debriefs to produce an overall thematic coherence. Rather than losing orientation in details, the research team discussed differences between groups, repetitions and the contribution of each group to the main themes of the research. Debrief notes were of critical importance for the analysis.



Oxford Research International

Main Report
Quantitative Survey

Introduction

This part reports the responses to the questions asked in the questionnaire survey. In order to avoid the possibility of overburdening the text, some of the information required for a comprehensive reading of the data is placed in an Annex. This part of the report therefore requires descriptive support from auxiliary documents. Especially, the corresponding charts, the results in tabular format and the survey questionnaire should be read first and kept at hand. Additional technical material can be found in the Annex.

The sample for this study is relatively large ($N = 3,580$) and is based on a multi-stage random probability selection method. This allows confident inferences from the sample back to the population from which it was drawn. In other words, what is found in the sample is also true for the population of BiH (aged 18+) within a known margin of error. The margin of error is outlined in the technical report. The questionnaire is both extensive and detailed. It includes 70 questions and more than 700 items. Consequently there is a need to summarise both the results and the statistical relationships between variables. In some cases this is achieved with the help of graphical representations.

This report selects what the authors consider to be the key points and there are no claims that the analysis is by any means exhaustive. Once policy-makers prioritise areas of future intervention, further data analysis can yield more targeted and more detailed information. The large sample size will be helpful in segmenting the data in the pursuit of identifying sub-groups and potential beneficiaries.

Two types of statistics are used: descriptive and analytical. Descriptive statistics aim to report the answers given to the questions in the survey¹. They include for example percentages, frequencies and averages (mean scores). In the report they are referred to as 'univariate'. The second type of statistics, analytical or inferential, seek to establish relationships between the different variables in the study. Using inferential statistics it is possible to generalise from sample values to population estimates. Only those findings, which are statistically significant, are reported. In effect this means that only findings, which are likely to be true for the population as a whole, are highlighted. To this end a number of bi- or multi-variate statistical tools are used. They include regressions, factor analysis and correspondence analysis. Each is explained at the point where it is first used.

For the regression analyses, two types of variables, dependent and independent, are mentioned. Generally speaking, dependent variables are those which the report is seeking to explain, independent variables the ones which do the explaining. This is achieved by exploring the degree to which such variables are associated. For example, life satisfaction (dependent variable) is partly determined by income (independent variable). In other tables, life satisfaction appears not as a dependent variable but as an independent one. For example trust in the UN (dependent variable) is partly determined by life satisfaction (independent variable).

¹ Results are shown as valid percent etc. as 'no answer' and 'not sure' remained within a one-digit percentage proportion throughout.

Section 1

General Well-Being, Conditions, Optimism and Migration

1.1 General Well-Being – Life Satisfaction

- BiH citizens are not unhappy ². Most people report above-average life satisfaction. The modal category (59.9%) says 'quite happy' and more than seven in ten respondents agree that their lives are happy ³. Moreover, in international comparisons ⁴, BiH ranks favourably. Looking at a range of post-administrative-centralist countries over the past ten years life satisfaction in BiH is found in the upper part of the rank-order table

Table 1.1.1 – Life Satisfaction in Post-Socialist Transformation Countries (10 = 'Satisfied')

Country	Mean	StD
Slovenia	7.23	2.15
Germany (East)	7.18	2.13
Czech Republic	7.06	1.97
Croatia	6.68	2.30
Kyrgyzstan	6.48	2.57
Poland	6.20	2.53
Slovakia	6.03	2.22
Estonia	5.93	2.18
BiH	5.88	2.38
Hungary	5.80	2.42
Serbia and Montenegro	5.63	2.43
Bulgaria	5.50	2.65
Azerbaijan	5.39	2.29
Latvia	5.27	2.39
Romania	5.23	2.77
Lithuania	5.20	2.66
Albania	5.17	2.25
Macedonia	5.12	2.72
Belarus	4.81	2.21
Russian Federation	4.65	2.57
Ukraine	4.56	2.59
Moldova	4.56	2.32
Armenia	4.32	2.37
Other		
Switzerland	8.02	1.83
United States	7.66	1.82
Germany (West)	7.64	1.74
Sweden	7.64	1.86

- While BiH fails to score as high as Croatia and the Czech Republic, it outscores Hungary, Latvia and the two recent EU accession countries: Romania and Bulgaria. It appears that BiH's many challenges in politics and transformation are not necessarily reflected in life-satisfaction reports
- In terms of estimating personal happiness over time ⁵, there is more stability than change: compared to one year ago, six in ten (61.2%) judge their life satisfaction as 'same' and half the respondents say they expect to be 'same' in one year's time. one in three expects things to get better ⁶. There is no compelling evidence that BiH respondents have over-optimistic aspirations for the future as only a minority expect an improvement in their personal circumstances. Equally, the fact that two in three do not expect improvements makes BiH a transformation country with low levels of optimism at the personal level. For example in a comparable study in post-war Iraq in 2004 using exactly the same question, more than eight in ten respondents said they were either

very or quite optimistic, one in ten said things would remain the same ⁷. Overall, while people agree they are generally fine, and expect to be fine in the future there is little expectation of significant progress

² Q1

³ Combining 'very happy' at 12.0% and 'quite happy' at 59.9%

⁴ The World Values Survey was chosen as the appropriate comparative context. Cf. <http://worldvaluessurvey.org>

⁵ Q2A

⁶ Combining 'much better' at 3.6% and 'somewhat better' at 33.0%

⁷ Survey completed by Oxford Research International using the same question. Valid N = 2,312

- Responses to a question on subjective health show that a (slim) majority of BiH citizens say their health is either 'very good' (11.8%) or 'good' (38.8%). Leaving to one side those with 'fair' health (23.5%) around a quarter (25.9%) report 'poor' or 'very poor'. Taking into account principally unenthusiastic evaluations of the public health sector ⁸, subjective health reports fare reasonably well. However, in a cross-national comparative context BiH performs at the low end of the scale, albeit close to Hungary and Poland. In sum, in subjective health assessments, BiH does not compare favourably

Table 1.1.2 – Subjective Health in Post-Socialist Transformation Countries (1 = 'very good')

Country	Mean	StD
Albania	2.04	0.78
Macedonia	2.14	0.86
China	2.21	1.01
Kyrgyzstan	2.33	0.76
Montenegro	2.34	0.95
Azerbaijan	2.34	0.77
Viet Nam	2.35	0.88
Germany (East)	2.38	0.88
Bulgaria	2.44	1.04
Romania	2.45	0.92
Serbia and Montenegro	2.45	0.90
Czech Republic	2.46	0.87
Slovakia	2.51	0.89
Armenia	2.53	0.86
Hungary	2.59	0.96
Lithuania	2.65	0.87
BiH	2.69	1.08
Poland	2.76	1.08
Moldova	2.98	0.84

- Unsurprisingly, life satisfaction and subjective health evaluations are linked by a robust statistical relationship: a linear regression ⁹ computes the effect of health on happiness, producing a β -score of 0.28 ¹⁰. The correlation coefficient is 0.41 and is statistically significant ¹¹
- Those who report 'fair', 'poor' or 'very poor' health (49.4% combined) were given an opportunity to list common conditions. Perhaps as expected, cardiovascular conditions ¹² feature strongly (31.0%), while anxiety and symptoms of depression are relatively low (11.4%) ¹³ and

affect a mere one in ten

- Similarly, time to fall asleep ¹⁴, a key variable in understanding people's psychological well-being, does not suggest that BiH respondents are plagued by insomnia or worry a great deal. Most (88.6%) slumber within one hour of deciding to go to sleep
- BiH is not a wealthy country. Unsurprisingly, 69.7% (combined score dissatisfied) say they are not satisfied with their finances ¹⁵, 30.4% (combined score) say they are, broadly speaking, satisfied. Other sections will demonstrate that economic issues are a major concern

⁸ Compare with Q11 below

⁹ Linear regression is useful for computing straight line relationships between two variables

¹⁰ Constant (a) 1.47

¹¹ Sig. 0.000

¹² 'The need to take tablets for controlling your blood pressure' (18.0%) and 'problems with your hearth' (13.0%)

¹³ 'Worrying thoughts which kept coming back' (6.9%) and 'periods of unhappiness which was hard to control' (4.5%)

¹⁴ Q5

¹⁵ Q8B

Table 1.1.3 – Satisfaction with Financial Situation (10 = ‘Satisfied’)

Country	Mean	StD
Viet Nam	5.95	2.12
Germany (East)	5.76	2.19
Kyrgyzstan	5.68	2.58
Czech Republic	5.10	2.33
Hungary	4.92	2.18
Albania	4.76	2.23
Slovakia	4.63	2.32
Azerbaijan	4.56	2.22
BiH	4.53	2.48
Macedonia	4.43	2.66
Poland	4.37	2.49
Moldova	4.07	2.26
Lithuania	4.02	2.38
Serbia and Montenegro	3.96	2.42
Romania	3.84	2.34
Bulgaria	3.64	2.19
Armenia	3.63	2.25
Other		
Germany (West)	6.61	2.27
United States	6.51	2.38

- However, BiH is not alone in pessimistic assessments. In fact in cross-national comparisons, BiH fares reasonably well, outpacing successful transition cases including Poland, Lithuania and Romania
- Turning to a measure of enfranchisement. The survey asked respondents to say if they feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives or feel that they have no real effect on what happens to them. A small majority (53.7%) of respondents say they feel autonomous in the sense that they feel in charge of their lives ¹⁶

¹⁶ Q8C

Table 1.1.4 – Life Control in Post-Socialist Transformation Countries
(10 = 'A great deal of control')

Country	Mean	StD
Viet Nam	7.49	2.22
Slovenia	7.17	2.15
Kyrgyzstan	7.06	2.52
Croatia	7.04	2.14
Germany (East)	7.04	1.91
Czech Republic	6.87	2.00
Romania	6.72	2.72
Lithuania	6.36	2.39
Bulgaria	6.29	2.57
Slovakia	6.28	2.26
Hungary	6.20	2.41
BiH	6.16	2.53
Poland	6.14	2.38
Estonia	6.07	2.12
Moldova	6.05	2.44
Albania	6.00	2.21
Serbia and Montenegro	5.95	2.44
Latvia	5.81	2.30
Macedonia	5.77	2.82
Armenia	5.66	2.59
Azerbaijan	5.61	3.01
Belarus	5.61	2.33
Russian Federation	5.51	2.59
Ukraine	5.41	2.61
Other		
United States	7.98	1.82
Germany (West)	7.45	1.72
Sweden	7.42	1.84
Switzerland	7.36	2.11

- In post-socialist transition comparisons, BiH is a mid-field player, ranking close to Poland and Hungary (table 1.1.4)

1.2 Life Areas – Situation in the Neighbourhood

- Respondents were asked to evaluate the current situation in a select number of life areas, as they experience them in their village/neighbourhood. Overall, there is more shadow than light as respondents see four areas principally as negative: medical care, local government services, and, particularly, the two employment-related issues ¹⁷
- Unemployment, as Section 5 below will show, is a key problem in BiH and comprehensively permeates public views on a range of issues
- In a wider context the positive endorsement of 'your family's protection from crime' ¹⁸ is a favourable report on police work. Similarly, the 'availability of education' in the local area is not perceived as problematic
- Computed across all items, local area issues receive a slightly negative overall mean score (2.81) ¹⁹. This finding is somewhat in contrast with overall positive evaluations of personal circumstances

¹⁷ Ref. frequency tables Q11A-C

¹⁸ 'Your family's protection from crime' (10.9%)

- Moreover, looking back and ahead, respondents do not seem to think that there has been, or indeed that there will be much improvement
- At the local-area-level too there appears to be only modest expectations of improvement, paired with a distinct sense of non-progress not to say of stagnation. Across all policy areas the modal categories say things will remain the same. However, among the remainder there are rather more optimistic than pessimistic views

1.3 The Situation in the Country and the Desire to Leave

- The situation in BiH at large, however, receives extremely unfavourable assessments: 'very bad' (32.2%) and 'quite bad' (56.3%). Close to nine in ten people see the situation as negative today, negative in comparison with one year ago, and six in ten see little scope for improvement in one year's time: just four in ten predict things to get better; a view which is broadly shared by the young ²⁰ Most of all seven in ten (70.2%) say things in BiH have not changed compared with one year ago and the modal category (half of the sample or 48.1%) expect no change within the next year. Once more there is a sense of non-progress, this time mixed with extreme negativity about today's situation in BiH
- It is not uncommon that people judge their personal circumstances more favourably than those in the neighbourhood, or indeed in the country at large. In BiH, however, there seem to be extremes: while most people say that personally they are fine, the situation in the country at large is perceived as overwhelmingly negative; with neighbourhood-issues somewhere in between
- Asked if they wish to leave BiH, 38.5% of the total sample say they would if given the opportunity ²¹. Critically however, close to two thirds (62.6%) of people below the age of 30 say they wish to emigrate
- In the yearning for selective out-migration lies one of the fundamental problems of contemporary BiH: the current arrangements appear unable to motivate a majority of its young people to stay in the country. Generally, it is perhaps not uncommon for young people to express the desire to go abroad, if only for a while. However, the visa regime regulating entry into EU countries, does not allow young BiH citizens to emigrate in any significant number, and may thus compound the desire to leave. Unsurprisingly, the policy aim (Q17 below) to change visa regulations may not be a top priority but is expressed most frequently by the young ²²

¹⁹ Coded between 'very good' (=1) and 'very bad' (=4). Obviously, there are concerns about using ordinal variables for the computation of means scores. However, it appears permissible to do so in order to illustrate the overall patterns. Issues associated with the discussion about heteroscedascity should be observed

²⁰ Ref. table 1.3.1 in the Annex (cross tabulation of age and Q32B)

²¹ Q10

²² Ref. table 1.3.2 in the Annex (cross tabulation of age-cohorts and Q10) and table 1.3.3 (cross tabulation of age-cohorts and Q17)

1.4 Individual Differences

- It is possible to explore the different influences on these measures using multivariate analyses. The aim in these analyses is to see if the outcome of interest, for example a wish to leave BiH, is related to a set of predictors such as age, gender, identity²³ and so on. Regression analysis is an appropriate tool for summarising a range of statistical relationships with a dependent variable. The list of predictors used in subsequent models is as follows. A full list can be found in the Annex²⁴. However, the footnotes for each model outline the exact variables used in each

²³ Cf. Q61A and Q61B. For the purposes of this report respondents who say they are BiH citizens in the first instance are referred to as 'primary BiH identity'. Those who identify themselves as Bosniak/Croat/Serb in the first instance but then say they are also BiH citizens are described as 'dual identity'. Respondents who reject BiH citizen's identity are referred to as 'exclusive identity'. For a discussion of identity and the categorisation into 'primary', 'dual' and 'exclusive' identities please refer to Section 9

²⁴ Ref. table 1.4.1 in the Annex

Original Variable Name	Recoded Variable Name	Recoded Values
Q64 - Which of the following best describes your own current employment status?	r64_rec: Employment Status	1 = Employed 2 = Unemployed 3 = Inactive
Q63 - What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?	r63: Education	1 = Low Education 2 = Mid Education 3 = High Education
Region/Canton/District	Ent: Entity	1 = FBiH ²⁵ 2 = Republika Srpska 3 = Brcko
Q59 - Could you please tell me your age?	r59_tito: Socialisation cohort ²⁶	1 = Tito-Era 2 = Post-Tito 3 = War 4 = Post-war
Q3 - All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...?	r3: Health	0 = Other 1 = Very good/good
Q1 - Taking all things together, would you say you are?	r1: Life Satisfaction	0 = Not satisfied/Other 1 = Satisfied
Q70 - What is your religion?	r70: Religion	1 = Roman Catholic 2 = Christian Orthodox 3 = Other 4 = Muslim
Q68a - What is your monthly net household income in KM? (How much money do you actually receive each month?) By net household income I mean all the cash incomes of your household	r68a: Income (KM) Categorised	1 = Low (<300) 2 = Mid (301-1000) 3 = High (>1001)
Q12 - How interested would you say you are in politics?	r12: Political Interest	0 = No interest/other 1 = Interest
Q45a - When do you think the involvement of the UN in BiH should end or should it be involved in BiH for many years to come?	r45a_rec: UN to Leave	0 = UN stay 1 = UN Leave
Q55 - How often do you follow the news, on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?	r55: Following the news	0 = Other 1 = Weekly
Q23 - Some people say that there is a lot of corruption by officials in BiH, others think there is little or none. How about you, what do you think?	r23_rec: Official Corruption	0 = Other 1 = Corrupt
Q48/51- Have you ever been displaced? By displacement I mean fleeing or leaving your home to avoid violence [...] Have you returned to the village/neighbourhood where you were originally displaced from or not?	disp_ret: Displacement and Return Status	1 = Returnee 2 = Non-returnee 3 = Non-displaced
Q61ab - Which of the following best describes you? (Above all, I am a citizen of BiH; Above all, I am a Bosniak, Croat, Serb; Other)	R61ab: Identity	1 = Exclusive identity 2 = Dual identity 3 = Primary BiH identity

²⁵ Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

²⁶ For an explanation please refer to the footnote in table 1.4.1

- These predictors represent some of the key demographic, socio-economic, subjective and identity measures. The results of the multivariate analyses show which of these predictors have significant relationships with the outcome of interest, after taking into account the other predictors also included in the model. The beta coefficients thus show the net effects of each variable. The larger the beta coefficient (β - shown in the first column of each table), the stronger the relationship. The second column in each table gives the standard error (S.E.), which is a measure of the extent of sampling error involved with the relevant coefficient. It provides the level of confidence in the prediction from sample to the population. In the tables which summarise the result of each multivariate analysis, only those coefficients which were statistically significant are reported: and coefficients which accurately reflect the picture in the population as a whole from which the sample has been drawn. In some cases, the absence of a predictor from the list of significant β -scores is as important as its presence

Table 1.4.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction ²⁷

	β	S.E.
Income – High compared with low	1.31	0.21
Subjective health – Very good/good compared with other	1.13	0.09
Income – High compared with middle	0.88	0.21
Socialisation cohort ²⁸ – Post-war compared with Tito-era	0.74	0.16
Education – High compared with low	0.71	0.16
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.49	0.17
Gender – Female compared with male	0.23	0.09
<i>Constant (α)</i>	3.35	0.64

- Life satisfaction is strongly affected by income and subjective health. More moderate effects come from age (especially the youngest age-cohort), education and finally gender. The fact that income makes such a large difference highlights the significance of economic themes for the way respondents feel about their lives
- As outlined above, in regression analysis, predictors which do not emerge in the final step of the model are sometimes as interesting as the significant ones that are included in the final model. In this case the absence of religion, self-identification, displacement status and employment are noteworthy. Specifically, this means that life satisfaction is independent of identity and religious affiliation

²⁷ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r1 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 q61a r68a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [6] steps. N = 3,546

²⁸ Age was recoded according to the era in which respondents were socialised. It was assumed that political socialisation usually happens between the ages of 15 and 21. Bosnian history was divided into four main eras, Tito-era and before (until 1980), Post-Tito era (1981-1991), the war period (1992-1995) and post war (1996-). This recode produced the following categories: Tito-era, 49.4%, Post-Tito, 23.1%, War, 12.0%, Post-war, 15.6%. There are no missing cases

Table 1.4.2 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Leaving BiH ²⁹

	β	S.E.
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	1.58	0.12
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.58	0.12
Income – Middle compared with high	0.46	0.15
Income – Low compared with high	0.40	0.15
Entity – Brcko compared with FBiH	0.37	0.08
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.34	0.14
Employment – Inactive compared with employed	0.33	0.10
Employment – Unemployed compared with employed	0.31	0.11
Gender – Male compared with female	0.20	0.08
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-0.25	0.18

- In the case of people's wish to leave BiH - if given the chance - the strongest predictors are socialisation generation (especially the youngest, post-war cohort). There are also modest (and rather small) effects of income and unemployment, with people on the highest incomes being least likely to wish to migrate
- Interestingly, neither displacement status nor religion or self-identification is associated with the wish to migrate

Table 1.4.3 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Health ³⁰

	β	S.E.
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	2.16	0.14
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	1.30	0.15
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	1.14	0.09
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.87	0.17
Employment – Employed compared with unemployed	0.54	0.11
Education – High compared with low	0.51	0.14
Gender – Male compared with female	0.34	0.08
Employment – Employed compared with inactive	0.26	0.11
<i>Constant (α)</i>	2.28	0.18

- Perhaps unsurprisingly, age has the greatest impact on the way respondents feel about their state of health; the youngest age-cohorts being most likely to feel healthy. At the same time, life satisfaction plays an important role. Further down the table there are modest effects from employment, education and gender
- Once more, religion, self-identification and displacement status do not feature

²⁹ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r10 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r68a q61a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [6]steps. N = 3,489

³⁰ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r3 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r70 q61a r1 r68a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 3,546

Table 1.4.4 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Standard of Living ³¹

	β	S.E.
Income – High compared with low	0.92	0.14
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	0.88	0.12
Income – High compared with middle	0.69	0.14
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	0.62	0.11
Education – High compared with low	0.62	0.14
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.47	0.13
Education – High compared with middle	0.38	0.12
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.34	0.15
Employment – Employed compared with inactive	0.29	0.12
Displacement and return – Non-displaced compared with non-returnees	0.29	0.13
<i>Constant (a)</i>	0.71	0.17

- As expected, and in keeping with table 1.4.1 income makes the greatest difference to the way respondents feel about their standard of living but there are also sizeable effects from socialisation cohort (where younger people tend to feel better off), education and life satisfaction. Education is also of some importance. Respondents with the highest educational achievements are more positive about their standard of living than others
- Interesting is that there is only a small effect from employment and displacement status where non-displaced respondents feel marginally better off than non-returnees. In effect this means that displacement status is only a minor predictor of subjective living standards
- Once more, religion and self-identification are absent from the list of significant parameter estimates for comparative living standards

1.5 Section Summary

- Overall, BiH respondents feel happier, wealthier and less worried than one might predict, given the extremely negative evaluation of macro-spheres. Most people also feel in charge of their lives. On most cross-national comparative rank-order tables, BiH finds itself around the middle, often close to top-performers of other transition countries such as Hungary and Poland. Subjective health scores, however, do not compare favourably with other transition countries
- There is a large chasm between assessments of personal and public spheres: virtually unanimously, BiH citizens are negative about their country and, with the exception of education and police work, have few good things to say about conditions in their immediate social environment. Especially employment conditions feature strongly in negative reports. Overall, negative reports may indicate low confidence in communal structures ³²
- There is more standstill than change in feel-good assessments at all three levels: personal, neighbourhood and national. Considering that BiH is also a transformation

³¹ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r9c /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r68a q61a r1 disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator(1) /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [6]steps. N = 3,546

³² However, one should remember that an assessment of personal circumstances can be contaminated by positive prestige bias: respondents tend to overstate their personal circumstances in order to impress the interviewer. Notwithstanding, this would affect all transition countries and is less common in face-to-face interviewing where the interviewer visits the respondent at home

country, there is only a modest sense of optimism and a majority of respondents say nothing has changed in the past year and many expect that nothing will change in the next twelve months

- A large majority of BiH's young have low commitment to the country as they would like to migrate abroad if they had the opportunity. This appears as one of the central themes emerging from this section
- Feel-good variables are affected by income, age and, moderately by employment and displacement status
- Religion and identity do not play a role in life satisfaction, the desire to emigrate, subjective health and indeed in subjective living standards. In other words, neither identity nor displacement serve as (important) predictors in measures which gauge how people feel about themselves, their wish to stay or go or the way they see their economic circumstances

Section 2 Trust

2.1 Social Trust

- With a World Values Survey variable exploring social trust, the survey at hand included a cross-national comparative, base-line measure of social cohesion ³³

Table 2.1.1 – Social Trust
'Others can be trusted' in %

China	54.5
Germany (East)	43.4
Belarus	41.9
Viet Nam	41.1
Montenegro	33.7
Ukraine	26.9
Bulgaria	26.8
Lithuania	25.9
Armenia	24.7
Czech Republic	24.6
Albania	24.4
Russian Federation	24.0
Estonia	23.5
Hungary	22.4
Croatia	20.5
Azerbaijan	20.5
Serbia	18.8
Poland	18.4
Latvia	17.1
Kyrgyzstan	16.7
Slovakia	15.9
Moldova	14.6
Macedonia	13.7
Romania	10.1
BiH	7.2

OtherGermany (West)31.9

- It appears that people in BiH do not trust each other very much. In fact, with only around one in 14 respondents (7.2%) saying you can trust other people, there appears to be a virtual breakdown in social trust
- International comparisons relegate BiH to the bottom of the global transformation-country league
- Similarly in fairness scores ³⁴, BiH is close to the bottom of international league tables. Only two in ten expect fair treatment from others

Table 2.1.2 – Fairness
'Others will be fair' in %

China	79.6
Viet Nam	72.6
Serbia	48.4
Montenegro	45.0
Kyrgyzstan	44.6
Albania	42.5
Macedonia	30.6
BiH	19.2
Moldova	16.8
Other	
Sweden	87.4
United States	61.7

2.2 Trust in Institutions

- Trust scores tend to serve as a commentary on the experiences of current institutional circumstances, not necessarily on structural arrangements
- The mean of mean trust scores for eleven institutions in BiH is 2.74 ³⁵. This indicates that, broadly speaking; there is more mistrust than trust

³³ Q6; It is not altogether clear that the use of dichotomised items 'most people can be trusted' vs. 'one has to be very careful in dealing with people' as done in WVS is necessarily the ideal way of measuring social trust. However, the BiH national survey included this variable purely for the purpose of international comparison

³⁴ Q7

³⁵ Coded between 'very much trust' (=1) and 'no trust at all' (=4). Obviously, there are concerns about using ordinal variables for the computation of means scores. However, it appears permissible to do so in order to illustrate the overall patterns of trust. Issues associated with the discussion about heteroscedascity should be observed

- Notwithstanding, the police, public service TV and municipal authorities are the most trusted institutions. At the other end of the scale, political parties, the state government in Sarajevo and the UN are not much trusted
- High trust for public service TV in conjunction with TV as the most trusted source of news ³⁶ (not radio or print) suggests that BiH is predominantly a TV nation
- The high trust score for the police strongly correlates with the finding that people feel reasonably well protected from crime ³⁷. This finding may provide an interesting commentary on ongoing efforts to reform the force
- As far as international organisations are concerned, the data indicate that they are mostly mistrusted. One exception is the EU where the sample is virtually split between trust and mistrust. Comparatively high trust towards the EU is consistent with other findings outlined below ³⁸
- The UN scores lowest among international organisations, with two thirds (67.6% combined scores) of the sample expressing mistrust. However, differences (mean scores) to other international organisations are within margins of error. The fact that trust levels for the UN are close to OHR ³⁹ scores may provide challenges: the OHR is widely recognised as a dying institution
- Factor analysis helps to unveil latent constructs. In practice it is a good method for grouping items and revealing underlying statistical associations. Factor analysis is a statistical data reduction technique used to explain variability among observed variables in terms of fewer unobserved random variables called factors. The observed variables are modelled as linear combinations of the factors, plus 'error' terms

Table 2.2.1 Factor Analysis – Institutional Trust ⁴⁰

Factor	1 International Organisations	2 National Institutions
State Government in Sarajevo	0.48	0.32
United Nations	0.82	0.13
Police	0.12	0.69
EU	0.76	0.17
Government in RS/Federation	0.04	0.74
OHR	0.87	0.06
EUFOR	0.87	0.05
FTV and/or RTRS	0.08	0.63
Political Parties	0.15	0.63
The Courts	0.25	0.65
Your Municipal Authority	0.06	0.70

- All international organisations load in excess of 0.81 on Factor 1 (table 2.2.1). This indicates that respondents showed near-uniformity when awarding their trust scores to international organisations. A partial exception is the EU, which loads marginally lower (0.76), showing that it is slightly distinct

³⁶ Please refer to Q56 in Section 9

³⁷ With Q11, Spearman's $r = 0.30$, Sig. .000

³⁸ e.g. Q35

³⁹ Office of the High Representative

⁴⁰ Varimax rotation. Principal component analysis. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. As a rule of thumb, values of less than 0.50 are not deemed strong enough to take into account

- The underlying association for the national government in Sarajevo is interesting: it loads more with international organisations (0.48) than with national institutions (0.32). This somewhat signifies a sense of externality to the key institution of overarching political unity
- On Factor 2, national institutions, except for the national government, load between 0.63 and 0.74. Interestingly, public service TV emerges as part of national institutions

2.3 Individual Differences

- As outlined above, logistic regression helps to identify the effects of predictors (independent variables) on binary dependent variables. The full list of predictors is shown in Section 1 above

Table 2.3.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Social Fairness ⁴¹

	β	S.E.
Gender – Female compared with male	0.31	0.09
Entity – Brcko compared with FBiH	0.27	0.09
Displacement and return – Returnees compared with non-displaced	0.24	0.10
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-1.53	0.15

- For social fairness ⁴² there are three moderate to weak effects. Women, Brcko residents and returnees are more likely to feel that others will deal fairly with them
- Absent are religion, identity, and economic variables such as income and employment

Table 2.3.2 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Trust Government in Sarajevo ⁴³

	β	S.E.
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox ⁴⁴	1.31	0.15
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.62	0.14
Displacement and return – Returnees compared with non-displaced	0.36	0.10
Education – Low compared with high	0.31	0.14
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-1.24	0.40

- In institutional trust however, religion plays a major role. The State government in Sarajevo is more trusted by Muslims than by Christians, especially Orthodox. Returnees tend to be slightly more trusting than the non-displaced and there is also a small effect from education
- Interesting is the absence of life satisfaction, economic measures and age. In other words, economic considerations do not impact on the way respondents perceive the

⁴¹ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r7 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r1 r70 q61a r68a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [4]steps. N = 3,546

⁴² Q7

⁴³ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r20_1 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r1 r68a q61a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [4]steps. N = 3,546

⁴⁴ There was also an effect from 'Muslim compared with other' (β 0.71 and S.E 0.32). However, due to the small number of 'other' (N = 79) this effect was excluded from the table

State government. Trust in the State government thus does not appear to be affected by rational economic considerations

Table 2.3.3 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Trust UN ⁴⁵

	β	S.E.
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox	0.72	0.14
Entity – RS ⁴⁶ compared with FBiH	0.66	0.32
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.37	0.12
Displacement and return – Returnees compared with non-displaced	0.37	0.09
Education – Low compared with high	0.31	0.13
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	0.25	0.09
Subjective health – Very good/good compared with other	0.22	0.08
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-1.16	0.35

- Once more religion and not rational economic considerations affect trust scores: Muslims appear more trusting than affiliates of the Christian denominations, although the effects are considerably more moderate than for the State government in Sarajevo. The fact that both RS-residents and returnees tend to trust the UN may be a commentary on the UN's work
- There are also small effects from education (low), life satisfaction and subjective health
- The absence of age and gender from the list of significant predictors demonstrates that there are no systematic demographic differences in trust towards the UN

2.4 Section Summary

- Social trust in BiH is virtually non-existent: cross-national comparisons relegate BiH to the last position. Also, people in BiH do not expect much fairness from their fellow citizens
- Respondents trust the police before any other institution. On balance, public service TV and municipal authorities are also trusted
- Except for the EU, all international organisations are met with more mistrust than trust
- The UN is the most mistrusted international agency; two thirds express their mistrust. However, the gap to other international organisations is small. The UN's trust scores are close to those of a dying institution, the OHR
- Respondents do not distinguish much between different international organisations. The UN does not emerge as distinct. Overall, international organisations appear as an undifferentiated aggregation which, on balance, respondents do not much trust
- Factor analysis extracts a clear grouping for international organisations on the one hand and national institutions on the other. The exception is the State government in Sarajevo, which does not really load on either and appears in an indeterminate situation

⁴⁵ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r20_2 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r1 r68a q61a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [6]steps. N = 3,546

⁴⁶ Republic of Srpska

- As was the case for feel-good measures in Section 1, social fairness is unaffected by religion and identity. However, in institutional trust religion matters a great deal. There are also effects from Entity. The State government, and to a lesser degree the UN do not do particularly well among the Christians of BiH
- Trust in the State government in Sarajevo and in the UN is virtually independent of rational economic considerations

Section 3

Displacement, Diaspora and Return

3.1 Displacement and Return – The Facts

- Four in ten (40.2% or 1,438) respondents say they experienced forced migration ⁴⁷
- Just over half (54.8% or 788) report that they were displaced once, leaving 45.2% (or 650) who experienced multiple displacements
- Out of the 650 respondents who were displaced, more than once ⁴⁸, one third (32.5%) were displaced twice, close to one third (29.1%) three times and about one quarter (25.4%) five times and more ⁴⁹. It appears that for about half of the BiH population who experienced forced migration, displacement was a history of multiple moves. In a few cases, respondents say they were displaced more than ten times
- As for locations ⁵⁰, about four in ten (43.4% or 624 ⁵¹) of the 1,438 who were displaced did not go far and remained within their Entity ⁵². A further two in ten (19.9%) stayed within BiH but went to the other Entity. Therefore, about two thirds (63.3% or 910 cases) remained within the borders of BiH. They represent the number of migrants who can be considered as IDPs ⁵³. The remaining 35.1% (or 504 cases) are strictly speaking refugees as they went beyond the borders of BiH ⁵⁴
- In sum therefore, 40.2% of the BiH population above the age of 18 experienced forced migration. One quarter (25.4%) of the total sample ⁵⁵ are IDPs, 14.1% are refugees. The rest were never displaced

3.2 Displacement and Return – Individual Differences

- In order to provide a systematic comparison of non-displaced respondents, returnees and non-returnees across key variables two approaches were taken
 - 1 Displacement and returnee status was included as a predictor in most regression analyses throughout this report
 - 2 Multinomial regression ⁵⁶ analysis was chosen to summarise the differences between the three categories along the lines of demographic, socio-economic and life-satisfaction/subjective health variables

⁴⁷ Q48

⁴⁸ Q49

⁴⁹ 13.1% were displaced four times

⁵⁰ Q50A; This bullet makes reference to both single and multiple displacements

⁵¹ This includes both single and multiple displacements

⁵² Reminder: at the time of displacement, Entities had not yet been created

⁵³ Internally displaced person

⁵⁴ 24 respondents who say they are displaced do not provide an answer to Q50A/B (1.6%)

⁵⁵ Valid cases only

⁵⁶ Multinomial logistic regression uses more than two items in the dependent variable

Table 3.2.1 – Multinomial Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Displacement and return ⁵⁷

	Non-returnees compared with non-displaced		Returnees compared with non-displaced	
	β	S.E.	β	S.E.
Residency – Urban compared with rural	0.52	0.10	-	-
Residency – Rural compared with urban	-	-	0.50	0.09
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	0.52	0.16	-	-
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.47	0.16	-	-
Employment – Unemployed compared with inactive	0.42	0.13	0.23	0.10
Employment – Inactive compared with employed	-	-	0.25	0.12
Standard of living – Other compared with above average	0.28	0.13	-	-

- The above shows net effects compared with non-displaced respondents
- Generally, effects are moderate to weak. Inverse values on residency confirm that non-returnees are slightly more likely to be in urban areas, returnees more in the countryside. To some degree this underlines the remaining urbanisation-dimension in displacement
- Non-returnees tend to be younger but there is no inverse value for returnees. Employment makes a small difference in the sense that non-returnees tend to be more unemployed (compared with inactive) and returnees are more likely to be inactive compared with employed. There is also a small effect from perceived standard of living
- Life satisfaction, subjective health, education and markedly income do not play a role. Also, there is no significant effect from perceived standard of living
- Overall, compared with other analyses in this report, the parameter estimates for displacement status are moderate or weak. They do not mark out returnees and non-returnees as special-needs groups which require immediate attention. The results also help to put comments made by discussants in the focus group into a quantitative context

3.3 Views on Displacement and Return

- The survey administered a battery of seven opposing statements on displacement and return and asked respondents to scale their views between one and ten. This battery preceded any questions about respondent's displacement status
- Was the policy to return displaced people to their former homes right or wrong? Overwhelmingly, respondents say the policy was right: nine in ten (91.2% combined agreement) agree with this statement. Two thirds (68.0%) choose '1' indicating unconditional agreement
- Feelings towards people who experienced forced migration are principally governed by compassion. Two thirds of (66.3%) of respondents insist that those who were displaced

⁵⁷NOMREG disp_ret BY urb_rur r1 r3 r68a r59_tito r64 r63 r9c /CRITERIA = CIN(95) DELTA(0) MXITER(100) MXSTEP(5) LCONVERGE(0) PCONVERGE(1.0E-6) SINGULAR(1.0E-8) /FULLFACTORIAL /INTERCEPT = INCLUDE /PRINT = PARAMETER SUMMARY LRT .
N = 3,560

were, in any, case worse off, irrespective of any assistance they may have received. The rest (33.6%) suspects that displaced people were over-compensated ⁵⁸

- However, the delivery system for assistance to displaced people is overwhelmingly perceived as corrupt: nine in ten respondents (89.3%) allege that fraud corrupted the process somewhere along the line. A mere 4.4% choose '10' and say the process was honest ⁵⁹. Notwithstanding, linear regression ⁶⁰ shows that visions of corruption in the return process do make a difference to the way respondents perceive corruption in the official sector (0.18 ⁶¹), and indeed, among international organisations (IO) (0.13 ⁶²). In other words, if respondents say that corrupt processes influenced the way assistance was administered to displaced people, they are also more likely to take a dim view of official and IO corruption
- Asked to choose between a continuation of post-war agreements governing displacement and return issues, or leaving such issues where they are now, close to two thirds (63.6%) choose '1', thus entirely agreeing with the continuation of post-war agreements. Cumulative agreement amounts to 89.5%. This is a powerful mandate for the preservation of the legal basis for return. It remains to be seen how this mandate for continued support will fare when exposed to the competition from other policy aims in Section 6 ⁶³
- Respondents somewhat favour returnees over non-returnees. There is broad agreement that the displaced should still be able to return to a place of their choice: eight in ten (78.5%) respondents say that returnees should be welcome wherever they choose to return ⁶⁴. Similarly, the sustainability of return is supported too: three quarters (74.5%) confirm that returnees deserve continued assistance to settle in their communities. For non-returnees support is much less enthusiastic: half (48.5%) say that non-returnees should now be responsible for their own future. The other half maintains that non-returnees should receive assistance wherever they are now. The range of opinions on this matter is expressed by the largest standard deviation in this response set: 3.63

Table 3.3.1 – Mean Scores Attitudes to Displacement and Return by Displacement Status ⁶⁵

<i>Numbers in brackets indicate which way an item is coded. The midpoint is 5.5</i>	Returnee		Non-Returnee		Non-Displaced	
	Mean	StD	Mean	StD	Mean	StD
(1) Continue vs. ending (10) logistics of return	2.0	2.1	3.1	2.9	2.4	2.4
(1) Supporting vs. not supporting non-returnees	5.5	3.8	4.7	3.6	6.1	3.5
(1) Ending vs. continuing sustainability of return	8.2	2.8	7.8	2.9	7.6	3.0
(1) Assistance corrupt vs. honest	3.0	2.6	2.8	2.1	3.1	2.5
(1) Assisted returnees better off vs. worse	7.8	2.8	7.6	2.8	6.9	3.1
(1) Displaced now stay vs. return	8.6	2.4	7.7	2.9	8.2	2.5
(1) Returns process right vs. wrong	1.7	1.8	3.2	2.8	2.3	2.3

⁵⁸ The remaining respondents do not give no answer (2.3%)

⁵⁹ A cumulative 10.8% say it was honest

⁶⁰ As Q23 and Q25 are near impossible to dichotomise, linear regression was preferred to logistic regression and the dependent variables were, for a broad indication, treated as interval - level

⁶¹ Standardised β . Standard error = 0.009

⁶² Again standardised β . Standard error = 0.006

⁶³ Q46

⁶⁴ 58.0% entirely agree with this idea

⁶⁵ StD = Standard Deviation. Lowest N = 3,390 and highest N = 3,568

- Overall, the differences between non-displaced respondents, returnees and non-returnees on views regarding displacement and return are rather small, many are within margins of error. A small difference exists in the assessment of the rights and wrongs of return as such, where returnees are more enthusiastic in saying 'right'. There is also very slight disagreement over supporting non-returnees
- Given return was one key theme of post-war BiH, views on the displaced and the process which either took them back to their old homes or made them stay in their host community are remarkably homogeneous and are not sectional but commonly shared in society at large. It appears that return is not (or no longer) a contentious issue

3.4 Views about the Diaspora

- Section 4 below will demonstrate that, from the perspective of policy priorities for the next twelve months, returning the Diaspora is not a key issue. However, with the OHR press release of 13 April 2007 ⁶⁶ and potential subsequent policy initiatives it may become more salient. Questions about the Diaspora ⁶⁷ were asked after policy aims ⁶⁸ to avoid response contamination
- Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a range of attitude statements regarding the Diaspora. A small majority (56.5% combined scores ⁶⁹) disagrees with the idea that the Diaspora ⁷⁰ 'left when we all suffered, they might find it difficult to be accepted back here'. The idea that the Diaspora is not part of a 'community of sufferers' is therefore, on balance, rejected
- Overwhelmingly accepted however, is the notion that the Diaspora should stay abroad in order to send remittances to their families in BiH (84.0% combined scores). Apparently, this is an economic theme and it receives very strong endorsement. Equally, the notion that the Diaspora live better lives abroad and would therefore not wish to return to BiH, is accepted by a virtually identical proportion of respondents (84.3% combined). This clearly maps out the economic dimension of the Diaspora. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a factor analysis ⁷¹ shows that these two items load powerfully on Factor 1 (0.85 and 0.83 respectively). There appears to be an economic theme underlying the evaluation

Table 3.4.1 Factor Analysis – Views about the Diaspora

Factor	1 Economic	2 Pro-Return	3 Rejection
Difficult to be accepted back	0.06	0.01	0.98
They should stay abroad	0.85	0.02	0.00
Have a positive impact	0.10	0.86	-0.16
Have a better life abroad	0.83	-0.13	0.07
Return is natural	-0.27	0.76	0.21

- Beyond economic considerations, respondents also agree that, at the end of the day, Bosnians are Bosnians wherever they are: the Diaspora belongs in BiH and should thus come home (71.5% combined scores). In other words, a return would be natural.

⁶⁶ Cf. www.ohr.int

⁶⁷ Q43 and Q44

⁶⁸ Q17

⁶⁹ Combining 'somewhat disagree' at 26.7% and 'entirely disagree' at 29.8%

⁷⁰ Q43

⁷¹ Rotation converged in 5 iterations

At surface-level there appears to be a contradiction between respondents' wishes that the Diaspora both come home and stay away. However, this conflict may be resolved if one considers that staying away may be perceived as a temporary economic solution but that return is natural and more of a long-term ambition. It is not something which features among policy priorities for the next twelve months

- Respondents also see that a returning Diaspora would make an important difference to BiH (63.4% combined agreement). Interestingly, this loads on Factor 2 with 'return is natural' in the factor analysis. This shows that respondents see a benefit in the long-term ambition of returning the BiH Diaspora to the country
- In order to specify the sort of difference a returning Diaspora could make to BiH, respondents were asked ⁷² to agree or disagree with attitude statements regarding the prospects of a returning Diaspora. Again, economic themes stand out
- 'Bring back their savings' is a statement which nearly nine in ten respondents endorse (88.9% combined scores). Similarly, 'bring back their skills' is met with resounding approval (86.1% combined). A returning Diaspora which could be 'creating employment' is envisaged by seven in ten (69.0% combined). Once more economics matter
- Conversely, six in ten respondents disagree with the idea that a returning Diaspora could 'take our jobs (61.1% combined disagreement scores) or make life tougher for local businesses (59.9% combined). In other words, a returning Diaspora is not generally perceived as an economic threat
- At the same time six in ten respondents feel that a returning Diaspora would not have a cultural impact: 'to make BiH more civilised' is rejected (64.2% combined disagreement). Regarding the integration of a returning Diaspora seven in ten people suspect that a returning Diaspora may 'behave as if they are superior' (69.2% combined agreement) and 64.0% fear that returnees would 'find it hard to fit in with our ways' (combined agreement). It appears that any reservations which exist about a returning Diaspora are of a cultural and attitudinal - and not of an economic - nature

Table 3.4.2 Factor Analysis – Views About Returning Diaspora

Factor	1 Advantages	2 Disadvantages	3 Non-integration
Take our jobs	-0.11	0.77	-0.05
Bring their savings	0.49 ⁷³	0.27	-0.51
Behave as superior	-0.11	0.70	0.03
Make BiH more civilised	0.70	-0.06	0.02
Make life tougher for local businesses	0.01	0.70	0.15
Bring back their skills	0.72	-0.11	0.09
Will find it hard to fit in	0.12	0.22	0.86
Create employment	0.77	-0.11	-0.09

- Factor analysis ⁷⁴ shows that socio-economic advantages load on Factor 1. The disadvantages (and threats) of a returning Diaspora load on Factor 2 and 'will find it

⁷² Q44

⁷³ This result is marginally below the rule-of-thumb threshold. Cf. above

⁷⁴ Rotation converged in 6 iterations

hard to fit in' loads positively on Factor 3, while 'bring back their savings' loads negatively

- In sum, there is a clear distinction between the pros and cons of a returning Diaspora in factors 1 and 2. In a way, the view that a returning Diaspora would find it hard to fit in is moderated by the idea that, nevertheless, they would be bringing their savings

3.5 Section Summary

- About four in ten respondents experienced forced migration. 25.4% qualify as IDPs, the remaining number are refugees
- At the quantitative level there is a story of success: more than six in ten persons in the sample who say they experienced forced migration were able to return to their kin communities and former homes. In effect this means that one of the major consequences of the war, namely displacement was somewhat ameliorated
- Except for a smallish effect from employment status, there are no significant economic differences between displaced and non-displaced respondents. This study thus shows that on the merit of people's own reports displacement did not expel returnees and non-returnees from the economic mainstream. That in itself is a major achievement
- Regarding attitudes to the displaced, overall, responses are remarkably supportive: when it comes to the displaced, there is a distinct sense of compassion and solidarity. At this level, there appears to be solid support for both continued return and the sustainability of return. However, people believe that the assistance-delivery-system is corrupt, and that non-returnees are somewhat less deserving. Remarkably, responses do not differ much between displaced and non-displaced respondents
- At face value, respondents enthusiastically agree with the continuation of return: morally, legally and operationally. It remains to be seen (Section 6 below) how support for returnees will fare when exposed to the competition of other policy areas
- When it comes to the Diaspora, economic themes dominate. BiH citizens who once fled abroad and now make a living in their host communities are predominantly perceived as a potential economic asset to BiH. Respondents are clear that a returning Diaspora would have a positive impact on the country. The Diaspora is not outside a 'community of sufferers' and its long-term return natural. However, for the moment and for economic reasons they should stay abroad but eventually return home
- The final return of the Diaspora emerges as a long-term aspiration
- Should the Diaspora return, respondents clearly see the socio-economic advantages such as capital investment, skills transfer and job-creation, though the idea of a positive cultural impact ('make BiH more civilised') is rejected. Return is not perceived as a threat to jobs or local businesses. At the same time, respondents are also clear that the integration of a returning Diaspora may provide both attitudinal and cultural challenges

Section 4 The World of Politics

4.1 Essential Measures – Citizens and the State

- There are a number of measures which help to outline the relationship between BiH citizens and politics

Table 4.1.1 – Not at all interested in politics

Country	Not at all interested in %	N =
Viet Nam	3.3	1,000
Lithuania	8.6	1,018
Czech Republic	8.6	1,908
China	8.8	1,000
Moldova	8.9	1,008
Germany (East)	8.9	999
Latvia	11.6	1,200
Armenia	12.7	2,000
Slovakia	14.6	1,095
Estonia	15.0	1,021
Kyrgyzstan	15.2	1,043
Ukraine	15.9	1,195
Belarus	16.3	1,000
Bulgaria	16.8	1,000
Russian Federation	18.7	2,500
Macedonia	19.3	1,055
Croatia	23.1	1,196
Serbia	23.2	1,200
Romania	23.8	1,239
Hungary	24.3	650
Slovenia	24.5	1,006
Azerbaijan	24.8	2,002
Albania	25.7	1,000
Poland	25.7	1,095
BiH	33.3	3,580

- Political interest is low. One third (33.3%) claim that they 'are not at all interested' in politics⁷⁵. In fact, BiH outperforms all other WVS transformation countries in terms of 'no interest at all'. If those endorsing 'not very interested' are combined with 'not at all interested', the figure is close to six in ten respondents (56.9%)
- For those below the age of 30 the number of non-interested approaches two in three (64.2% combined). In essence this means that at the cognitive level most young people are outside the political process

OtherUnited States11.11,200Germany
(West)11.91,037Sweden12.01,009Switzerland18.71,212

Table 4.1.2 – Logistic

Regression – Dependent Variable: Political Interest⁷⁶

	β	S.E.
Education – High compared with low	0.90	0.13
Socialisation cohort – Tito-era compared with post-war	0.84	0.11
Gender – Male compared with female	0.66	0.07
Socialisation cohort – Post-Tito compared with post-war	0.59	0.12
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.50	0.12
Education – High compared with mid	0.47	0.12
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	0.42	0.08
Income – High compared with low	0.41	0.14
Socialisation cohort – War compared with post-war	0.41	0.14
Displacement and return – Non-returnees compared with non-displaced	0.26	0.10
<i>Constant (a)</i>	-0.13	0.17

⁷⁵ Q12

⁷⁶ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r12 /METHOD=FSSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r68a q61a r1 disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [7]steps. N = 3,546

- Logistic regression shows that political interest is affected by (high) education, gender and, as expected age: better-educated, middle-aged and male respondents are more likely to be interested. Moderate effects come from religion, life satisfaction, income and, in a minor way, displacement status
- Returning to the univariate level, all forms of political participation ⁷⁷ are relatively low. Strikingly, almost twice as many respondents say they have voted in elections, than have talked with other people about politics ⁷⁸. More active types of political participation have only a small minority of adherents
- One in eight respondents (12.8%) would consider violence in the pursuit of political ends, 6.2% say they have used violence in the past (19.0% combined). Unfortunately, this question was not asked by World Values Survey researchers in other transition countries. Nevertheless, there are some comparisons from established democracies with no recent history of war: in Spain there is a combined score of 7.6% and in France 9.1% ⁷⁹. It is therefore not entirely unusual that respondents give such answers, even in Western Europe. The BiH value is more than twice that of France, yet one needs to consider both BiH's recent violent past and its status as a transition country
- As mentioned above, there appears to be a disjunction between voting behaviour and interest in politics. Surprisingly, over three in five (60.4%) who say they are 'not at all' interested in politics nevertheless claim to have voted in the last election. In other words, there is a sizeable minority among BiH voters who say they vote but take no interest in political matters. There are two plausible explanations: one is that to some respondents voting is somewhat ritualistic and involves little cognitive effort. The other is that questions about voting behaviour are affected by response bias in interviewing
- Three quarters of respondents say they voted in the last general election ⁸⁰. This is inconsistent with actual turnout on 1 October 2006 ⁸¹. Either electoral participation items attracted social-desirability bias (as suggested above), and/or improvements to the electoral register have yet to remove all inconsistencies brought about by a high-migration electorate. It is possible that both factors are at work
- Of those who state they did not vote (25.3%), a large proportion rationalise their abstention with logistical factors such as incapacity, an inability to get to the polling station and other non-politically-related reasons. (41.7% combined scores). Less than half (46.0% combined scores) give reasons which indicate alienation from the political process such as 'I found it difficult to choose a party to represent my views'

⁷⁷ Q13

⁷⁸ Combining 'have done' and 'might do'

⁷⁹ Valid N = for Spain 2,060 for France 1,157. The WVS question asked about the pursuit of personal violence for political ends

⁸⁰ Q14

⁸¹ The actual turnout was 55.3%. Source: www.izbori.ba (official site for the Electoral Commission of BiH)

Table 4.1.3 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Non-Voting ⁸²

	β	S.E.
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	1.25	0.12
Education – Low compared with high	0.87	0.16
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.87	0.13
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.62	0.15
Education – Mid compared with high	0.62	0.15
Life satisfaction – Other compared with satisfied	0.45	0.09
Religion – Roman Catholic compared with Muslim	0.40	0.12
Employment – Unemployed compared with employed	0.36	0.12
Employment – Inactive compared with employed	0.34	0.14
Displacement and return – Non-displaced compared with returnees	0.27	0.10
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox	0.20	0.09
<i>Constant (a)</i>	-1.21	0.17

- Logistic regression helps explain the statistical drivers behind non-voting. Especially very young voters tend not to attend the polling station. Low and mid-level education has an important effect and there are moderate to weak effects from life satisfaction, employment, displacement status and, finally, religion
- There is no statistically significant effect from identity
- Interestingly, subjective health does not feature in the last step of the model. This suggests that incapacity (the top scorer for reasons for non-voting) may be a claim which cannot substantiated at the multi-variate level
- Turning to party-political choices, party preferences at State level are virtually identical to those at Entity level. Voters do not seem to differentiate systematically between different tiers of government. This may also indicate that there are low levels of tactical voting ⁸³

4.2 Levels of Political Power

- There is a general agreement that political power should reside at State level with over two-thirds (67.7%) giving this option their first choice. This finding was not expected considering that the majority of the people (76.6%) say they do not trust the State government in Sarajevo ⁸⁴. An overwhelming majority (85.7%) who trust the state Government in Sarajevo ‘a great deal’ want political power to be located at the state level, whereas only one half (51.7%) who have no trust at all in the Government in Sarajevo want state power to be located there. There is not necessarily a contradiction between mistrust in the State government of the day ⁸⁵ and the desire to locate political power at state level: the location of political power is, broadly speaking, a matter of constitutional arrangements. However, there appears to be a gap between respondents’ experiences of the State government and their aspirations for constitutional arrangements

⁸² LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r14 /METHOD=FSSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r68a q61a r1 disp_ret /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [6]steps. N = 3,546

⁸³ Ref. frequency tables Q16A and Q16B

⁸⁴ Cross-reference between Q20 (Trust in Organisations) and Q19 (Political Power)

⁸⁵ Q20

- Very few (2.8% ⁸⁶) thought on a first-priority basis that Cantons were places where political power should reside. This raises questions about the position of political sub-units in the Federation

Table 4.2.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Political Power ⁸⁷

	β	S.E.
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox	1.42	0.14
Identity – Primary compared with exclusive	0.87	0.10
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.86	0.13
Entity – FBiH compared with Brcko	0.76	0.14
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.60	0.16
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.41	0.14
Displacement and return – Returnees compared with non-displaced	0.31	0.10
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	0.29	0.13
<i>Constant (α)</i>	2.42	0.14

- In logistic regression, religion features as a powerful predictor: Muslim respondents are much more likely to support the idea of locating political power at State level than their Christian counterparts. Respondents with primary BiH identity and FBiH residents are also more likely to support State-level power. There are moderate and weak effects from age and displacement status

4.3 Policy Aims and Role Assignments

- Respondents were presented with eleven policy aims ⁸⁸ for the next twelve months and given an opportunity to assign first, second and third priorities, followed by another set which asked them to identify what was not a priority at all
- Beyond powerful demands (first priority) for an improved economic existence (41.3%) ⁸⁹, almost half of the remainder attribute their first policy choice to growing BiH into one country (27.3%). Beyond a strong desire to bring BiH together, respondents see a need for infrastructural improvements (10.0%) and taking the fight to corruption (9.9%). Overall however, in policy choices economic concerns clearly dominate constitutional considerations
- Policy options which attract near-vanishing endorsements ⁹⁰ include clearing landmines (0.8%), dealing with war criminals (1.0%) and national defence (1.1%). There are two possible interpretations: these policy options were never important to begin with or, the implementation of those policies has been so successful that they no longer matter. In any case, from the perspective of popular reproductions, it now appears that there will be diminishing returns from investment
- No priority at all are dealing with war criminals (26.4%), bringing home the Diaspora (23.5%) and, importantly, growing BiH into one country (17.3%). This shows that there

⁸⁶ First choice only. Cantonal level is only available in FBiH. However, it appears fair to include the views of the entire sample as all respondents may have knowledge of the operation of Cantons

⁸⁷ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r19a_rec /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r1 r3 r70 r68a q61a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 3,546

⁸⁸ Q17

⁸⁹ 'Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living' 41.3%

⁹⁰ First choices only

is a degree of polarisation on the unification issue which will be discussed further in Section 5 below

- Returning the Diaspora is not a short-term policy priority probably because it emerges more as a long-term aspiration. Section 3 clearly demonstrated that respondents fully understand the (economic) benefits of a returning Diaspora. The item was included not least to provide a pre-implementation measurement point should policy makers decide to pursue this policy in the future
- Having identified their policy priorities, respondents were asked to say whom they wanted to take care of each policy ⁹¹
- Section 2 demonstrated that overall institutional trust is relatively low. In fact, political and government institutions attracted considerably more mistrust than trust. Nevertheless, when asked in an open-ended question who they thought should turn their top policy priority into reality, a mere 4.5% of respondents look to themselves and say 'the people'; 1.7% mention international organisations, but hardly any single out the EU. An overwhelming 92.0% insist that political institutions ⁹² should provide solutions. In other words, more than nine in ten BiH citizens think that the state is responsible. These numbers are reminiscent of those found in the immediate aftermath of the *Deluge* which flooded Central and Eastern Europe around 1990. Once more, at face value, aspirations (structural) and realities of contemporary arrangements (trust) appear to be incongruous
- Beliefs in 'Big Government' become even more pronounced in the case of those who choose a 'decent living' ⁹³ as their first priority, where 96.5% feel that the state is responsible for its provision. Only 8.5% of those who choose 'finally growing BiH into a unified country' as their top priority ⁹⁴ also say the people are responsible. In other words, policy priorities, which by their very nature demand both individual effort and societal input, are not assigned to the people but the state

4.4 Section Summary

- It appears that the relationship between BiH voters and the political world is not one of active interest and involvement. Given the range of pressing issues arising from policy priorities, levels of politicisation appear low. In fact, one might argue that non-engagement is an underlying hallmark of the relationship between citizens and politics
- No other transformation country has a similar proportion of respondents who say they are 'not at all' interested in politics
- Low interest in politics predominantly affects young people and those with low education. Religion plays a subordinate role, identity no role at all
- Voting outstrips political communication ('talking politics'); more active forms of political participation are not very popular

⁹¹ Q18

⁹² This includes 'state/government 76.7%, 'politicians' 14.0 and 'political parties' 1.3%

⁹³ 'Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living'

⁹⁴ 'Ensuring that BiH finally grows into unified country'

- If two in ten BiH respondents claim to have some appetite for violence, the pursuit of potentially divisive issues, such as a change to the country's political structure requires special attention for the associated risks. Clearly, religion and identity loom large in constitutional concerns
- Similar to low political interest, non-voting affects the young and people with low education. Religion and identity are not crucial. Abstention is not necessarily a comment on perceived political efficacy as half the non-voters rationalise their abstention with logistical reasons rather than with alienation
- Structural or constitutional aspirations are not matched by the trust scores awarded to the corresponding institutions. There is a gap between trust in State government and the endorsement to locate political power at the State level. This suggests that current arrangements are met with a notion of mistrust and tolerance while respondents entertain hopes for structural changes in the long-term future
- The desired location of political power is predominantly determined by religion and identity. This is an indication that religion and identity loom large in constitutional concerns, while economic determinants matter less
- Following socio-economic demands BiH citizens choose coalescence ('growing BiH into one country') over infrastructural improvements and the fight against corruption. De-mining, prosecuting war crimes and defence no longer carry much salience. This shows that economic progress and constitutional issues over unification dominate the policy agenda
- The pervasive belief in 'Big Government' with top-down solutions may indicate that BiH remains in the embryonic phases of transformation from administrative-centralism to an open society and economy. For the time being, the state is seen as a 'delivery van' for a comprehensive range of needs and wants. In fact, one may argue that BiH citizens are yet to appreciate that in open societies living standards are not solely the job of government and national cohesion is principally based on co-operation between politicians and population, and not merely a top-down pursuit
- The EU does not emerge as an institution which is seen responsible to realise short-term policy aims. Other international organisations play a marginal role

Section 5

Change and Future

5.1 Strength, Weakness and Vision

- In a set of three open-ended questions, respondents were free to give any answer they chose. The first two questions dealt with what respondents feel is the main strength and weakness of BiH. The third question asked respondents what or where they thought BiH would be in 20 year's time
- The main strength of BiH is 'young people' (39.4%), ⁹⁵ followed by 'the people' (16.8%) and 'natural resources' (8.0%) (top three). Critically, nearly six in ten (56.2% combined scores for 'young people' and 'people') respondents perceive human and not natural resources as the country's chief asset
- Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main weakness of BiH is unemployment (21.2%), followed by corruption (15.8%), politicians/politics (21.1% combined), with the economy in fifth position (7.2%): if one accepts that unemployment is principally an economic issue, economic problems constitute the modal category. This puts economic themes at the forefront of any agenda for progress
- Looking back to Section 4, an overwhelming majority of respondents clearly award politics the task of realising their respective policy priorities, yet strength-weakness-profiling fails to present the political world as an asset. If anything, especially its actors, are seen as a weakness. This once more illustrates a gap between people's political aspirations and their current view of the political arena
- As far as the central theme of the survey – a vision of the future – is concerned, the open-ended question ⁹⁶, probing for 'what or where will BiH be in 20 year's time', delivered a remarkable result: respondents interpreted the question as virtually exclusively oriented towards 'where' rather than 'what'. The question thus failed to elicit *sui generis* visions: 'in the EU' is where more than seven in ten (70.8%) see BiH in twenty years' time ⁹⁷. It is unusual in survey research that open-ended questions produce such high levels of accord. There are several ways of interpreting this datum:
 - One may argue that this finding simply denotes powerful popular desires to join the EU as a long-term aspiration by BiH citizens. There may also be the desire to move close to those EU countries which host significant proportions of the BiH Diaspora. In addition, as Slovenia serves as one of the key models for BiH ⁹⁸, it may be widely known that Slovenia recently joined the EU. It may therefore be rational for respondents to aspire to EU membership
 - Perhaps there is the notion of transferring local responsibilities to a trans-national institution. With somewhat low confidence in domestic structures (Section 1) respondents may see the EU as an optimum answer to many Bosnian problems. In this sense, respondents subscribe to a supra-national concept, not to autochthonous solutions. The near absence of *sui generis* vision may indicate limited hope for progress within existing structures and underline notions of non-progress and non-engagement found in other sections

⁹⁵ It is unusual in survey research that around four in ten respondents agree on an item in an open-ended set

⁹⁶ Q35

⁹⁷ With so little variability on this response set, multi-variate analyses are unlikely to produce many meaningful insights

⁹⁸ Q37

- The desire to see BiH in the EU in 20 year's time decreases with age. For respondents who were politically socialised in the Tito era, two thirds (66.6%) give this answer compared with close to eight in ten (78.7%) of young people who were socialised after the war

Table 5.1.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: BiH in 20 Years – In EU ⁹⁹

	β	S.E.
Identity – Primary BiH identity compared with exclusive identity	0.64	0.16
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with Tito-era	0.60	0.14
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with war	0.45	0.17
Socialisation cohort – Post-war compared with post-Tito	0.41	0.15
Employment – Employed compared with unemployed	0.35	0.12
Employment – Employed compared with inactive	0.34	0.11
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox	0.25	0.12
<i>Constant (a)</i>	1.71	0.15

- The desire to see BiH in the EU (dependent variable) produces moderate β -values. Primary compared with exclusive identity heads the table. There are also moderate effects from age with young respondents favouring BiH in EU more than their elders. This is consistent with the bi-variate result above. Small effects come from employment and religion
- Both the overwhelming support for BiH in EU and only moderate β -values, indicate that, while people may have differing views, EU accession is not necessarily as divisive an issue as potential constitutional changes e.g. a new political structure to the country (below)

5.2 The Mandate for and Direction of Change

- Respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of one to ten, polarised by opposing statements ¹⁰⁰, broadly dealing with issues of the future, or more precisely with the direction of change
- There is an resounding mandate for change: asked to scale their views between 'this country needs big change now' (coded 1) as opposed to 'this country is as it is and does not need much change' (coded 10), seven in ten (70.8%) respondents choose the top option for change (1) as against 1.8% who say 'no change'. The combined endorsement of change cumulates to 93.4%. The mean score computes at 2.0 with a standard deviation also of 2.0
- Broadly, respondents endorse the statement that the 'government should take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for' as indicated by the mean score (6.41 ¹⁰¹). One third of the respondents (36.1%) give this option a score of 10 whereas one in six respondents give the alternative option (1) that 'people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves' (16.6%). In addition, respondents are more likely to say that politicians 'should decide on a way ahead for the country' (69.3 % combined) as distinct from 'ordinary citizens should have a say' (30.8% combined). In

⁹⁹ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r35 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r70 identity r68a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (identity)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [4]steps. N = 2,664

¹⁰⁰ Q36

¹⁰¹ StD 3.4

effect this means that there is limited demand for popular input in shaping the future of the country. These findings serve as a powerful reminder of the dependency on the state which was initially detected in responsibility assignments for top policy priorities ¹⁰² (Section 4) and may well be an echo from the administrative-centralist past

- Most of the respondents endorse the option that 'BiH citizens should take the future in their own hands'. Over half of the sample (53.5%) give this statement a score of ten and two thirds (66.6%) give it a score of eight or more ¹⁰³. Obviously this statement is aimed at the personal rather than the national level. This clearly shows that respondents aspire to a situation where they, and not others, are the shapers of their own future. This is consistent with findings about levels of enfranchisement (Section 1)
- There is strong support for the statement 'we need to make sure that any injustice created by the war is finally put right' and over a half of the respondents (54.6%) award this sentiment the top score of '1' ¹⁰⁴. This indicates that there remains a sense of grievance which requires attention
- There is also moderate support (54.8% combined) for the statement that 'our politicians should stop making their decisions according to ethnic principles' ¹⁰⁵. This may serve as an illustration that a majority of respondents seek rational politics over sectional interests
- 'Corruption is crippling BiH and we must get rid of it urgently': 17 out of 20 respondents (86.2%) give this option a score of '10'. This reflects the priority given to the fight against corruption in policies ¹⁰⁶ which will also feature in Sections 6 and 7 ¹⁰⁷
- Beyond frequency distributions, an analysis of the underlying statistical relationships between attitude statements is highly revealing (factor analysis ¹⁰⁸). In five iterations three factors were extracted ¹⁰⁹

Table 5.2.1 Factor Analysis – Direction of change ¹¹⁰

Factor	1 Moving on Together	2 People in Charge	3 Seizing Control
Responsibility assignment – People vs. government?	-0.14	-0.79	0.08
Who decides – Politicians vs. people?	-0.03	0.81	0.14
Waiting for outside world vs. taking fate in own hands	-0.12	0.22	0.70
Addressing war injustice vs. moving on	0.51	0.27	-0.14
Big change vs. no change	0.80	0.04	-0.08
Continue vs. stop ethnic politics	-0.75	0.09	0.00
Corruption way of life vs. eliminate	-0.03	-0.15	0.80

- Factor One – ***Moving On Together*** – The desire for 'big change' loads (.80) with an end to ethnic politics ¹¹¹ (-.75) and, in the second instance, with moving on (.51) as

¹⁰² Ref. Q17 and Q18

¹⁰³ Ref. frequency table Q36_3

¹⁰⁴ Ref. frequency table Q36_4

¹⁰⁵ Combined scores of six to ten for this position

¹⁰⁶ Q17

¹⁰⁷ Especially Q46

¹⁰⁸ Principal component extraction. Syntax : FACTOR /VARIABLES q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e q36f q36g /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e q36f q36g /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION ROTATION /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) /EXTRACTION PC /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) /ROTATION VARIMAX /METHOD=CORRELATION

¹⁰⁹ Principal component extraction

¹¹⁰ Please note the direction in which the items are described in the table in order to discern the direction of negative and positive values

¹¹¹ 'This country needs big change now' (.80) and 'our politicians should stop making their decisions according to ethnic principles' (.75)

opposed to attempts to address injustices created by the war ¹¹². It appears that the strong association between 'Big Change' and an end to ethnic politics is self-explanatory

- Factor Two – ***People in Charge*** – 'Ordinary citizens should have a say on a way forward' (.81) loads with 'people should take more responsibility for themselves' (-.79) (opposed to 'government should be responsible'). This indicates that those who demand popular input into the political process also tend to say that individual responsibility is key. In other words there is a clear indication that a sense of individual initiative in BiH exists: a demand for having a say loads with individual responsibility
- Factor Three – ***Seizing Control*** – Eliminate Corruption ¹¹³ (.80) loads with 'BiH citizens should take their future in their own hands' (.70). This indicates that the fight against corruption matters in people's desire to shape their own future
- Data reduction reveals that a continuation of ethnic politics and attempts to continue addressing war grievances appear as impediments to 'Big Change'. However, it should be remembered that at the univariate level there is an overwhelming majority (79.8%) which remains keen to put right the injustices created by the war, and a large minority which continues to support ethno-religious politics (45.2%)
- However, there is no *prima facie* evidence to identify the precise nature of such 'injustice'. Notwithstanding, it is entirely clear that the continued prosecution of war criminals is unlikely to present a complete solution as very few respondents (1.0%) choose 'dealing with war criminals' as their first policy priority
- Data reduction also reveals that there is in fact a latent *sui generis* way forward. Respondents who stipulate that ordinary citizens should have a say in political decisions are also likely to see individuals and not necessarily the state as responsible for the provision of living standards
- Beyond a clear mandate for change, the data suggest that there is a cognitive awareness for how BiH can progress. However, the mechanisms by which future progress will be facilitated remain to be determined

5.3 Systemic Change

- This study is focussed on visions of the future and therefore on people's aspirations. A central part of such a vision is the structure BiH will have in the future. Through a battery of four response sets, this study yields fairly straightforward answers on this issue
- The Dayton Peace Accord is virtually universally known ¹¹⁴. On its merits, however, there is a virtual split: half (49.7%) say that, overall, it has worked, with the other half (50.3%) disagreeing ¹¹⁵. This means that half the sample says that the DPA, which is practically the constitution of BiH, has not been effective as it has not worked. In other words, half the sample rejects the constitution of BiH

¹¹² 'We need to make sure that any injustice created by the war is finally put right'

¹¹³ 'Corruption is crippling BiH and we must get rid of it urgently'

¹¹⁴ A mere 7.5% are not aware of DPA

¹¹⁵ Cross-tabulations show that there is very little variance between different categories

Table 5.3.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: DPA has worked¹¹⁶

	β	S.E.
Religion – Christian Orthodox compared with Muslim	0.75	0.13
Entity – FBiH compared with Brcko	0.62	0.31
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.45	0.14
Subjective health – Other compared with very good/good	0.20	0.08
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	0.18	0.09
Constant (α)	0.24	0.31

- Logistic regression reveals that β -values are moderate but do make some difference. Especially Orthodox and to a lesser degree Muslim respondents feel that the DPA has worked. There is also some effect from Entity and feel-good variables
- The absence of economic variables, education, age and especially displacement status is interesting. After all the DPA provided the legal base for return ¹¹⁷
- The present system of government in BiH is not considered to be a viable one. Beyond an evaluation of the DPA, an overwhelming majority insist on the need for systemic change: close to three quarters say the system of government in BiH is ‘too complicated and should be changed’ ¹¹⁸; a mere 6% feel no need for change ¹¹⁹. In other words there is a tidal demand for structural change ¹²⁰. The finding above (5.2) that more than nine in ten respondents favour ‘big change’ over ‘no change’ powerfully compounds a pressing desire to change the structural arrangements in BiH
- Given this mandate for systemic change, the maintenance of the status quo and unpopular options of adding entities or dividing the country can be left to one side: there are two top runners for change
- The two top runners are a ‘centralised state’ and a ‘centralised state with strong regions’. The former draws its support predominantly from first choices (38.5%) and less so from second (20.4%) and third choices (5.5%). The latter, the federal option – ‘centralised state with strong regions’- draws its support more from second (34.4%) and third (10.5%) choices rather than from first priority (22.1%)
- ‘As is’ is in third place outflanked by the centralised and the federal option. Clearly, respondents are articulating that there are superior alternatives to current arrangements
- The race between the top runners is decided by the amount of opposition to each: for the centralised state around two in ten say it is ‘no choice at all’, for the federal option it is a mere three in one hundred (2.7% or N = 90) respondents. In fact, the federal option receives the least opposition of any of the choices. The data show that more than twice as many respondents oppose the status quo (‘as is’) than the federal alternative

¹¹⁶ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r30 /METHOD=FSSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r68a r1 disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 2,936

¹¹⁷ Annex 7 of DPA

¹¹⁸ Q22

¹¹⁹ The remaining 22.2% say it is ‘perhaps complicated but there is no urgent need to change things’

¹²⁰ 61.6% of those who say the DPA ‘has worked for BiH’ also say the system of government needs change. 80.9% of those who say DPA has not worked feel systemic change is needed

Table 5.3.2 – Net Difference in Percent – First Choice Less ‘No Choice’ ¹²¹

Future structure	First choice	No choice at all	Net difference
Federal State	22.1	2.7	19.4
Centralised state	38.5	20.4	18.1
As is	14.3	6.7	7.6
Bring back Yugoslavia	7.4	7.9	-0.5
Three Entities	7.9	13.2	-5.3
Divide country and join neighbours	7.2	24.0	-16.8
Divide country	2.6	25.1	-22.5

- The above table of net differences (first choice less ‘no choice at all’) summarises the overall patterns of support and opposition. The two centralised options and ‘as is’ are in the lead, dividing the country, bringing back Yugoslavia and the ‘three Entity’ option have substantially more opposition than support
- The maintenance of the status quo (‘as is’) is perceived as the most likely option to actually happen (36.2%). This denotes a gap between aspirations and expectations: while a centralised state and the federal alternative outflank the status quo on the list of desirable options, a centralised country ranks second (21.8%) and the federal option third (18.1%) in the rank order table of anticipated outcomes. More than twice the number of respondents who support the maintenance of the status quo as their first choice (14.3%) say that it is nevertheless the most likely outcome. Once more there appears a sense of non-progress. At the bottom of the table of likely outcomes, a mere 7.3% (combined) expect BiH to be divided or Yugoslavia to re-emerge (1.7%). Overall, however, the federal alternative emerges among the top runners of likely outcomes, respondents certainly have it on their list
- In terms of unlikely outcomes the federal option features strongly: the least number of respondents expect that a federal BiH ‘will never happen’ (2.5%) ¹²². In contrast, more than four in ten (42.1%) expect that a return to Yugoslavia will never happen. Similarly, nearly four in ten (36.8% combined) say a division of the country is not at all a likely scenario. 12.0% insist that a centralised state will never happen
- The interim conclusions are fairly straightforward. Dividing the country, establishing three Entities or Yugoslavia Mark II are virtually unacceptable and are not anticipated as likely outcomes. ‘As is’ is in third position. Prima facie, it is thus purely a matter of deciding which centralised option attracts most support and least opposition; i.e. the least divisive outcome. The answer is a ‘centralised state with strong regions’ or rather the ‘Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’

¹²¹ Net difference of the ‘first priority’ (Q38A) and the ‘no choice at all’ (Q38B) answers regarding the future structure of BiH

¹²² Discounting those who perhaps unrealistically choose ‘will never happen’ for the status quo (1.1%)

Table 5.3.3 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Federal State Support ¹²³

	β	S.E.
Religion – Muslim compared with Christian Orthodox	1.55	0.14
Identity – Primary BiH compared with exclusive identity	1.43	0.19
Entity – FBiH compared with RS	0.97	0.13
Income – High compared with low	0.78	0.16
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.55	0.12
Income – High compared with mid	0.43	0.16
Displacement and return – Returnees compared with non-displaced	0.42	0.10
Identity – Primary BiH identity compared with dual identity	0.25	0.09
<i>Constant (α)</i>	1.71	0.16

- Notwithstanding the strong support and the marginal opposition to the federal option, the sources of support must be considered in order to complete the picture. Regression analysis shows that Muslims strongly favour the federal alternative over their Orthodox compatriots and to a lesser degree over Catholics. Almost equally, respondents who subscribe to a primary BiH identity support a federal BiH. Strong to moderate support comes from FBiH residents and, to a lesser degree from high and mid-level income earners. There is also very modest support from returnees
- As outlined above, 2.7% of the sample ¹²⁴ or 90 respondents oppose the federal alternative, two of whom say they actually have used violence in the pursuit of political ends and 15 think that they might do (proportionally 18.9% combined). Therefore, respondents who oppose the federal alternative have no greater appetite for violence than the rest of the sample

5.4 Ongoing Initiatives to Change the Constitution of BiH

- In terms of ongoing efforts to change the constitution of BiH, there is a widespread lack of awareness: a mere two in ten (20.2%) have heard of such efforts
- The 683 out of 3,580 respondents who say they are aware of the constitutional reform process virtually unanimously support change (91.8%). This strongly suggests that awareness of the constitutional reform process is virtually identical with support for it
- In an open-ended response set ¹²⁵, the modal category (combined 38.8%) say they wish to unify the country (25.6%) and abolish the Entities (13.2%). Other specific constitutional changes include virtual non-issues such as police reform (3.4%) and a reduction of bureaucracy (2.7%) ¹²⁶. This powerfully reinforces the importance of structural options oriented towards a unified BiH. It also demonstrates that police reform is not very important

¹²³ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=fed38a_3 /METHOD=FSSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r70 identity r68a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (identity)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 3,536

¹²⁴ Valid percent

¹²⁵ Only administered to those who are aware of the constitutional reform process

¹²⁶ Non-specific changes focus on a 'stable state' (10.4%), 'equality' (8.5%) and 'better legislation' (5.1%). Non-constitutional issues include 'a better life' (11.1%), 'the economy' (5.6%) and 'employment' (5.5%)

5.5 Section Summary

- The main perceived strengths of BiH are 'young people' and 'people' in general. In people's views the country is thus rich in human resources but less so in other assets. The main weaknesses are economic concerns (unemployment), corruption and politics. The vision of the longer-term future is the EU. This overall profile serves as a concise pointer for future policy initiatives
- The powerful belief that BiH's future is essentially being part of a supra-national body (the EU) underpins the idea that there is perhaps limited confidence in domestic structures. Low trust in government institutions (Section 2) supports this view. It appears that BiH respondents are looking outside of BiH for visions and solutions. At the same time, there is the notion that people 'should take their fate in their own hands', not to 'wait for the outside world to decide' and that people can be in charge
- Respondents who have an exclusive identity are considerably less likely to envisage EU membership than those who have a primary identity
- Beyond any interpretations, more than seven in ten respondents see BiH's long-term future in the EU, sending an unequivocal message to policy-makers
- The determinants behind the overwhelming demand to join the EU include (primary) identity and age. They are, however, moderate in their effects. Economic themes are subordinate. In contrast to constitutional issues, religion does not play an important role and EU accession appears considerably less divisive
- There is a resounding mandate for change: nine in ten respondents favour 'Big Change'; half the sample rejects the DPA/constitution; nearly three quarters say they wish to change the system of government. The current status quo is outflanked by two alternatives (centralised and federal options), and the second most important policy aim after economic progress is a matter of changing the constitutional arrangements (unify BiH)
- At the same time, the proportion of respondents who might pursue their aims by violent means is twice as large as in France, though it represents only a small minority. Given the recent violent history of BiH, any efforts to change the constitutional arrangements may well require the utmost caution
- A small majority says that ethnic politics should end
- As for the direction of change there is, broadly speaking, an underlying logic in the responses. At the same time at the univariate level, the demand for 'Big Change' contrasts with the reluctance by a large minority to let go of ethnic politics, and the powerful idea that politicians and government rather than the people should be in charge of change. The 'delivery van' is also present in direction of change variables. In other words, the mechanisms for the implementation of change are less clear and require further discussion
- Factor analysis shows that 'Big Change' and an end to ethnic politics are related. Addressing the injustices created by the war appear to be to be part of any policies for progress. Factor analysis also shows that there is latent *sui generis* energy from the

association between people-vs.-government/politicians items. The release and direction of this energy may be an important contribution to progress

- The federal alternative outpaces other models, prominently including the current status quo. On aggregated scores a centralised BiH with strong regions gathers most support and is opposed by hardly anyone (<3%). Therefore, a federal BiH appears least likely to entrench any significant minority. The federal option also does well in terms of envisaged likelihood of outcome. In fact, very few respondents think it is unlikely to come about. Opponents of the federal option are no more likely to resort to violence than the rest of the sample
- At the same time, as for any of the proposed models, sources of support for the federal option are strongly affected by religion and identity. This suggests that any new political structure to BiH is likely to be divisive and could potentially carry significant risks
- A minority of two in ten is aware of the current constitutional reform process and is almost unanimously in favour of that process. National unity and an abolition of Entities feature strongly among the desired constitutional changes, police reform is virtually unimportant
- Overall, the sense of unity presents itself as a multi-source emergent theme in this survey. Beyond the sound-bites by the political classes, the Silent Majority of BiH talks more about variants of unity than it does about division

Section 6

External Influence and International Community

6.1 External Influence or *Sui Generis*?

- Previous sections unveiled considerable demand for change. Policy priorities and the modalities of change ¹²⁷ provided an initial idea of the anticipated direction of change. Respondents were asked in an open-ended question ¹²⁸ to suggest a country which would act as a model which BiH could follow
- Almost one third (30.2%) spontaneously insist that BiH needs no model, further underlining a latent energy for *sui generis* change. As for actual models, two in ten (21.7%) mention Switzerland. One in ten respondents (10.6%) says Germany and almost the same number (10.0%) propose Slovenia. Sweden (7%) is the only other country to receive the endorsement of more than 5% of the sample
- For those who mention a model country, there is a remarkable absence of successful post-socialist transformation countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary or even Romania. Also the absence of the US from the top-five raises questions. In fact, respondents choose either countries which host the BiH Diaspora and/or Switzerland (probably for its Cantonal system) and other ex-Yugoslavia states. It appears plausible to argue that respondents do not necessarily perceive BiH as a member of the family of transformation countries and see its future modelled more on affluent federal democracies. This finding is consistent with the federal choice in Q38
- As for countries and organisations which should have an influence on BiH's future ¹²⁹ (close-ended) the EU (42.3%) outflanks other options. This finding is consistent with Q35, where 70.8% nominate the EU as the focal point of visions of the future. Notwithstanding, almost as many (38.9%) once more choose the *sui generis* option: 'No influence, people in BiH will decide'. One in ten (10.5%) say the UN; and almost the same number of respondents (9.8%) mention the OHR. As for particular countries, the US tops the list (19.4%), outpacing the combined score for all other countries. This indicates that US influence on BiH is differentiated from modelling the country on America. Other options include Serbia (8.3%); Germany (5.3%) and Croatia (4.5%)
- Regarding unwanted influence, Serbia (45.2%) is in pole position, followed by Germany (18.0%) and, remarkably the US (12.9%). This indicates that US influence is somewhat polarising. Also, by a sizeable margin, respondents may look to Germany as a model but do not wish to see Germany involved in BiH. A mere 0.5% say they do not wish the EU to meddle in Bosnian affairs; powerfully underlining desires to be guided by the EU. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that institutional trust towards the EU is virtually split ¹³⁰

6.2 The UN – Stay or Go?

- Currently there is no comfortable majority in support of a continued a UN presence in BiH ¹³¹. Four in ten (39.9% combined) would like the UN to depart either immediately (29.8%) or within one year (10.1%). The modal category (43.7%) would like to see the

¹²⁷ Q36

¹²⁸ Q37

¹²⁹ Q39A

¹³⁰ Cf. Q20, 'a great deal' (9.3%) and 'quite a lot' (41.2%)

¹³¹ Q45A

UN leave if and when BiH joins the EU, providing a sense of natural succession. One may argue that respondents can only see the UN leave on condition that another supra-national body takes over. Only a minority would like the UN to stay indefinitely ¹³². It appears that at this stage the UN is not seen as part of the long-term future of BiH

- As for the OHR the values are almost identical with those for the UN ¹³³. There are two ways of interpreting this result: one is that the UN has yet to distinguish itself sufficiently from other international organisations. The other is that the UN scores for stay or go are not entirely reassuring, as respondents attribute much the same values to the UN as they give to the OHR. The latter will be wound up in the foreseeable future
- In addition, it should be remembered that neither the OHR nor the UN command unqualified trust: on combined scores 67.6% of respondents mistrust the UN, 65.1% mistrust the OHR ¹³⁴

Table 6.2.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable – UN Should Stay ¹³⁵

	β	S.E.
Religion – Muslim compared with Orthodox	1.31	0.15
Entity – FBiH compared with RS	1.05	0.31
Identity – Primary compared with exclusive identity	1.01	0.14
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.78	0.12
Identity – Primary compared with dual identity	0.44	0.09
Gender – Female compared with male	0.32	0.08
Education – High compared with low	0.29	0.13
<i>Constant (a)</i>	1.66	0.13

- There are, however, substantial differences between groups of religious affiliates and the Entities, as can be seen in the multi-variate analysis above. In other words, support for the UN remaining is not equally shared among all groups in society. Economic variables do not feature, neither does life satisfaction or age
- Crucial also is the absence of displacement and return status as significant parameter estimates in the logistic regression. This may indicate that the UN is yet to convert the capital gained for its assistance to the displaced and returnees into support for its overall mandate
- Rational economic considerations such as perceived living standards and income are also absent from the model
- Above all however, the central message is that, on balance, respondents do want the UN to stay for now (60.1%)

6.3 Policy Aims for the UN

- First and foremost, respondents say they want the UN to ensure that human rights are observed (33.6% - first choice) ¹³⁶. There are two ways of interpreting this result. One is

¹³² 'It should be involved in BiH for many years to come'

¹³³ Q45B; $\chi^2 = 7,377$ with 9 degrees of freedom, sig. .000

¹³⁴ Q20

¹³⁵ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r45arec /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r1 r3 r70 r68a identity disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (identity)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 3,326

¹³⁶ Q46A

that respondents actually would like the UN to promote human rights. The other is that promoting human rights is a surrogate for other issues. Interestingly, deficiencies in human rights are not mentioned once among BiH's greatest weaknesses ¹³⁷. It appears that the UN is synonymous with human rights, however, human rights are not among people's core concerns

Table: 6.3.1 – Logistic Regression –
Dependent Variable – UN 1st Priority Promoting Human Rights ¹³⁸

	β	S.E.
Identity – Primary BiH identity compared with exclusive identity	0.44	0.14
Education – High compared with low	0.44	0.12
Religion – Christian Orthodox compared with Muslim	0.32	0.14
Entity – Brcko compared with FBiH	0.28	0.13
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	0.27	0.13
Identity – Primary BiH identity compared with dual identity	0.27	0.08
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-0.36	0.11

- Differences in first policy priority for human rights produce rather weak parameter estimates. If anything identity, education and religion have weak effects. However, age, subjective measures, economic variables and displacement and return status do not feature at all. In essence, this multi-variate analysis does not reveal a key driver which could point policy-makers in the right direction. It is, however, clear that the idea the UN ought to promote human rights has little to do with displacement and return
- Leaving aside human rights, the net values (most important less least important) for policy priorities show that socio-economic concerns once more loom large (+13.7). In addition, second and third choices re-enforce this concern
- Respondents also see a role for the UN in the fight against corruption: both in terms of fighting corruption per se (net +7.6%), and holding politicians accountable (net +2.9%) ¹³⁹. Section 7 below will shed more light on corruption, its realities and its subjective reproductions
- UN planning assistance to BiH authorities evokes somewhat opposing views: one in ten (10.3%) says they want the UN to help (first choice), while 8.3% are against. This leaves a rather small net value of 2.0%. If anything, respondents would like the UN to assist with government planning on a second (12.8%) and third choice (10.7%) basis. In conjunction with a sizeable negative net value (-18.1%) for improving municipal efficiency, respondents appear reluctant to involve the UN in political decision-making
- Critically, in a study which deals with visions of the future – displacement and return, respondents are not overtly keen for the UN to continue its support for returnees. The integration of returnees (or sustainable return) receives a marginal net value of +1.6%, returning people to their homes (the logistics of return) a marginal negative net value of -1.6%. Overall, it appears that the UN's involvement in return has lost its saliency for BiH citizens

¹³⁷ Cf. Q34

¹³⁸ LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r46a_2HR /METHOD=FSSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r1 r3 r70 r68a identity disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (identity)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model

[4steps. N = 3,536

¹³⁹ 'Ensure that BiH politicians follow the law'

Table 6.3.2 – Net Difference in Percent Between UN's Most and Least Important Role

	All	Returnees	Non-returnees	Non-displaced
Promote human rights	32.5	28.2	35.5	33.5
Improve living standards	13.7	13.1	14.4	14.0
Fight corruption	7.6	5.6	5.3	8.9
Compel politicians to follow laws	2.9	2.1	1.2	3.6
Assist government planning	2.0	0.6	4.5	1.8
Integrate returnees	1.6	8.7	1.0	-1.6
Facilitate return	-1.6	1.8	-0.2	-3.5
Help the weak get a say	-13.8	-15.4	-11.6	-13.7
Improve municipal efficiency	-18.1	-18.7	-18.0	-17.8
Improve Education	-26.7	-26.3	-32.3	-25.2

- Moreover, non-returnees produce a neutral net value (-0.2%) in support of a continued returns policy. Returnees score at a net value of +1.8%. Continued support for the integration of returnees is not a priority for any group. Even among returnees it is third (+8.7%) after human rights (+28.2%) and economic themes (+13.1%). Both the non-returnees (+4.5%) and returnees (+0.6%) wish to see UN input into government planning but only by modest net values
- Respondents are virtually unanimous about education: they do not wish to see the UN involved in this field (net value -26.7%). Similarly, activity to 'make sure the weaker people in the community also get a say' is clearly rejected (-13.8%)

Table 6.3.3 – Net difference in Percent Between the Most Important and Least Important Role of the UN

	All	UN should stay	UN should leave
Promote human rights	32.5	33.2	30.9
Improve living standards	13.7	11.0	16.5
Fight corruption	7.6	4.2	12.8
Compel politicians to follow laws	2.9	3.4	2.4
Assist government planning	2.0	5.9	-3.0
Integrate returnees	1.6	2.9	-0.6
Facilitate return	-1.6	-0.6	-2.8
Help the weak get a say	-13.8	-13.0	-14.2
Improve municipal efficiency	-18.1	-19.4	-16.5
Improve education	-26.7	-27.6	-25.4

- Differences between those who say the UN should stay and those who take an opposing views are quite modest. In fact, on most policy aims there is broad agreement between the two categories. These results suggest that the rationale behind stay or go are not policy-driven
- In Section 3 it was shown that attitudes to IDPs and return are compassionate and pro-return. Most respondents feel that both the legal foundations of and policy support for returnees and non-returnees should be maintained. However, once return policies are presented together with other policy aims, and thus have to compete for respondent's first, second and third choices, return policies lose out. This either means that respondents have reservations about the UN, rather than other institutions dealing with assistance for the displaced, or, perhaps more likely, that other (potential) UN-policy aims are judged to be more important, even among those who could benefit from continued support

6.4 Section Summary

- Questions on external influence once more surface *sui generis* energy: the modal category does not think BiH needs any model and is ready to find its own way
- Successful transformation countries such as Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic are not seen as models
- Federal is becoming a theme, with two affluent federal democracies heading the table of country models respondents are aspiring to. This supports the findings about the federal alternative in Section 5
- Germany serves as a possible model but should stay out of BiH affairs. US influence is controversial and the USA does not really feature as a model. Slovenia also features. Serbian influence is rejected
- The EU emerges as the international organisation which is widely endorsed to play a role in BiH's future. One in ten choose the UN for their first priority
- Currently there is no comfortable majority in support of a continued UN presence in BiH. A large minority would like to see the UN leave soon. A similar proportion feels the UN mandate should come to an end if and when BiH joins the EU. The UN is not seen as part of the country's long-term future. Support for the UN remaining comes from religion, Entity and identity. There is a notable absence of economic parameters and policy-driven support. The same is true for displacement and return status
- On balance, the position of the UN is challenging but by no means unpromising. On the one hand it is disappointing that its stay-or-go-scores resemble those of a dying institution (OHR), and its (mis-)trust scores are close to those of the State Government. On the other, a small majority continues to envisage a role for the UN for now, and provides messages regarding that role
- Role assignments very prominently include human rights but the precise rationale behind this assignment remains somewhat unclear. It is possible that human rights are a surrogate for other issues
- Beyond human rights economic themes are key. Similarly the fight against corruption emerges as a theme. Respondents are very clear that they see no role for the UN in education, municipal efficiency and helping the weak get a say. Overall, UN involvement in politics appears as problematic
- There are perhaps two plausible explanations for the overall results: one is that the UN's current programmatic reach has not been entirely successful in carrying the population with it. This would raise questions about branding, above- and below-the-line, as well as communicating product range and quality. The other is that the UN has become a victim of its own successes: initial development areas such as municipal efficiency and education do not require further intervention, freeing resources for addressing development areas which are likely to improve living standards (or human rights) and reductions in (perceived) corruption
- It appears to be quite clear that continued support for returnees and the integration of non-returnees is unlikely to yield high returns on investment. Even the potential

beneficiaries of such policies no longer prioritise them. Other areas such as human rights, sustainable livelihoods for all, and the fight against corruption have become more important

Section 7

Corruption and Beliefs in Corruption

7.1 Belief vs. Actual Experiences

- A mere 5.4% of respondents think that officials assume their positions on merit alone ¹⁴⁰. In fact, an overwhelming majority believes that pathways to office are either achieved through the right connections (friends and family) (44.3%) or through a balance of merit and nepotism (50.4%). Subjective reproductions of recruitment into the official sector see little room for meritocratic mechanisms. Overall, most respondents seem to think that positions are (at best in part) handed out on the basis of cronyism
- More than nine in ten (92.0%) also believe that the public sector is corrupt ¹⁴¹: More than two in ten (22.7%) say practically all officials are corrupt, 41.2%, the modal category, say 'most are corrupt' and 28.1% say 'about half and half'. This leaves only 8.0% to believe the public sector is clean
- More than eight in ten (81.9%) think that official corruption is all-pervasive and thus happens at all levels. A two in three majority (64.2%) of the few who make a distinction say it happens predominantly at state level. This is consistent with relatively low trust scores for the State Government in Sarajevo ¹⁴²
- International organisations such as the EU, NGOs, OHR, UN and its sub-organisations ¹⁴³ fare somewhat better: still 68.7% say they are (at least on balance) affected by corruption: 14.0% say 'practically all are corrupt', 19.1% insist that 'most are corrupt', 35.6% think it is 'about half and half'. This leaves roughly one third (31.4%) to believe international organisations are free of corruption. Section 3 demonstrated that there is a link between alleged corruption in returning displaced persons to their former homes and wider perceptions of corruption
- Once more, respondents were asked to validate their beliefs by identifying where IO corruption happens. 75.8% insist corruption pervades all international organisations. For the minority who distinguish, NGOs are singled out: 62.0% allege corruption among NGOs
- The acid test of actual corruption came when respondents were interviewed about their actual experiences of corruption. Here respondents were considerably more cautious: close to eight in ten conceded that they had not been affected by official corruption in the past twelve months ¹⁴⁴. If anything, the health sector, and not government institutions, was identified (52.8%) by those who experienced corruption
- As for the private sector, a mere 2.2% say they had to deal with corruption when trying to get a job and 0.9% say 'when trying to get business'. This leaves 96.9% of valid responses to report no such personal experiences in the last twelve months
- It appears that most people's actual experience of corruption in BiH is predominantly a matter of small bribes to buy preferential medical treatment. Judging by respondents' personal experiences, there is no empirical evidence from the survey to suggest that

¹⁴⁰ Q21

¹⁴¹ Q23

¹⁴² Ref. Q20

¹⁴³ Data reduction for Q20 demonstrated that respondents do not distinguish between international organisations in any major way

¹⁴⁴ Twelve months are usually the maximum time span social researchers allow for valid recalls

official corruption amounts to a major problem as eight in ten respondents are unaffected by recent direct experiences. To be sure, high-level corruption in government or international organisations might not be experienced directly by the respondents, and it is therefore not possible to use the survey to determine actual levels of corruption in BiH. However, the contrast between our evidence on people's perceptions and their own accounts of experience of corruption means that one should be cautious in one's interpretation of the data

- There are a number of interesting statistical relationships all of which are significant at the 0.01-level, meaning they are very likely to hold in the population from which the sample was drawn: the relationship between beliefs in corruption and trust in the State Government in Sarajevo produces a moderate statistical association, namely a correlation coefficient ¹⁴⁵ of 0.09. Trust in respective Entity Government associates at 0.19 and 'your municipal authority' (again at 0.19). Clearly, there is a significant statistical relationship between beliefs in corruption and trust in political institutions. It therefore appears reasonable to propose that if beliefs in corruption decline, trust in political institutions may increase
- As for political interest an inverse correlation of 0.05 (sig. 0.01) prevails. This means that those who are least interested in politics are most likely to believe that the entire official sector in BiH is corrupt. Voting and beliefs in corruption are also inversely associated. Those who believe that practically all officials are corrupt are also least likely to vote: 0.07 (sig. 0.01). The strongest (inverse) statistical association in this set is produced by the relationship between beliefs in corruption and the assessment of the overall situation in BiH. Respondents who feel the situation in BiH is 'very bad' also think that practically all officials are corrupt (0.15; sig. 0.01). It is possible therefore that the belief in high-level corruption is simply part of a general syndrome of disaffection rather than an accurate representation of corrupt practices in government
- As discussed in Section 3 above, there is a statistical association between alleged corruption in the return process ¹⁴⁶ and views of corruption in the official sector and among international organisations: official corruption correlates with alleged corruption in the return process at the 0.20-level ¹⁴⁷ and is highly significant. Similarly, yet at a lower level, the correlation between perceived corruption in the return process and corruption among international organisations produces a coefficient of 0.13 ¹⁴⁸
- However, it should be borne in mind that there are global and undifferentiated allegations of corruption affecting all the sectors and institutions. A correlation between perceived corruption in the official sector and corruption among international organisations produces a 0.33 coefficient ¹⁴⁹, which is also highly significant. In other words, given the large gap between perceived and actual corruption, institutional differentiation in perceived corruption should also be consumed with caution

¹⁴⁵ All coefficients are Pearson's *r*. All values are negative in line with coding

¹⁴⁶ Q47_4

¹⁴⁷ Spearman's, 2-tailed; sig. 0.000

¹⁴⁸ Spearman's, 2-tailed; sig. 0.000

¹⁴⁹ Spearman's, 2-tailed; sig. 0.000

7.2 Section Summary

- Nine in ten respondents believe that the official sector is corrupt, and eight in ten say that officials do not assume their position by means of meritocratic processes. Eight in ten also believe that such corruption pervades all levels of government from high to low. Also most respondents seem to think that at least half of the international organisations in BiH are corrupt. Respondents allege that corruption affects all IOs with few exceptions. There appears to be an undifferentiated certainty about institutional corruption, which may well be part of a general syndrome of disaffection rather than an accurate representation of corrupt processes
- However, actual experiences of corruption in the past twelve months appear in stark contrast with the allegations: an overwhelming majority of respondents cannot report incidents of corruption in the official sector and indeed in industry. Beliefs and actual experiences clash
- Alleged corruption in the return process is related to the way respondents perceive corruption in the official sector and, to a lesser degree among international organisations
- Fighting corruption in BiH thus might well be a matter of fighting primarily perceptions of corruption
- There are a number of significant statistical relationships. Importantly, beliefs in corruption correlate with political interest and low esteem in the country. Tackling popular conceptions of corruption may therefore produce a number of desirable side-effects

Section 8

Self-Identification

8.1 Multiple identities

- It is not uncommon for citizens to ascribe to multiple identities ¹⁵⁰. BiH is a case in point: a small majority 56.8% say that ‘above all’ they are either Bosniak, Croat or Serb. 43.0% declare they are first and foremost BiH citizens (0.3% ‘other’)
- While the sample may be somewhat split on their initial replies, responses to a subsequent question hold the key. This was administered only to those mentioning ethno-religious identities in the first instance: three quarters (74.6%) of whom also ascribe to BiH citizen’s identity
- For the purposes of this report respondents who say they are BiH citizens in the first instance are referred to as having a ‘primary BiH identity’. Those who identify themselves as Bosniak/Croat/Serb in the first instance but then say they are also BiH citizens are described as possessing a ‘dual identity’. Respondents who reject BiH citizen’s identity are referred to as having an ‘exclusive identity’
- However, there are some important differences between Entities. In the first instance, FBiH respondents embrace a primary BiH citizen’s identity more enthusiastically (57.8%) than their RS compatriots (18.9%). Nevertheless, in the follow-up question a slim majority of RS residents also embraces BiH citizen’s identity (56.9% having a primary or dual identity). At the same time, a majority of those who reject BiH citizen’s identity are RS-based
- The upshot is that one in seven respondents (14.2%) rejects BiH citizen’s identity. However, in both Entities there are majorities who describe themselves as BiH citizens, it is merely a question of the size of that majority
- In order to explore further who belongs to these three identity categories a multinomial logistic regression was run. It helps to compare the characteristics of those who accept only an exclusive identity, and those who accepted both identities, with the reference category of those with a primary identity

¹⁵⁰ The Eurobarometer surveys are a rich source of information on this point

Table 8.1.1 – Multinomial Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable – Primary Identity ¹⁵¹

	Exclusive compared with primary BiH identity		Dual compared with primary BiH identity	
	β	S.E.	β	S.E.
Religion – Orthodox compared with Muslim	5.19	0.40	1.62	0.15
Religion – Catholic compared with Muslim	3.71	0.40	1.70	0.13
Entity – RS compared with Brcko	2.52	0.52	0.63	0.28
Education – Low compared with high	1.92	0.26	0.94	0.15
Entity – FBiH compared with Brcko	1.42	0.57	-	-
Education – Mid compared with high	0.99	0.23	-	-
Income – Low compared with high	0.81	0.28	0.42	0.16
Displacement status – Non-returnees compared with non-displaced	0.65	0.17	0.32	0.13
Income – Mid compared with high	0.62	0.27	-	-
Employment – Employed compared with inactive	0.42	0.19	-	-
Gender – Male compared with female	0.37	0.14	-	-
Life satisfaction – Not satisfied/other compared with satisfied	-	-	0.29	0.10
Age Cohort – Post war compared with Tito-era	-	-	0.30	0.14
Displacement status – Returnees compared with non-displaced	-	-	0.32	0.10

- Overall, people who accept dual identities lie somewhere in the middle of the other two categories, the non-BiH identifiers and the primary BiH identifiers, as representing the two extremes. The key characteristics which distinguish between these two extremes are religion, Entity and, to a lesser extent, education and income. In general, other things being equal, people with higher education and with higher incomes are more likely to primarily identify themselves as citizens of BiH
- However by far the most important factor associated with rejection of a BiH identity is religion, with Orthodox Christians being the least likely to accept a BiH identity. Religion is also associated with a preference for a dual identity, although the magnitude of the association is not as strong as in the case of rejection
- The small group (14.2% or N = 504) of respondents with an exclusive identity are therefore predominantly Orthodox (but also include some Catholic), many but not all live in the RS. They are not high-income earners, have low to middle education, and some have a history of displacement without return. Yet they tend to have jobs (rather a weak effect, however)

¹⁵¹ NOMREG identity BY r64_rec r63 q58 ent r1 r59_tito r3 r70 r68a disp_ret /CRITERIA = CIN(95) DELTA(0) MXITER(100) MXSTEP(5) LCONVERGE(0) PCONVERGE(1.0E-6) SINGULAR(1.0E-8) /MODEL /INTERCEPT = INCLUDE /PRINT = PARAMETER SUMMARY LRT . N = 3,536. As in other multi-variate models 'other' religion was omitted due to low N

Table 8.1.2 – Residency of Respondents with Exclusive Identities (<10 per Municipality)

	N =
Banja Luka	142
Prijedor	93
Novi Grad	25
Kozarska Dubica	24
Gradiska	23
Bijeljina	20
Drvar (FBiH)	15
Laktasi	14
Doboj	14
Derventa	13
Modrica	12
Trebinje	11

- In the above table there is a disaggregation of residency of respondents with exclusive identities. Municipalities with more than ten respondents with an exclusive identity are shown adding up to 406. The remaining 98 live scattered out in other places; many are in the FBiH
- As suggested by the regression analysis, Municipalities in the RS dominate with Banja Luka, Prijedor and Novi Grad heading the list

Table 8.1.3 – Cross-Tabulation in Percent – Identity and Political Action

	All	Primary	Dual	Exclusive
Talking politics – Have done	42.2	45.2	37.7	46.6
Talking politics – Might do	30.8	26.0	34.2	34.7
Voting – Have done	80.8	80.7	81.4	79.4
Voting – Might do	10.6	9.7	11.0	12.5
Joining Political Party – Have done	15.5	16.3	15.4	13.0
Joining Political Party – Might do	20.0	20.0	19.0	22.8
Joining Citizens' Group – Have done	14.3	18.3	11.5	10.4
Joining Citizens' Group – Might do	24.8	27.7	24.2	17.8
Demonstrate – Have done	9.3	14.0	6.8	2.8
Demonstrate – Might do	22.1	23.6	21.8	18.6
Political violence – Have done	6.2	6.6	3.4	13.6
Political violence – Might do	12.9	10.4	12.1	22.9

- Turning to the implications of these three identities for political involvement, there are only moderate differences in political communication and voting. More active forms of political participation such as joining a citizens' group or demonstrating are more likely to find followers among respondents with a primary BiH identity
- But there is a sizeable difference in the reverse direction on actual experience or willingness to use violence: 13.6% of those who reject a BiH identity (exclusive) report that they have used violence, while a further 22.9% say that they might do so. This compares with figures of 6.6% and 10.4% in the case of the primary identifiers. In other words, over one third of respondents with exclusive identities showed some appetite for violence compared with one in five for the overall population

- In sum therefore, respondents with exclusive identities are less likely to engage in peaceful active forms of political participation but are more than twice as likely as primary or dual identifiers to use violence in the pursuit of political aims

Table 8.1.4 – Cross-Tabulation in Percent – Identity and Trust in Institutions

	All	Exclusive	Dual	Primary
Police	67.1	79.8	68.3	61.6
Public Service TV	58.0	77.8	51.5	58.0
Municipal Authority	53.4	65.2	50.6	52.1
EU	50.5	30.3	51.6	56.1
Entity Government	43.5	71.5	45.5	32.2
Courts	40.7	49.2	39.4	39.1
OHR	34.9	18.6	33.5	41.8
EUFOR	33.1	19.2	31.1	39.9
UN	31.4	21.2	30.7	35.3
State government in Sarajevo	22.9	6.5	23.6	27.5
Political parties	14.8	16.8	15.5	13.4

- Respondents with exclusive identities are more trusting when it comes to the police, public service TV, the judiciary and especially local government (Entity and municipal). However, they place significantly less trust in the State government and, to a lesser degree in international organisations
- As for a future political structure to BiH, respondents with exclusive identities favour ‘as is’ namely the preservation of the status quo at 50.5% compared with primary identifiers at 13.6% (first choice only)

8.2 Section Summary

- Either at the primary or at the dual level between well over eight in ten respondents do not have a problem with identifying themselves with BiH citizenship. However, there is a small minority of 14.2% (or N = 504) of exclusive identifiers
- Respondents with exclusive identities tend to be Christian (Orthodox more than Catholic). Economically and in their education they tend to be at the lower end of the spectrum, yet there is no indication that they are disproportionately affected by unemployment. Some were displaced but never returned. Their trust is primarily extended to local institutions, and not to the State government or the international community. In terms of BiH’s future political structure, they strongly favour the preservation of the status quo. While the 504 are less likely to use peaceful means of political participation they are twice as likely to become violent
- The data suggest that the 504 exclusive identifiers represent a section in BiH society which requires close monitoring in preparation for any significant changes, especially constitutional ones

Section 9

Staying Informed – Media and Media Uses

9.1 Weekly Audience and trusted Source of News

- Trust in public service TV (FTV and RTRS) was briefly discussed Section 3 above. After the police, public service TV emerges as a trusted institution. At the same time logistic regression analysis shows that there are considerable sectional differences

Table 9.1.1 – Logistic Regression – Dependent Variable: Trust Public Service TV ¹⁵²

	β	S.E.
Entity – FBiH compared with RS	2.09	0.32
Religion – Muslim compared with Roman Catholic	1.27	0.12
Education – Low compared with high	0.41	0.12
Socialisation cohort – Post-Tito compared with post-war	0.41	0.11
Religion – Christian Orthodox compared with Muslim	0.34	0.13
Life satisfaction – Satisfied compared with other	0.34	0.08
Education – Mid compared with high	0.26	0.13
<i>Constant (α)</i>	-0.04	0.13

- There is a large effect from Entity: FBiH residents appear considerably more likely to trust public service TV than viewers in the RS. Similarly, Muslims are more trusting than their Christian fellow citizens
- There are also smaller effects from education (low and mid), age and life satisfaction
- This substantiates that trust in public service TV varies considerably between Entities and religious groups. This suggests a challenge for dissemination strategies which uniformly reach out to all citizens in BiH
- To turn to the consumption of media texts, the weekly audience ¹⁵³ for news in BiH is eight in ten (82.3%). Nearly six in ten (56.4%) consume news-based media texts every day ¹⁵⁴. However, 17.7% (combined score ¹⁵⁵) do not follow the news on a weekly basis, of which 4.2% never do
- For trusted sources of news ¹⁵⁶, BiH is almost exclusively TV-oriented. Avaz, the only print medium in the top ten, ranks eighth at 3.8%. Only six respondents (or 0.2%) say that the Internet is their most trusted source
- Interesting is the influence of foreign media on the BiH news market. To 11.5% (combined score) of the sample foreign channels are the most trusted source of news. This is especially true for TV stations from Croatia: 8.8% of the sample say HRT is their most trusted source, 1.2% say NOVA TV and 0.6% cite RTL-Croatia. A further 0.9% say RTS from Serbia is most trusted

¹⁵² LOGISTIC REGRESSION VAR=r20_8 /METHOD=FSTEP(LR) r64_rec r63 q58 ent r59_tito r3 r70 r1 r68a q61a disp_ret /CONTRAST (r68a)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r70)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r64_rec)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r63)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q58)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r59_tito)=Indicator /CONTRAST (disp_ret)=Indicator /CONTRAST (ent)=Indicator(1) /CONTRAST (r3)=Indicator /CONTRAST (r1)=Indicator /CONTRAST (q61a)=Indicator /CRITERIA PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5); Forward step model [5]steps. N = 3,546

¹⁵⁴ Other categories: 'several times a week' (17.2%), 'once or twice a week' (8.7%), 'less often' (13.5%) and 'never' (4.2%)

¹⁵⁵ 'Less often' 13.5% and 'never' 4.2%

¹⁵⁶ Q56

- For the regular (weekly) consumption of print texts ¹⁵⁷, close to six in ten do not read a paper regularly. 51.0% of weekly readers say they read Dnevni Avaz, 15.6% say Blic and 13.1% prefer Glas Srpski. In effect this means that Avaz maintains a commanding position in the weekly print market

Table 9.1.2 – Cross-Tabulation – Reading Newspapers Regularly With Political Action: Talking With Others About Politics

In Percent	All	Have done/Might do	Would not do
Reading regularly	43.8	48.7	30.6
Not reading	56.2	51.3	69.4

- Perhaps as expected, respondents who tend not communicate with others about politics ¹⁵⁸ are also considerably less likely to be regular readers of newspapers. In this sense, newspapers play an important role in popular political communication but with the prominence of TV this is likely to work best at the secondary level

Table 9.1.3 – Cross-Tabulation – Reading Newspapers Regularly With Identity

In Percent	All	Exclusive identity	Dual Identity	Primary identity
Reading regularly	43.7	54.9	37.9	45.8
Not reading regularly	56.3	45.1	62.1	54.2

- Respondents who have an exclusive identity are more likely to be regular readers of newspapers, especially when compared with those who have a dual identity

9.2 Section Summary

- In terms of trusting public service TV, the large difference between the Entities suggests that any dissemination strategy which is aimed at reaching the people of BiH in a uniform manner requires due attention to the computed variances. This is a critical finding for any dissemination strategy. Print appears as fairly unsuitable for primary releases as only a very small minority refers to it as a trusted source of news. However, print may be helpful in reaching people with exclusive identities
- Foreign media, mainly from Croatia, play an important role for around one in ten respondents. The effect of media output from other countries, including Serbia, is negligible


¹⁵⁷ Q57

¹⁵⁸ Q13

Section 10

Correspondence Analysis

- In order to provide an overview of the relationships between key variable explored in the sections above, correspondence analysis was chosen as a summary tool
- Technically speaking, correspondence analysis is an exploratory technique related to principal components analysis which finds a multidimensional representation of the association between the row and column categories of a two-way contingency table. This technique finds scores for the row and column categories on a small number of dimensions which account for the greatest proportion of the χ^2 for association between the row and column categories, just as principal components account for maximum variance. For graphical display two or three dimensions are typically used to give a reduced rank approximation to the data
- For a two-way table the scores for the row categories, namely x_{im} , and column categories, y_{jm} , on dimension $m = 1, \dots, M$ are derived from a singular value decomposition of residuals from independence, expressed as d_{ij} / \sqrt{n} , to account for the largest proportion of the χ^2 in a small number of dimensions. This decomposition may be expressed as
 - $\frac{d_{ij}}{\sqrt{n}} = \sum_{m=1}^M \lambda_m x_{im} y_{jm}$ (10) where $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \dots \geq \lambda_M$, and $M = \min(I-1, J-1)$. In M dimensions, the decomposition (10) is exact. A rank- d approximation in d dimensions is obtained from the first d terms on the right side of (10), and the proportion of χ^2 accounted for by this approximation is $\sum_{m=1}^d \lambda_m^2 / \chi^2$
- Thus, correspondence analysis is designed to show how the data deviate from expectation when the row and column variables are independent, as in the association plot and mosaic display. However, the association plot and mosaic display depict every cell in the table, and for large tables it may be difficult to see patterns. For this reason a graphical presentational format, a bubble chart, was chosen. On the diagrams below (Figs. 10.1.1 and 10.1.2), the size of each bubble is approximately proportional to the number of respondents it represents
- Correspondence analysis thus helps to position the findings from bi-variate, regression and factor analyses in a wider relational framework. It is perhaps less concrete in its exploration of individual themes and it is unable to provide strict rank-order perspectives. However, it is the appropriate tool for providing a multi-dimensional mapping of key types
- Critically, however, correspondence analysis is not an inferential statistical tool. It may provide a multi-dimensional image, including positioning, proximity and proportional size but there is no guarantee that the findings will hold in the population from which the sample was drawn
- There are two charts (Figs. 10.1.1 and 10.1.2). One shows the entire diagram, the other an enlargement of the main cluster for an easier review



- As correspondence analysis provides a multi-dimensional vision of the data, a myriad of interpretations can be made. The aim is to point out the overall picture rather than to over-interpret and thus to confuse the central arguments
- There are five key areas in this diagram. The socio-economic and attitudinal centre, or 'Middle-Bosnia' ¹⁵⁹, and four areas, broadly divided along the zero-axes
- In the top right-hand area, there are positive ideas and people: younger cohorts, well-to-do, informed, politically interested, contented optimists who believe they have a high degree of control over their lives. The overall trajectory of this cluster is led by high income
- The left-hand bottom area there are their opposites: older cohorts, low income, less well informed, politically non-interested, dissatisfied pessimists, who feel they have little control over what happens to them in their lives. On the centre fringe of this cluster, very close to 'Middle-Bosnia' is dual identity
- In the bottom right-hand area are returnees, respondents with primary identity, unify-BiH agendas (combining centralised and federal models) and support for the UN staying. Further away are associated ideas such as 'take fate in own hands' and 'change constitution' (for those who are aware). Telling is the relative proximity of this cluster with the positive, young and optimistic cluster in the top right-hand corner
- In the top left-hand area, and with considerable distance to all other clusters, there is a relatively small proportion of respondents with exclusive identities. They are close to 'no change' or retreatist agendas including opposition to constitutional change and calls for dividing the country. Further towards the centre but along the same line are the supporters of a UN departure, of 'other' future political models for BiH (three Entities and the resurrection of Yugoslavia) and proponents of 'move on' as opposed to 'address the war-grievances'. This shows that to some extent 'move on' is not necessarily part of a progressive agenda
- 'Middle-Bosnia' is represented by a tight cluster of large bubbles representing sizeable majorities. Fig. 10.1.2 (enlargement) helps to take a closer look at this cluster. Perhaps unsurprisingly respondents who see the situation as 'same' compared with last year and predict 'same for the future' are close to middle-free-choice and middle-satisfaction. All the 'middle categories' and non-progress ideas are at the centre of BiH society. Both 'wait for outside world' and 'people having a say on a way forward' are close indicating that they are not necessarily in contradiction. 'Big Change' and 'addressing

- The correspondence analysis therefore distinguished two main cross-cutting dimensions, one which could be described as an optimism/pessimism, young/old or economic dimension and one which could be described as a political dimension. Thus we find the optimism/pessimism dimension contrasting people with high satisfaction and optimistic views about their present and future situation with people who have low satisfaction, pessimistic expectations about the future, and low feelings of control. The second dimension has a much more political character and contrasts people with exclusive identity who wish to divide BiH or to leave the constitution as it is with people with primary identity who see future unification of BiH as a top priority and who wish the UN to stay
- While non-displaced respondents are core part of the 'Middle-Bosnia' cluster, returnees and non-returnees are apart but fairly close to the central cluster. Non-returnees are in the upper part of the optimism/pessimism, young/old or economic dimension, returnees in the lower part. Overall however, correspondences analysis shows that displaced respondents, irrespective of their return status are part of the wider orbit of 'Middle-Bosnia' and appear closer to the mainstream than respondents who have, for example, exclusive identities, low optimism and low life satisfaction or believe the UN should leave. From Section 3 it is clear that there are no systematic socio-economic differences between non-displaced respondents on the one hand and returnees and non-returnees on the other. There is only a small effect from employment status. Whatever distance can be observed between returnees/non-returnees and 'Middle-Bosnia' is likely to be more demographic and attitudinal than economic



Oxford Research International

Main Report

Focus Groups

'... Tito Made the United Nations'

*'Start small businesses, allow private initiative because this is a
transition country'*

Section 1

General Observations

The research team has conducted many of focus groups in a variety of countries and on different continents. A number of groups with young people in Central and Eastern Europe were conducted for UNICEF. A range of issues has been researched. How did the groups with IDPs in BiH differ? Interesting was the level of discipline within all groups. The moderators never had to intervene in order to stop an ill-tempered debate. Discussants were quite measured and rarely interrupted each other. On very few occasions did the moderators have to cut individuals off or ask them to be less forceful.

On the contrary, the moderators found it hard to stimulate debate on certain issues and overall, groups appeared laid-back, not to say reserved. There were only few occasions when respondents would actively suggest solutions to the problems they were describing. In fact, overall, people spent more time looking for flaws than looking for ways forward. It often took a while before discussants felt comfortable enough to discuss issues among themselves, i.e. moved away from what they initially interpreted as a question-and-answer session, to 'free-wheeling' discussion. If at all, this usually happened in the second part of the session, after participants had a chance in the break to talk informally with each other and members of the research team.

There are topics on which discussants either did not comment much or only responded after probes and prompts from the moderators. Prominent examples were the role of the UN, potential institutional support as a contributor to the decision to return, and sustainable return and integration. More lively debates ensued when corruption, advice to the Head of the UN and employment were discussed, though advice to the Minister of MHRR¹ generated less analysable material. In fact, the first issue in the discussion guide to receive any unprompted involvement was sharing participants' experiences with the assistance they had received.

Interesting too was the finding that the experiences of displaced people were fairly similar, even in different geographical areas. In fact, in core parts of the enquiry there was more sameness than difference with one group broadly confirming the findings of another. Furthermore, the anticipated differences between minority and majority returnees as well as between men and women did not emerge. Instead, major differences surfaced between young and old, and, as expected, between returnees and non-returnees. There were also notable differences between urban and rural perspectives. As a result the research team proposed to UNDP to abandon women-only groups and the dedicated recruitment of minority returnees. Because young people seemed inhibited in the presence of their elders it was decided to recruit younger discussants to special youth groups and there were five such groups. The research team thus went beyond its initial remit, and administered additional questions to youth groups, not least of all to present results on constitutional issues from the quantitative survey research to young discussants ².

As an overall observation, there was a latent sense that the research was late. On occasion this surfaced and discussants expressed this openly.

'Too much time has passed [...]'

(Woman, 25, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

¹ MHRR – Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees

² Q38 of the quantitative survey questionnaire

'[...] It is too late now after 10 years'

(Woman, 40, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

Overall, for the reporting the research team decided to provide a clear-cut evidence-based argument. Repeats in quotations are avoided. Principally, quotations stand for widely held views across a number of groups. It is made clear when there is a departure from this rule.

Section 2

Push and Pull Factors - Motivation to Stay or Go

The discussion guide included two key sections on push and pull factors as well as the gains and losses of either returning or staying displaced. While push and pull factors may have mattered at the planning stage, gains and losses were decisive in the actual outcomes of the decision to stay or return. During the groups however, discussants did not distinguish much between initial motivational aspects and actual outcomes. In their responses, participants in all groups blurred the distinctions and talked about initial motivations and final outcomes as one theme.

Across all groups, the wish to return appears as highly emotive and in some cases even nostalgic. However, those who choose to return are seeking to solve real problems in their lives, predominantly instability, insecurity and low self-esteem.

There are some comments about the general advantages of return, which receive broad agreement. These tend to split fairly between push and pull factors:

*'In general we are better off now than where we were displaced to'*³
(All agreed, returnees, Kotorsko, rural location)

'I was very unhappy while we lived in Bijeljina'
(Woman, 49, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'The sun shines brighter here'
(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

The decision to return or stay in the host community was not always a voluntary one. A few say that they had little choice as economic pressures made return inevitable.

'I had no choice but to return. If I had owned enough money, I would have stayed away'
(Woman, 49, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'[...] not to pay rent anymore'
(Man, 50, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'Poor people were forced to return to their property'
(Woman, 41, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

In terms of return, the key aspiration is to have a place of your own, which is usually but not always a displaced person's former home. Yearning to go home 'no matter what' is clearly the main pull factor for the majority. Similarly for perceived gains, being 'back home' is considered the key benefit. Some say that staying in another person's house often felt like an imposition and was perceived as transitional. Feelings of homesickness loomed large during displacement. Also, there was a sense that returning was the natural thing to do. Returnee discussants in all geographical areas sought ultimate comfort in returning to their old neighbourhoods.

'Your own house; nostalgia! You cannot stay in someone else's property forever'
(Man, 60, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

³ Translations of the verbatim have been kept closely to the native original, with minimal corrections to grammar and syntax. This was done in order to maintain maximum authenticity

'It's better here in a tent, than living there in a villa'
(Man, 40, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'The most important thing is that you are in your own house'
(Woman, 52, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'The heart wants to go where you were born'
(Woman, 41, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'The main motive is a feeling that you are in your own property'
(Youth Group, man, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

The search for security and peace matters a great deal. This includes the elimination of the fear of eviction, and ending the disruptions caused by migration. Migration often involves the fundamental reorganisation of individual lives. Understandably, discussants found moving quite unsettling and were looking forward to a time when their lives would settle down. Many sought to regain peace of mind, perhaps even irrespective of the precise circumstances.

The restoration of stability is a major theme. For some discussants, feelings of disruption were compounded by latent or even actual fears of eviction. In other words, many returnees only found stability when they returned to their former homes.

'I have found peace by being in my own house. While living in Bijeljina I always feared I would be evicted'
(Woman, 52, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'I felt a sort of personal contentment in returning; a sort of peace of mind'
(Man, 74, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

The restoration of self-esteem and social status emerges as a key motivational driver behind return. In many discussions there is a distinct sense that forced migration in itself affects people's self-esteem. In the host community, low self-esteem was compounded in cases where displaced persons would have to bear an IDP-label⁴. From a socio-psychological perspective, labels would continue to affect some people's sense of self-worth throughout their stay in the host community. Clearly, some discussants feel that there was a stigma attached to forced migration.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, an opportunity to shed this stigma is cherished by most as a key benefit of return.

'I was tired of being a stranger and being called a 'refugee' [...]'
(Woman, 45, returnee, Kotorako, rural location)

'The biggest gain is that I'm not called a 'refugee' anymore'
(Woman, 44, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'At least here they don't call us 'refugees''
(Woman, 41, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

⁴ For clarity of terminology this report refers to displaced persons as 'internally displaced persons' or 'IDPs' throughout. In original verbatim discussants frequently referred to themselves as 'refugees' which is inconsistent with strict definitory terms but has been preserved to maintain authenticity

In addition to social labels, some discussants report social exclusion in their respective host communities. Integration with non-displaced people became a real challenge as IDPs' social status was questioned and a few report that they had to endure verbal abuse. It is not surprising therefore that many yearn for a sense of community or a return to social inclusion.

'Refugees are not welcome anywhere'

(Man, 42, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'We were not accepted [...]'

(Youth Group, woman, 20, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

'The neighbours were happy to see us leave'

(Woman, 61, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'People always think of you as a foreigner or lower class'

(Man, 25, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'We were called ugly names [...]'

(Man, 72, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'I was never called by my proper name [...] instead they referred to me as 'the one from Hasan's apartment''

(Woman, 58, non-returnee, Doboj, urban location)

IDPs who return as a group find coping with the challenges considerably easier than those who return as individuals or individual families. Especially, acceptance and integration appear significantly smoother for group returnees. Discussants in Kotorsko and Gorazde talk about community spirit and communal action to facilitate return and reconstruction. Moreover, it appears that the community played an important part in the decision to return: IDPs within groups tend to convince each other to return.

'In the beginning we were all helping each other, because we knew each other from before'

(Man, 42, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'We all got displaced in the same year, and we all returned in the same year. There are no problems. We accepted each other'

(Man, 42, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'We organised ourselves and that was the best help'

(Male, 33, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

In terms of tangible gains and losses, some discussants say that their children especially lost out on return. Other participants feel that return furnished them with greater autonomy.

'It was hard for children to leave all their friends behind'

(Woman, 51, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'Whatever I grow, I know it is mine'

(Woman, 38, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'I have my own wood: firewood for free and I can cultivate my own land'

(Man, 64, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

For non-returnees, emotive drivers are of lesser importance than rational assessments. Also, to non-returnees social exclusion is much less of an issue. They seem to find it easier to adapt to new circumstances. Generally they found it easier to integrate in host communities, which many soon accepted as their new home. Moreover, to non-returnees return to the old neighbourhoods is not a precondition for stability and a sense of security.

'We started life in another place and didn't consider returning'

(Youth Group, all group agreed, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'People will accept you depending on the way you behave'

(Man, 25, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I feel safer in the town I was displaced to'

(Woman, 40, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'I feel at home where I live now'

(Youth Group, man, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

Prominently, non-returnees talk about time as an important factor in weakening their desires to return: lives moved on.

'The longer you stay, the less likely you are to return'

(Man, 53, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'We only thought about returning in the first year after the war. After that it was not really an option'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

In terms of social inclusion, non-returnees feel that they have created a new life, especially in places where displaced people became a majority. However integration is not simply a matter for the individual but involves a process in which entire families are integrated. To some, leaving their host community would entail losses, predominantly the loss of social relationships.

'My entire family feels accepted'

(Woman, 51, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'Displaced people became a majority in Banja Luka. We were accepted'

(Man, 51, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'It would be difficult to return now. We would have to start out again - making friends and connections'

(Woman, 25, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

There is a clear recognition of the opportunity structures in their host communities. Conversely, discussants also talk about the lack of opportunities in their former home settlements. Some are dismissive about the places they came from. There is also the notion that urban areas provide greater opportunities than villages and smaller towns.

'In eastern BiH there are no prospects'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'The stupid one lives where he was born. The smart one lives where he feels better'

(Man, 65, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'[...] there are fewer opportunities in small towns compared to Sarajevo'
(All agreed, non-returnees, Sarajevo, urban location)

'There are more opportunities in bigger towns [...]'
(Woman, 40, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

To further the idea that predominantly rational arguments kept non-returnee discussants in their respective host communities, employment emerges powerfully. In several areas, this report will show that employment is a central concern in return, and especially in sustainable return. Employment opportunities are also reported as a factor in non-return. This idea is supported by a majority of discussants across all relevant groups. It is especially true for young and middle-aged non-returning discussants.

'Job opportunities are the deciding factor [...]'
(Woman, 26, non-returnee, Doboj, urban location)

'If they find a job, then people decide where they are going to stay [...]'
(Woman, 43, non-returnee, Doboj, urban location)

'If there was a chance of employment in the place of return, I would go there.'
(Man, 25, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

For those with children, education plays an important role. Many discussants appear unwilling to disrupt or otherwise jeopardise the education of their children by returning to their old environment. In two groups virtually unanimously ⁵, school is mentioned as a reason for staying. Once children are established in school, parents appear reluctant to move them, especially if they feel that schools in their kin communities are inadequate.

'A big factor in staying was education'
(All agreed, non-returnees, Banja Luka, urban location)

'School played a major role in our reasons for staying'
(All agreed, non-returnees, Doboj, urban location)

'The school hasn't been reconstructed, and that is probably the reason why many people still haven't returned'
(Man, 42, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

For some, return appears as one way of addressing perceived injustices created by the war. There is a distinct sense that return is defying the causes which led to displacement in the first place. In a few comments, especially by younger discussants in Sarajevo notions of revenge loom large.

'Show them that they have not succeeded in creating a mono-ethnic area. This would be a motive for returning'
(Man, 24, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'One day when we retire, we may go back. We will show them that we are not defeated'
(Man, 25 non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

⁵ Banja Luka Urban and Doboj Urban

To only very few discussants, displacement means non-integration in neither host nor kin community. As one middle-aged lady (non-returnee) put it:

'We are neither accepted here, nor where we were born'

(Woman, 52, non-returnee, Doboj, urban location)

At the beginning of their return many returnee discussants expected to return to their pre-war lives. There was the notion that people could re-construct their previous existence. Some talk about the old factories, others about the certainties of life in socialist Yugoslavia. In the event, however, returnees learn that the world has changed, that they have changed and that a return 'to the world we have lost' was an illusion. Especially, returning to a life without a job is cited as a key disappointment by a few.

'When we thought about returning, we were thinking about going back to the life we had before the war'

(Woman, 56, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Once my desire for return was fulfilled, my disappointment began'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'I would never have returned if I had known that I would not be able to find a job for five years'

(Woman, 38, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

Section Summary

Distinctions between push and pull and gains and losses appear blurred. Discussants see such issues as largely marching hand in hand.

Broadly speaking, the desire to return to the kin community is emotive, the motivation to remain in the host community is rational. For returnees, especially being in one's own home but also regaining stability and security through peace of mind and ending social exclusion are key. In many cases, returnees are keen to end fears of eviction, lose a stigma and restore their social status and self-esteem. To some return brings greater autonomy. For others return appears as a way of addressing the injustices of the war. More rational considerations are less important.

For non-returnees, social inclusion means first and foremost integration into the host community. In a way they appear more adaptable. With time the desire to return wanes. Rational considerations such as employment, perceived greater opportunities and education keep non-returnees in host communities. Often they have few good things to say about the places they originally came from.

Overall, returnees seem to be motivated by an idea: the idea to return. Non-returnees clearly contemplate their present circumstances and are determined by those. The gains and losses from the decision to return or stay broadly match the considerations which supported that decision in the first place, namely push and pull factors.

Some returnees hoped to be able resurrect their pre-war existence. Many soon realised that the world had changed and that the certainties of socialist Yugoslavia, including a secure job, would not return.

Community spirit, communal action and group dynamics appear as a powerful agent in return. Discussants in Kotorско and Gorazde report that the fact that they helped each other made things a lot easier.

Section 3

The Role of Assistance in the Decision to Return

The moderator asked discussants to think back to the time when they were considering returning. The central question was if, at the time, they understood how NGOs and government agencies could help them. In the event, it turned out that it was less a question of how but more one of awareness of any assistance per se.

De facto, in most groups discussants were not aware of assistance before those who decided to return actually did so. As one example in a wider picture, in the urban group in Doboj there was unanimity on the observation of one discussant that virtually no-one knew much about potential assistance at the start of the return process. Assistance was perceived primarily as humanitarian relief, and not necessarily as support for sustainable return. Thus, broadly speaking, assistance was not an incentive for return.

'There wasn't much information. There weren't many international organisations around back then'

(Man, 47, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'I knew that humanitarian organisations were present in BiH, but I didn't know how they were helping. For example, UNDP, Mercy Corps, USAID, but I didn't know how they provide assistance'

(Man, 60, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

It therefore follows that the prospect of assistance was not at all a crucial motivational driver behind the decision to return. In other words, discussants were willing to return to their former neighbourhoods, irrespective of any potential assistance being available.

'Even though I knew that there were no prospects, I returned'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'I didn't expect that anyone would help us'

(Woman, 52, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

This re-enforces the findings in Section 2. The key motivational catalysts were emotive and not necessarily rational. This includes an awareness of potential incentive structures.

Section Summary

This summary is short: assistance did not play a role in returnees' decision to return, as returnees were not aware of the availability of assistance when they made the decision to return.

Section 4

The Facts about Assistance

Discussants were asked to say who helped them or who made things difficult for them. It is obvious that returnees talk primarily about their return and non-returnees about integration into their respective host communities.

Returnees give international organisations (IO) and NGOs most credit for their assistance in return. There is no mention of local (BiH) NGOs. Participants also talk about 'humanitarian organisations' by which IOs and NGOs are meant.

'The biggest role was played by humanitarian organisations, because they gave us money for house reconstruction'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'International organisations assisted our return, the municipality only coordinated it'

(Man, 47, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'The NGO which gave me assistance for reconstructing my house really helped me'

(Woman, 74, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

At this point disagreement emerges between groups. Some groups assert that local representatives were, on the whole, helpful; others claim they were frustrated with local co-ordination. Some returnees in Kotorsko and Tuzla praise the work of local representatives. Travnik and Gorazde groups are angered by the lack of help from local intermediaries. There is however, no mention of an active or systematic disruption of the return process. If anything, inactivity is identified as the problem.

'Local community representatives helped with return. They were elected during the time of displacement, and then worked on behalf of the village'

(Man, 68, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'Two representatives from our community helped a lot, because they tried to find assistance for people [...]'

(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'I am angry with local authorities for not helping me, but grateful to international organisations'

(Man, 46, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'Local community representatives made it harder for us as they never organised any assistance for returnees [...]'

(Woman, 56, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

As for non-returnees, they say friends, relatives, and even people whom they had never met before, helped them integrate in their host communities. Interestingly, unlike returnees, non-returnees talk about individuals rather than organisations or local intermediaries. Also, assistance to non-returnees is not necessarily systematically organised but depends largely on individual initiative. In addition, there is a high level of solidarity between people with similar experiences.

'I was helped by friends and relatives'

(Woman, 20, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'We were helped mostly by people who had been through the same problems as ourselves'

(Woman, 25, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'We helped each other. Those who had the same background [...]'

(Woman, 25, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

There are no complaints as to the actual quantity of assistance received. Returnees may not have been aware of potential assistance at the time they were thinking about their return, however, most of them say they received some assistance later.

Three main forms of assistance are reported: the reconstruction of dwellings ('turnkey' assistance), the delivery of construction materials and the provision of livestock. In some cases a combination of assistance was provided.

'Key in hand [turnkey], reconstruction work done by an NGO – Hilfswerk Austria'

(Woman, 47, returnees, Tuzla, rural location)

'I received building materials [...] self-help – I had to do the building myself'

(Man, 50, returnees, Gorazde, rural location)

'I received cows [...]'

(Woman, 42, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

While there are no reported problems about the overall amount of assistance, some discussants say they were unhappy with the inequity in its distribution. In fact, it is possible to argue that alleged inequality tainted overall perceptions of assistance. It certainly affected the fabric of communal structures and systems of solidarity which exist between people with similar fates.

'Some NGOs were giving assistance for house reconstruction, some delivered livestock, machinery, food. Some people got more while others got less or nothing. It's not fair'

(Man, 40, returnees, Gorazde, rural location)

'[...] there was tension, because some got more assistance and others got less'

(Man, 73, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

In contrast with their returnee compatriots, people who chose not to return received little or no assistance at all. There is overwhelming agreement on this issue in non-returnee groups. Whatever assistance was extended to them tended to consist of short-term aid such as food parcels and humanitarian aid during the initial stages of their displacement. Some say they received privileged access to legal advice for displaced persons.

'Nobody really got anything of substance apart from a few food parcels but nothing to really live on'

(Man, 58, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'I asked for a plot of land – my son did not get anything. We never received any assistance'

(Woman, 52, non-returnee, Dobo, urban location)

'Maybe received a bag of flour some time ago, but I never asked for anything'
(Woman, 47, non-returnee, Dobo, urban location)

In contrast to returnees, non-returnees are not as interested in assistance. They do not appear to have actively sought assistance at any time during their displacement, and relayed a greater sense of self-reliance.

'Certain individuals would not accept aid out of principle'
(Man, 51, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'I did not know that there were any NGOs present. I never asked for anything'
(Woman, 43, non-returnee, Dobo, urban location)

Unlike the quantity of assistance, the quality is widely seen as problematic. The quality of construction materials and the standard of workmanship are especially questioned.

'In general we are all unhappy with the quality of workmanship and the material, as we had to redo much of the work'
(All agreed, returnees, Foca, rural location)

'I am not happy with the quality of assistance because the windows fell out and I didn't get the roofing materials I needed'
(Woman, 45, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'In general we were not happy with the quality of the workmanship, the walls cracked and the bathrooms were not fitted properly [...]'
(Woman, 52, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

Similarly, the timing of assistance is a concern. There is virtual unanimity across many of the returnee groups on this subject. Reported delays in assistance ranged from a few months to as much as eleven years in one individual case. One discussant describes a delay where he waited until the Winter before the workers arrived. It is interesting in itself that some discussants would wait for months and sometimes years for institutional assistance rather than solve their problems by means of individual initiative.

'After waiting for months we received building materials from FIDA'
(Woman, 51, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'I waited for three years to get my house reconstructed'
(Man, 47, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'I waited eleven years to get assistance'
(Man, 40, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'The assistance was not received at the right time. The work was completed in Winter when it is not the season for this type of work'
(Youth Group, man, 26, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

Nevertheless, it appears that timing was not mission-critical. No severe consequences ensued from any delays discussants experienced. In fact, despite sporadic long waiting times, many returnees were grateful for whatever assistance they received.

'People in general are grateful for the assistance they received'
(All agreed, returnees, Kotorsko, rural location)

The issue of corruption fired discussants' imagination. Even less engaged groups came alive when the moderator mentioned corruption. The discussion opened up and many participants joined in. The topic seemed to inspire interest in most groups, particularly in Travnik and Kotorosko. However, the discussion remained at the level of describing corruption rather than offering solutions for fighting it. Some discussants talk about actual experiences of corruption which they encountered. Others relate stories about people they know. In some cases, bribes failed to achieve their desired effect.

'I paid KM 1,600 to [...] in order to get assistance. It never happened'

(Man, 63, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Vicious circle, the returnees were offering bribes, and the officials were taking them'

(Man, 40, returnee, Kotorosko, rural location)

'We were used to paying to be included on the list. On one occasion I was told I would be included on the list if I paid for lunch. I paid for lunch but I never received any assistance'

(Man, 36, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'On corruption – they would bring materials for five houses, then distribute it in such a way that people would never know how much material they were supposed to get, and how much they actually received'

(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

Critically, neither international organisations nor NGOs are alleged to be corrupt by any significant number of discussants. Whatever allegations are made tend to be directed at intermediaries and not at their funders.

'Representatives in local communities were not supposed to be in a position to make decisions about who gets assistance and who doesn't. Some people received assistance four times, and they also gave assistance to their family members'

(Woman, 49, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Corruption was happening at the local level'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorosko, rural location)

Section Summary

There is no mention of active or systematic obstruction to the return process. However, inactivity, especially by local representatives, is mentioned and some participants are frustrated. But there is no mention of concerted efforts to discourage returnees.

International organisations are well thought of: they are credited with the successes of assistance, and, at the same time, are generally perceived as honest. Participants seem to enjoy talking about corrupt people and processes. Local intermediaries are primarily blamed for corruption. However, the fact that discussants were not aware of any effective control over the distribution of funds and materials contaminated participants' trust in the integrity of the entire process.

There are no complaints about the overall quantity of assistance. This in itself appears as a major achievement. Returnees were, in effect helped once they had returned. Reconstruction and initial assistance with livelihoods were important foundations on which

returnees built their existences. However, perceived inequality in its distribution and the overall quality give cause for concern. It appears that quality control is an issue. Moreover, inequity in the distribution of assistance atomises recipients and affects solidarity systems and the local social fabric.

Delays in assistance appear more as a nuisance than mission-critical. As for the dependency on institutional support, it is interesting to note that some discussants would wait for years for assistance rather than solve their problems through individual initiative.

Broadly, non-returnees emerge as more self-reliant: there is a mix of not receiving assistance but also of not asking for it, or being too proud to accept it. If they received anything non-returnees benefited from humanitarian relief early in their displacement.

Section 5

Logistics or Sustainability of Return

Discussants were asked to comment on two ways of assisting return. One is to reconstruct homes and assist with transport; the other is to help returnees make a living once they have actually returned.

In terms of assistance with transport, only one discussant in all 20 groups received logistical assistance in actually returning to his former home. The following quotation is therefore entirely a singular one:

'UNHCR transported our belongings from Drvar'
(Youth Group, man, 24, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

In Section 4 above it was reported that, broadly speaking, non-returnees neither sought nor received much assistance. In fact, overall non-returnees appeared more self-reliant than their returnee compatriots. When asked about sustainability, some talk about long-term perspectives but, at the same time they appear keen to be responsible for their own futures. Nevertheless, some do see room for outside support and favour assistance for enhancing livelihoods rather than housing and stop-gap relief.

Overall, there is demand for assistance from some (but by no means all) non-returnee discussants. This limited demand is aimed at securing long-term socio-economic prospects, particularly jobs.

'You should have the means to build your own future, be it where you are displaced to or where you have returned to'
(Man, 24, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'It is not just about getting a roof over your head. We need jobs, we need everything to continue our lives'
(Man, 53, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

In Section 3 above it was established that there was virtually no awareness of potential assistance at the time when people decided to stay or go. It therefore follows that discussants were in a better position to discuss dimensions of sustainability than of the logistics of return. To an overwhelming majority of returnee discussants, initial assistance with reconstruction was a necessary condition but not sufficient to secure a durable solution. In other words, for many, assistance with housing does not go far enough; support for livelihoods is repeatedly requested.

'You cannot eat walls. People need some assistance [...]'
(Woman, 37, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Return itself does not mean anything, if people don't work and have no financial means for living'
(Woman, 49, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'People cannot just look at their house. They need to make a living somehow, maybe livestock or machines'
(Man, 40, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'It is not enough just to return people. They need to make a living [...]

(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

With such demands, in many groups there was also a latent recognition that assistance can lead to dependency. It is perhaps understandable that admissions of dependency may be muted by social desirability bias. Nevertheless, a few discussants openly talk about the dependency which assistance and unemployment can breed.

'If people had jobs in the first place, they wouldn't have needed humanitarian aid. Everyone would be able to earn their money, and fix their house themselves. People became lazy'

(Man, 60, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'We should not expect everything to be served to us'

(Youth Group, Woman, 25, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

The moderator asked discussants to describe what is meant by 'sustainable return/integration' ⁶. As an immediate reaction, many groups are silent. Slowly, discussants grapple with the terms and come up with a variety of interpretations, most of which are close to the actual meaning. Interestingly, contributions from non-returnees denote notions of self-reliance. Returnees, on the other hand, see home, livelihoods and, especially, employment as vital. Overall, however, 'sustainability' remained an administrative term for most.

'Long term sustainable integration means that each individual can look after themselves and cater for themselves on their own'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'To create an existence with your own means'

(Man, 25, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Sustainable return means normal life which can only exist if you have employment'

(Woman, 42, returnee, Kotorosko, rural location)

'Sustainable return means to have electricity, water, telephone and employment'

(Man, 60, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Sustainable return means that you should live in your own property and work'

(Woman, 37, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

Employment emerges as the most powerful theme, especially in the returnee groups. In fact, in some groups, debates about employment (as in discussions on corruption) had to be cut short to allow time for other themes. This issue certainly stimulated discussants and appears as their greatest concern. In fact, some discussants argue that they would leave their reconstructed home for a job. On the importance of employment, returnees and non-returnees tend to agree.

'The most important thing is employment'

(Woman, 49, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'I would leave my house, if I could go and get a job somewhere'

(Woman, 37, returnee Foca, rural location)

⁶ Non-returnees were asked about sustainable integration

'Employment is crucial'

(Man, 29, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'Jobs, jobs, jobs [...]'

(Woman, 26, non-returnee, Dobo, urban location)

Beyond jobs, discussants ask for means of production as a contribution to sustainability, and this is especially the case in rural locations. Farm machinery, tools and other agricultural assets top the list of requests. Land in itself is not an issue. Overall, returnees tend to ask for both jobs and means of production, non-returnees talk more about employment per se.

'It would be useful for people to receive tools and machinery'

(Man, 43, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'[...] People need some assistance, a cow or something similar'

(Woman, 37, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'They should ensure that people can cultivate their land'

(Woman, 74, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'Agriculture should be an additional activity. First we need proper jobs'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorako, rural location)

Some discussants also recognise that tools and machinery are not ends in themselves. Beyond production and the means of production, markets and marketing are an important consideration, especially for agricultural produce. Outside assistance is envisaged to kick-start outlet channels but sometimes notions of autarky surface. Overall, discussants make it clear that support for production (including credit) requires support for distribution.

'Everybody would produce if they were able to sell; that is the problem!'

(Man, 72, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'I have a cow, but I give the milk to the pigs'

(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'Bring a German to restart the local dairy [...] now we have cows, but no dairy to deliver the milk. We still have to repay the credit for the cows'

(Woman, 56, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'We should work on production in this country, so we wouldn't need to import. Job creation – instead of importing livestock and meat. People don't want to do it, because they can't sell it anywhere. There should be some help in setting up markets'

(Man, 67, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

At the same time, there are ideas of higher levels of social organisation, or co-operatives, to pool resources and move things forward. Such ideas are expressed without prompts from the moderators and, when mentioned, are met with virtually unanimous agreement. Once more the significance of communal structures and activities are presented as a possible strategy for returnees to help themselves:

'One big tractor with the attachments so that we can cultivate the land: organise an agricultural co-operative so that everyone can benefit from it'
(Woman, 39, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'Not to distribute tools and machinery to individuals, rather organise workshops or groups who receive assistance and organise themselves'
(Man, 56, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

When discussants are asked to comment on access to services, they hesitate before discussing access to health services as the only one of any significance.

'Health is also important for sustainability'
(Man, 56, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'Services are available but we need to pay for everything, even if we have a health card'
(Woman, 42, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

Equally, prompts regarding an improved road network and public transport are met with initial hesitation. Transport infrastructure, unlike employment is not a major theme. Social isolation, despite moderator prompts is not discussed.

'In general we are in need of public transport to our village [...]'
(Woman, 67, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'There is a village in the area that has public transport going there only once a week. They are cut off from the rest of the world, especially in Winter'
(All agreed, returnees, Foca, rural location)

When asked to consider fighting corrupt processes, discussants do not propose solutions. Most find it more congenial to discuss incidents of corruption rather than offering solutions. In a way, corruption is accepted as a way of life. Participants are clear that life without corruption would be better yet they do not see how they can fight it; neither do they give much thought to possible solutions.

'Corruption here is the biggest problem. Nothing happens without it'
(Man, 23, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'Corruption is at a level we cannot influence'
(All agreed, non-returnees, Banja Luka, urban location)

'Corruption was around from the time we received house reconstruction assistance, through to the time of distribution of cows and stables'
(Woman, 62, Tuzla, rural location)

'If there was no corruption, we would all eat with a golden spoon'
(Man, 46, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

Section Summary

There was very little in terms of actual logistical support for returnees. To some, the reconstruction of properties and initial help with livelihoods does not go far enough. Many returnees request continued support beyond a kick-start to their lives. There certainly is the idea that institutional assistance is critical for improving people's employment prospects. Returnees also ask for means of production. Latently, there is the notion that displaced people, especially returnees, are owed something. At the same time, there is awareness that assistance and unemployment can breed dependency and inactivity. A few discussants say this openly.

At the same time, non-returnees once more appear as more self-reliant and less dependent on institutional assistance. There is demand for assistance from some but not all non-returnees. If anything non-returnees are asking for help with their employment prospects. In fact, jobs emerge as the critical issue for virtually all displaced people.

On questions about assistance key differences emerge between returnees and non-returnees. Non-returnees tend to look for solutions in themselves, returnees look for external support.

Overall, discussants have no answers as to what to do about corrupt processes. In a way they see it as a way of life and appear powerless to curb it.

Sporadically there are unprompted ideas for higher levels of social organisation, especially the pooling of local resources. Whenever such notions emerge, they are met with broad agreement. This underlines the significance of communal structures and activities in self-help systems.

The term sustainable return/integration is first met with lack of comprehension. However, once discussions proceed most discussants are able to present definitions which are close to the administrative meaning.

Section 6

Perceived Roles of the UN

To start the section on perceived UN roles, the moderator asked non-returnee participants if they feel they are still owed something i.e. if they feel entitled to compensation ⁷. There are few focussed answers, however, two main camps can be distinguished: some think compensation is owed; others do not. Interestingly, employment issues once more come to the fore as some discussants say that compensation would not actually be needed if jobs existed. In effect, discussants propose employment as compensation.

'We should be given what we lost [...] those who were displaced are entitled to compensation, it is their right'

(Man, 53, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'People feel that they are entitled to compensation in some way just because their house has been damaged. Today they are homeless'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'Nobody owes us anything'

(Youth Group, woman, 23, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'I don't think I am owed anything'

(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'We wouldn't need assistance at all, if we all worked'

(Woman, 43, non-returnee, Dobo, urban location)

The moderator went on to ask all participants (both returnees and non-returnees) to comment on how the UN helps returnees. Here comes one of the critical moments in all 20 groups: initially there was silence. At first, discussants simply cannot think of answers. The moderator purposefully remained silent and waited for discussants to come forward with any ideas at all. A few people then mention the UN's past role in establishing peace and distributing humanitarian aid. There is also some mention of the UNHCR and the UNDP in a few groups. Two people mention UNDP support for a dairy.

'They send humanitarian aid'

(Man, 29, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'The UN helped to achieve peace'

(Man, 56, returnee, Kotorako, rural location)

'The UNHCR helped, they are part of the UN'

(Man, 33, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'UNDP supports big projects e.g. dairies'

(Youth Group, man, 26, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

⁷ After all, Annex VII of the DPA undertakes to compensate displaced persons even those who cannot return

When it came to how the UN should help (i.e. to help integrate non-returnees and generally help returnees) discussions came alive again. Broadly, there are five main areas where discussants think the UN should concentrate in order to help them:

- Job creation
- Provision of capital equipment such as livestock and machinery especially in rural areas
- Support in developing markets and channels
- Greater transparency and accountability in its dealings
- Improvements in public relations and communication

The above five points are all important but not equally important. When the question is raised an overwhelming majority of returnees turn immediately to unemployment. Older participants suggest re-opening factories, which were closed during the war. As with push and pull factors in Section 2, there is a yearning for the security of pre-war times especially from older age cohorts. Quite a few discussants recommend that the UN help the young to gain access to the labour market and, importantly, see the future in the hands of the young.

'Re-open factories, put UN people in charge'

(Man, 60, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'To start factories, so people can start working'

(Woman, 61, Gorazde, rural location)

'To return people to the positions they had before the war'

(Woman, 52, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'The future lies with young people'

(Woman, 41, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'They should help younger people to get jobs'

(Woman, 53, Tuzla, rural location)

While older participants suggest primarily collective, past-oriented solutions, younger discussants are more interested in individual, future-oriented entrepreneurial models. They tend to favour investment in small business initiatives and vocational training. Some recognise that BiH is primarily a transition country. Others ask explicitly for education abroad. At the same time, young people do not see themselves as initiators: all of their suggestions imply external stimuli. This is in keeping with findings in Section 8 below.

'Provide training for people to do things; grow mushrooms, farm snails and bees'

(Woman, 22, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Start small businesses, allow private initiative because this is a transition country'

(Youth Group, Woman, 26, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Transfer their knowledge to us – seminars, courses, education in foreign countries'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'To organise as many seminars as possible. Also some courses on starting up small businesses'

(Man, 24, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

In rural areas, discussants think the UN could help with capital equipment and marketing. They suggest investment in (agricultural) machinery and livestock. Furthermore, a number mention that markets and outlets for agricultural produce are essential. This reiterates the marketing theme in Section 4. Many comments underline a latent sense of dependency on institutional input.

'Give us machines - means for employment!'

(Man, 43, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'They should give people cows, sheep [...]'

(Man, 39, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'Find a market for products to be sold'

(Youth Group, woman, 25, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'People who provide assistance, should also provide a market for the products'

(Man, 39, returnee, Foca, rural location)

There are a small number of comments regarding the *modus operandi*. To a few discussants it is not the volume of assistance that is critical but the way it is targeted and distributed.

'To control all the assistance that they give. It should be spent properly'

(Man, 44, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'There was some assistance, but not to the right places. They should have a way of controlling things according to their criteria'

(Man, 43, returnee, Foca, rural location)

Some discussants, especially those in youth groups make the point that the UN in BiH needs to take a new approach to the way it communicates with the public. Overall greater visibility is mentioned. As most groups seemed uniformed about the UN's remit and activities, this appears to be an important point.

'I think they should make themselves more visible to the people in the ways that they help and how to get help from them as we are not aware that there are offices which can help [...] a lack of information is the worst problem'

(Youth Group, man, 23, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'I wish they would open up more to young educated people so we could speak more positively about them'

(Youth Group, woman, 23, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

Section Summary

Beyond the latent assumption that displaced people are owed something, in this section discussants openly articulate such sentiments. Interestingly, some who think they are owed something think that what they are owed is employment.

When it comes to concrete ideas on how the UN helps, at first discussants are not sure what to say. After prompts they talk primarily about past roles of the UN. It appears that many discussants are confused about current UN activity. The UN is not necessarily perceived as a development partner. Its brand image remains vague. At the same time,

discussants have clear ideas as to how the UN could be helping. It appears that information about the UN, its sub-organisations, and its current range of activities is yet to crystallise at the local level. Younger participants encourage the UN to increase its visibility, build its brands and communicate its mandate and policies directly.

The young are seen as the key to the future. People of different ages agree that investing in the young makes sense.

Regarding future interventions, an age split emerges: older discussants ask for collective and past models, the young for entrepreneurial and future concepts. Older people suggest investment in capital equipment such as machinery. Especially in rural areas, machinery is an important consideration. In addition, the marketing of agricultural produce, namely developing channels and markets resurfaces as an important concern.

Younger participants on the other hand, propose investment in human resources and mention interventions such as knowledge and skills. A few explicitly ask for tertiary education abroad. Some also see BiH primarily as a transition country. It appears that young people have fairly clear ideas about viable solutions to their problems; some seem ready to get involved. It may be low-level and it may be latent but there is entrepreneurial spirit among the young. Critically, however, young people do not see themselves as initiators: all their suggestions require some element of outside stimulation.

Irrespective of external stimuli, it is generally the case that discussants have a clear idea as to what the UN can do for them at this stage: the young envisage a transfer of skills, assistance in developing business ideas, education abroad and vocational training. Older discussants ask for capital equipment and marketing systems to sell agricultural produce. Only a few ask for loans.

Above all and irrespective of age, discussants are asking for initiatives to put people back to work. Whatever assistance the UN may decide upon, discussants are clear that it should be well-directed and distributed.

Section 7

Advice to the Head of the UN and the MHRR

Overall, the discussion on advice to the Head of the UN, Christine McNab ⁸ was quite engaging. Discussants felt this was their opportunity to have an impact. However, groups repeated each other and the overwhelming majority of the advice could easily be grouped. In addition, it was not difficult to find telling quotations to illustrate and authenticate the various suggestions. There are also various pieces of advice to the Minister of the MHRR; however, advice to the Minister was less forthcoming. Questions regarding advice to the Minister were administered after the Moderator had asked for advice to the Head of the UN. It is not inconceivable that whatever advice people wanted to provide, had already been given to the Head of the UN.

In many ways, advice to the Head of the UN echoes UN role assignments given in Section 6. However, the Head of the UN is perceived as a locus of authority with the power to move things forward.

First and foremost, discussants ask the Head of the UN to be more direct in her communication with locals. People seem keen to make direct contact with her. In effect, this means by-passing local intermediaries.

Discussants also ask for greater accountability and transparency. Many participants see her as a trustworthy authority that could act as a watchdog in the fight against the improper use of funds by local intermediaries. Beyond requests for direct and transparent communication there are calls for policies which support employment.

'She should come here and speak directly to ordinary people and hear their problems directly from them'

(Man, 42, returnee Kotorsko, rural location)

'She should come and visit us like you did, so we could tell her directly what we need; we have had enough promises!'

(Man, 40, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'She should come and see for herself what the situation is'

(Youth Group, man, 21, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'She should take a group of young people, hear their opinions and go in that direction'

(Woman, 22, non-returnee Sarajevo, urban location)

'If they have a programme, then they should work directly, and not through local administrators'

(Woman, 37, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'Form a team and go around BiH, but not to talk to the authorities, but to people who are returnees'

(Man, 50, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'She should provide employment so that people can make a living'

(Woman, 57, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

⁸ Christine McNab was not mentioned by name in the discussions but it was made clear that the Head of the UN is female

'She should work on employment'
(Woman, 41, returnee, Foca, rural location)

Ms McNab is asked to invest in SME start-up initiatives and, more generally, to create employment opportunities, especially for the young.

'Small businesses and employment for young people'
(Man, 60, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'Provide younger people with jobs or at least provide them with low interest loans so that they are able to start up their own small business'
(Woman, 26, non-returnee, Dobož, urban location)

'Employment – many younger people would return if there was employment'
(Woman, 62, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'To help younger people get jobs'
(Woman, 26, returnee, Foca, rural location)

As mentioned above, some discussants see a need for the Head of the UN to ensure more transparency in UN spending. There are very few suggestions that the UN is corrupt, in a way discussants are simply asking for information, which would give them a better understanding as to how and where funds are invested. TV is mentioned as a potential platform.

'If they give assistance, make it transparent – on TV – in order to inform people'
(Woman, 43, non-returnee, Dobož, urban location)

'To control where the money goes'
(Man, 24, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'To provide an insight into who received what, so that based on this information, they can continue their work'
(Man, 44, returnee, Foca, rural location)

Much of the advice to the Minister requests direct contact with policy recipients. This echoes the advice already given to the Head of the UN. After discussants advised the Head of the UN, they struggled to find additional advice for the Minister. However, repeatedly discussants invite the Minister to visit them. Some discussants in the Foca group advise the Minister not to rely on Municipalities for information, but to establish more direct lines of communication.

'To visit returnees and see how they live'
(Man, 33, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

'He should visit us and have a chat with us so we can give him information, he should not just go to the Municipality'
(Man, 40, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'They should send their colleagues to the field [...] not go through the Municipality'
(Man, 44, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'To visit people as much as he can'
(Man, 57, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

In concrete terms, a number of non-returnees feel that the Minister is too far removed from the realities of displacement.

'When he is talking about refugees, he should have the facts. I suspect that he does not have the experiences of displacement'

(Woman, 30, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

'Is he a displaced person? They should appoint a person who has been through the same things we have'

(Woman, 43, non-returnee, Doboj, urban location)

One discussant in Tuzla speaks for many. She feels that the Minister should only promise what he can expect to realise. There is a sense that past promises have not been fulfilled.

'To visit us but this visit should be fruitful instead of just coming and giving unrealistic promises'

(Woman, 47, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

Unlike for the Head of the UN who is assigned the role of a trustworthy watchdog, there are occasional signs of a lack of confidence in the Minister. This is compounded by requests for him to act rather than speak. More extreme views include the idea that the Ministry be closed down altogether, not least of all to signal that displacement and return had now become an issue of the past.

'Start implementing what he says'

(Woman, 18, non-returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I don't trust the Minister, he only talks'

(Man, 73, returnee, Kotorako, rural location)

'Sack and replace if possible'

(Woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'If he is not capable of doing things properly, he should go'

(Man, 66, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'The best thing would be to close the Ministry. This would mean that all the problems are solved in the area of displacement'

(Man, 58, non-returnee, Banja Luka, urban location)

There are however, two exceptions. In the Kotorako groups it emerged that the Minister had visited the village the day before the groups were convened. The effect was immediate; the Minister was seen in a positive light. In Gorazde too, positive views outweigh negative ones.

'The Minister was here, he is an honest man and he will help us'

(Man, 42, returnee, Kotorako, rural location)

'I think that he is a good man'

(Woman, 42, returnee, Gorazde, rural location)

In addition, discussants clearly see his role in providing equal rights. Moreover, they assign responsibility for safeguarding equal rights to the Minister rather than to the Head of the UN.

'We do not have the same rights as Serbs (in RS). Our rights should be returned to us'

(Woman, 40, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

'He should pass a law which states that all people in BiH have the same rights, the ones in Sarajevo and us here'

(Man, 39, returnee, Foca, rural location)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, discussants suggest that the Minister ought to tackle their core problem, namely unemployment.

'Open the factories so people can work'

(Woman, 51, returnee, Tuzla, rural location)

'Even if they gave me a sky-scraper, I would pack my things and go where the chance of getting work is better'

(Woman, 41, returnee, Foca, rural location)

'The most needed thing is employment'

(Woman, 37, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

'If it is possible to pull any strings, then restart two companies in Turbe'

(Man, 60, returnee, Travnik, rural location)

One discussant identifies the need for the Minister to continue efforts in returning IDPs to their rightful homes. However, this is an isolated request.

'Return those who still have not returned, everyone should go back to their own house'

(Woman, 29, returnee, Kotorsko, rural location)

Section Summary

While there was a lot of advice, much of it was easily grouped and falls under a limited number of headings. Both the Head of the UN and, to a lesser degree the Minister are seen as figures of authority; people who can make things happen. Discussants were eager to give their advice, yet most was given to the Head of the UN. At the same time both figures appear remote and there is little authentic information about either person.

According to discussants in all parts of BiH, the Head of the UN is advised to make direct contact with local people and hear their concerns. There are no contributions which suggest the Head of the UN should be involved in the provision of equal rights; such advice is reserved for the Minister. Beyond going direct, Ms McNab should bypass local intermediaries in policy implementation and create greater transparency. There are very few suggestions that the UN is corrupt. Discussants would simply like to know more about the way the organisation invests its funds. In a way the Head of the UN is perceived as a guarantor against local corruption. Unsurprisingly, she is asked to support initiatives which create employment. Critically, participants in different age groups ask Ms McNab to invest in the young, especially in SME start-up initiatives.

The Minister of MHRR is perhaps seen with less confidence than the Head of the UN. He is asked to ensure equal rights and make good on what people see as his promises. Some discussants suggest that the Ministry be closed down, while a majority say that the

Minister should continue and work on employment opportunities. Where the Minister visits, positive comments follow.

Section 8

Youth Groups

As outlined in the methodological introduction, in the course of discussions with displaced participants, the research team discovered that main cleavages emerged not between men and women, minority and majority returnees but prominently between young and old. As a result the research team recruited and convened five groups with displaced participants between 18 and 29.

In addition to standard questions on displacement and return, the moderator explored the following thematic areas with the young discussants.

- Inclusion in society
- Socio-economic position
- Education
- Future structure of the country
- Relationship with the political world

Interestingly, young participants were less inclined to give engaging responses to the standard questions on displacement and return. Little discussion among participants ensued. Young people tend to reflect the position of their parents and point out that they may have accepted their parents' decision to stay or return but that they had little say in the decision itself. Consequently, responses to thematic areas including push and pull factors, gains and losses, assistance and integration are not perceived from the perspective of decision-makers. Much of what young people say on these topics appears as second-hand knowledge. However, when it comes to advice to the Head of the UN and the Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, discussions are energised and discussants own opinions begin to emerge.

As for additional questions, some lively debates took place. This shows that young discussants appear more comfortable with topics they can relate to and reflect actual experiences.

8.1 Inclusion

The moderator asked if discussants feel that their contribution to society is valuable or whether they feel excluded sometimes. Overall, there is a sense of exclusion, especially by the actions of older people. Young people seem to feel that potentially they could make a difference but that in reality they have no real effect. They claim that they are not listened to and that older cohorts and the authorities sometimes exclude them.

'Whoever sits in the 'armchair' here, you cannot get rid of them easily. Therefore young people cannot have much of an impact'

(Youth Group, man, 29, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

'We could make a contribution but nobody listens to us'

(Youth Group, woman, 25, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I think we are excluded from society by the authorities'

(Youth Group, man, 22, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

Discussants also see structural obstacles and the media as contributors to their perceived exclusion.

'The structures should change, the media should give more space to young people'
(Youth Group, man, 26, Ilijas, rural location)

At the same time, there is belief in the power of youth. At a minimum, young discussants feel that they have the potential to move things forward. There is a demand for new thinking and opportunities to shape and improve things.

'The potential of young people should be recognised'
(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Young people should be in a position to make decisions because they are young and creative'
(Youth Group, man, 25, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Young people can do some things better because they think differently'
(Youth Group, man, 25, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

There appears to be a disjuncture between the experiences and the aspirations of young discussants. On the one hand, they feel excluded in a number of ways, at the same time they do recognise that in principle they have the potential to make a difference. Beyond perceived structural obstacles, young people are realistic and see themselves as partly responsible for what they feel is their exclusion. Especially a lack of social organisation and of persistence are suggested as possible causes.

'If all of us 'knock at the door' together, we could actually make a difference'
(Youth Group, man, 25, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Young people should not give up easily in their attempt to make changes'
(Youth Group, woman, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

In sum, young discussants recognise both their difficulties and their potential. However, they do not necessarily envisage ways of realising their desire to change and to shape things. In the end they appear disengaged, critical, slightly under-confident and inactive. This is in keeping with Section 6 where young people suggest viable future models but appear dependent on external stimuli for their realisation.

8.2 Socio-economic Position

The moderator asked: *do you feel you have enough money and things to do the things you like doing or are there restrictions sometimes?* Perhaps unsurprisingly, many young discussants claim that they do not have enough money. However, it appears that some accept this and confirm that young people also like to spend. There are no suggestions as to how they could change things for the better. In other words, at this point participants do not suggest ways in which young people could either individually or collectively improve their socio-economic position.

'My personal situation is that I cannot afford anything I want [...]'
(Youth Group, man, 24, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'We do not have enough money to do what we want'
(Youth Group, all agreed, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I think that the majority is satisfied with what they have, but appetites are large and that is normal because we are young'

(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

At the same time it is clear that a lack of funds has an effect on education. This is a serious finding.

'I cannot afford education, because I do not have money'

(Youth Group, woman, 20, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'People do not have enough money for education'

(Youth Group, man, 23, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

8.3 Education

Continuing on the theme of education, the moderators asked if discussants feel their education had enabled them to do what they wanted to do, or if in fact there were things they did not learn. Overall, young discussants appear content with the education they received. However, two fractions emerge over the issue of tertiary education reform (Bologna Reform ⁹). One fraction argues that the old education system is fine and, overall, has provided young people with what they need. The other insists that the old system had been too general and has taught them irrelevant material.

'We prefer the old system because it helped us with our daily lives'

(Youth Group, all agreed, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'In the old system you learned a lot of irrelevant things'

(Youth Group, man, 29, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

Some participants are negative about current reform processes, and the Bologna system receives particular criticism from discussants in Pale and Ilijas.

'We have good teaching staff and a good educational system [...] Bologna is limiting knowledge by [...] keeping us at a high-school level'

(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'We complain about Bologna. It doesn't give us enough knowledge'

(Youth Group, man, returnee, 24, Ilijas, rural location)

Overall, however, discussants do not query the important contribution their education has made to them.

8.4 Future Structure of BiH

The moderator presented one of the key questions from the questionnaire used in the quantitative survey to gauge young discussants' views on a future structure for BiH (Q38). The moderator then went on to read the preliminary results of the survey to the discussants ¹⁰. Question: *Here are some options about the future structure of the country. Which one would you choose and why?*

⁹ On 18 September 2003 at the meeting in Berlin, Bosnia and Herzegovina formally submitted necessary documentation and joined the Bologna Process. Thus BiH committed itself to work, along with other countries, on creating the European higher education area by the end of 2010. In order to fulfil the commitments and contribute to the objectives of the Bologna Process, BiH needs to conduct a reform of its higher education system which will be in accordance with the modern European higher education systems

- *A new country, which is joined by as many countries of ex-Yugoslavia as possible*
- *One unified country with central government in Sarajevo*
- *One unified country with central government in Sarajevo with strong regions (BiH)*
- *As is, two Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo*
- *Three Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo*
- *Dividing the country into separate independent states*
- *Dividing the country into areas some of which could join neighbouring countries*

Broadly speaking, the quantitative survey shows that the unified-country options receive most support. Division of the country appears unacceptable to most.

Reactions varied according to geographical areas. In Pale, one group favours the division of BiH and dismisses the results of the survey as unscientific. Some Pale discussants appear unable to accommodate opinions which are at variance with their own experiences. In fact, participants keep citing the opinions of their friends as evidence that the survey results are wrong as the selection of respondents is, in their eyes, skewed.

'The researchers are unrealistic, most of their sample is in the Federation'
(Youth Group, woman, 23, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Last option – we have all seen where togetherness has got us'
(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'[...] we thought we could all live together again [...] but then too much blood has been shed and that's why I think it's better to be separated'
(Youth Group, man, 21, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

The second Pale Youth Group and a minority in the Sarajevo group favour maintaining the status quo, namely to preserve the current political structure of BiH.

'RS to be independent from BiH but not to join Serbia'
(Youth Group, woman, 20, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'The best is to have it as is. We will never be able to agree'
(Youth Group, woman, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

In contrast, the groups in Ilijas and the majority of discussants in the Sarajevo group either favour a unified country with central government in Sarajevo, or a unified country with strong regions.

'It would be ideal to have one unified country with centralised government in Sarajevo [...]'
(Youth Group, man, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Centralisation is not good – better to have strong regions'
(Youth Group, man, 24, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

¹⁰ 'A new country, which is joined by as many countries of ex-Yugoslavia as possible' (7.4%), 'one unified country with central government in Sarajevo' (38.5%), 'one unified country with central government in Sarajevo with strong regions (BiH)' (22.1%), 'as is, two Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo' (14.3%), 'three Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo' (7.9%), 'dividing the country into separate independent states' (2.6%) and 'dividing the country into areas some of which could join neighbouring countries' (7.2%)

'One unified country [...]

(Youth Group, woman, 20, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

'Regions because the RS doesn't want to join Europe with us, they want to do it with Serbia'

(Youth Group, man, 22, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

Overall, however, constitutional preferences appear primarily subjective with few rational arguments. Responses are spontaneous and there is little coherent indication why discussants are choosing one option over another. This part of the discussion was determined by a small number of opinion leaders in each group. There was little debate and discussants tended to agree with the opinion leaders. In a way, it appears that discussants broadly base their responses on their religious and geographical identities, and these responses are not the outcome of deliberative discussions and a willingness to accept diverging views.

8.5 The Political World

Moving to politics, the moderator asked the young participants about their relationship with politics: *Very generally, how do you feel about the world of politics in BiH?*

Initially it was hoped that questions on politics would result in lively debates. Given the number of problems, which discussants raise in groups, it was reasonable to expect a range of policy options from the groups. For this reason, this question was asked last in order to allow an open-ended discussion unaffected by time restrictions. However, in the event, discussants did not have much to say. They appeared fairly uninterested. In fact, constructive comments were outweighed by less than serious comments and even by immature responses. Politics emerges as a show, not as something serious or as a vehicle for young people to realise their aspirations.

'Politics is a show that one cannot take seriously'

(Youth Group, woman, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I'm not interested in politics at all. They just talk, scream [...] I cannot take it'

(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Our politicians are catastrophic, we should get together in front of parliament and hang them'

(Youth Group, man, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'I love politics, politics here is very interesting, 60-Minutes ¹¹ is like Jerry Springer'

(Youth Group, woman, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'Our politics is in a tunnel where everybody goes in the same direction – I cannot see an exit'

(Youth Group, man, 22, returnee, Ilijas, rural location)

In addition, there appears to be a sense of low efficacy. Young discussants do not seem to think that their politicians assume office on the merit of their moral credentials or knowledge. There is little belief that political representatives are able to make good on their pre-election promises.

¹¹ Talkshow with politicians on public service TV

'I do vote, but I have no influence in the end'

(Youth Group, woman, 20, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Some politicians are decent but are unlikely to 'make it' in BiH politics'

(Youth Group, man, 18, returnee, Sarajevo, urban location)

'People in politics are not educated in politics'

(Youth Group, woman, 23, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'Everybody talks about changes before the elections but nothing happens'

(Youth Group, woman, returnee, 20, Ilijas, rural location)

Beyond the disaffected rhetoric of the majority, some discussants do recognise that the political world is improving. At the same time, some suggest that it will take a while until mistrust between young voters and elected representatives will decrease

'Politics is getting better – now it's much better compared to the immediate post war'

(Youth Group, woman, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

'It will take time for people to retrieve trust in politicians'

(Youth Group, man, 22, non-returnee, Pale, urban location)

Section Summary

Young people feel held back by intergenerational conflict, the authorities and the media. Quite a few feel excluded from society. Not least the current structures are seen as an obstacle. At the same time, young discussants do not look for solutions within themselves. If anything, they suggest external support to deal with their problems. This is in keeping with findings in Section 6. The preparedness to engage in collective or individual action appears low.

Young participants recognise that, at least in principle, they have the capability to shape things. At the same time they are also aware of the things, which prevent them from making valuable contributions to society. In principle, they also recognise that greater social organisation and persistence could be the vehicles for realising their aspirations. In the end, however, disengagement and not initiative prevails. On the whole and with some exceptions, discussants come across as disengaged, slightly over-critical and a little under-confident.

Discussants confirm that generally young people like spending. However, they also say that a lack of funds prevents them from achieving certain goals. Critically, a lack of funds is made out as an inhibitor to educational achievements. There are no real suggestions as to how young people could improve their economic positions through individual or collective action.

Most youth discussants favour a unified country over division but their choices appear spontaneous, emotive and not the result of deliberative debate. Broadly, they prefer to follow in-group opinion leaders and the badges of their identity.

Young discussants are not keen to talk about politics for long. Overall they seem fairly uninterested. Some of their spontaneous responses appear both uninformed and

immature. Overall, the relationship between young voters and elected representatives appears to be characterised by mistrust and low efficacy. Politics does not emerge as an arena where young BiH citizens feel they can realise their aspirations and make their voices heard. While the majority takes a dim view of the political world, a minority does see recent improvements.



Oxford Research International

Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Policy Advice

Section 1 ¹

Conclusions to the Quantitative Survey

This survey is based on a nationally-representative sample, which reflects the opinions of the residents of BiH within a known margin of error ². This report selects what the authors consider to be the key points and the analysis is by no means exhaustive. Once policy-makers prioritise areas for future intervention, further data analysis can yield more targeted and more detailed information. The large sample size will be helpful in segmenting the data for identifying sub-groups.

One central aim of this research is to give the voters of BiH a voice. Beyond the political rhetoric of public debate, this research enables the 'silent majority' of BiH to be heard. Another aim is to compare BiH with other transformation countries.

BiH respondents feel happier, wealthier and less worried than one might expect, given the negative evaluations of macro-spheres. The survey shows that in most cross-national comparisons, BiH general well-being scores rank at the midfield-level. In subjective health, however, BiH does not compare favourably. Regarding perceived living standards, there are some sectional differences but they are not extreme: younger people do better than older people and education plays a role. Displacement status produces a smallish effect. There are no indications that any particular group is systematically disadvantaged.

Evaluations of conditions in the immediate neighbourhood demonstrate that respondents think police-work and education are not a problem. Local government services and the availability of health services receive a balance between positive and negative scores. The unavailability of jobs, especially secure jobs, is seen as highly problematic. The issue of employment emerges as a critical theme in this survey, and the immediate social environment is where respondents experience the lack of employment opportunities.

The survey shows that social trust in BiH is virtually non-existent. In international comparisons, BiH is relegated to the last position. This means that in a key indicator of social cohesion, BiH is outperformed by all other transition countries which the World Values Survey programme covers. Also, in perceptions of social fairness BiH does not do well; most respondents say that they do not expect much fairness from others. While at the personal level people report relatively high life satisfaction, the lack of trust in others and in society at large appears as highly problematic, indicating that a core component of social capital (Putnam) is under-developed.

Overwhelmingly, BiH citizens see the situation in their country as 'bad'. In contrast to their evaluation of personal spheres, respondents take a dim view of present conditions at the macro-level. In fact, there is a chasm between people's description of their personal circumstances and their assessments of the country at large. A negative view of the national situation is compounded by relatively low trust in the institutions of BiH. Averaged across all scores, there is slightly more mistrust but there are important exceptions. Public service TV, and, on balance, municipal authorities are trusted. Most of all, there is relatively high trust in the police. Half the sample trusts the EU but few trust other international organisations (IOs), the judiciary, and the State government in Sarajevo. Hardly anyone trusts political parties. Among international organisations the UN is the

¹ It may be difficult to read the conclusions as a stand-alone document. The arguments are developed in the analysis of the research results and important details can be critical for an understanding of key issues

² Please refer to the technical report

least trusted but the differences are small. In fact, respondents do not distinguish much between international institutions. Overall, and with exceptions, popular respect for the institutions of BiH society is low. The parties and the State government are accorded lower trust scores than political institutions at the municipal or Entity level. Cantons are not seen to be essential. Institutional trust is a concrete expression of system acceptance. It gauges a sense of the legitimacy of the governance arrangements in the eyes of the population. It appears that trust needs to grow before greater political legitimacy, especially at State-level, can be achieved.

Four in ten BiH citizens say they would leave the country if given an opportunity, though there are no differences between displaced and non-displaced respondents. Critically, two thirds of respondents aged between 18 and 30 state that they would like to go abroad. Such powerful desires for selective out-migration illustrate that young people especially have a low commitment to BiH. The creation of conditions which are likely to motivate young BiH citizens to remain in their country emerges as a key challenge.

Beliefs in corruption are widespread. In particular, most respondents believe that corruption is pervasive at all levels of the public sector and that most officials assume their positions on non-meritocratic grounds. Also international organisations are seen to be corrupt albeit to a much lesser degree. Perceptions of corruption in assistance-delivery systems for returnees correlate with perceptions of overall IO corruption. Low esteem in the country and low trust in its institutions are associated with strong beliefs in corruption. However, the small number of recent actual experiences does not match beliefs in the extent of corruption. Beliefs in corruption emerge as part of a general syndrome of disaffection rather than accurate representations of corrupt processes in government.

Regarding the inclusion of BiH citizens in civic life, there are a number of key observations. In no other transformation country are there more voters who say they are not at all interested in politics. Younger cohorts especially are affected by low interest. Also, political action scores are low with voting outstripping political communication. Conversely, twice as many respondents in BiH compared with France have some appetite for political violence. Nevertheless, this is a minority position. BiH does not emerge as a country where voters are actively engaged in the shaping of political decisions. In fact, people appear mistrustful of political structures, and, beyond voting, do not seem ready to participate. Overall, the relationship between citizens on the one hand and the political world and its actors on the other emerges as one of disengagement rather than involvement.

Identity measures include both religious affiliation and identity. Though it is associated with religion, identity plays a critical role. The survey questionnaire administered a two-stage question on identity which reveals that more than eight in ten respondents do not have a problem with BiH national identity. Nearly half say they are primarily BiH citizens; most others subscribe to a dual identity. Critically, 14.2% or 504 out of 3,580 respondents reject a BiH citizen's identity and thus ascribe to an exclusive identity ('the 504').

Broadly, measures of well-being, such as life satisfaction, perceived living standards, social trust, and perceptions of fairness are not affected by identity measures. Other independent variables explain the differences. Nonetheless, religious affiliation and identity become important explanatory parameters when they are regressed against variables measuring institutions, politics and, crucially, constitutional issues. This demonstrates that the way people in BiH feel about themselves and about the fabric of society is independent

of identity measures. One may argue that particularistic differences are essentially political in nature.

In the eyes of its population young people and people generally are the key strength of BiH: human and not natural resources are identified as the main asset. As for weaknesses, unemployment, corruption and politics and its actors are prioritised. This establishes a profile of pros and cons which can be of guidance in overall policy design. As for visions of the future for BiH, the central focus of this research, seven in ten say 'in the EU'. This is particularly striking since this result emerges from an open-ended question. This gives a clear direction in long-term aspirations.

As for short-term priorities (next twelve months), an improvement in living standards is the top concern. In conjunction with unemployment as the greatest perceived problem, the call for the use of economic levers resonates throughout the survey. In addition to demands for national unification, improvements to the infrastructure and reducing corruption surface as priorities. Non-priorities include the prosecution of war-criminals, de-mining, national defence, police reform and education.

Principally, respondents expect that the political world rather than individuals should take care of their respective policy priorities. This indicates two things. One is that there is a belief in 'Big Government' as a solution to people's problems. Dependency on state output ('delivery van') is also found in other variables. The other is that people's relatively low trust in institutions and their negative attitudes towards the political world are a commentary on their perceptions of the current arrangements, which also influence their expectations for the immediate future. At the same time, this does not debar them from aspiring to a better future.

In individual spheres, in neighbourhoods and at the national level there is a sense of stasis. Some people expect that things will improve but most say conditions in a range of areas have remained the same over the past year and they expect little to change in the near future. This is atypical for transformation countries and is in contrast with nine in ten supporting 'big change'. People see little change, expect little change but aspire to 'big change': it appears that not incremental change but a major shift is desired. People's aspirations and their expectations built on the realities of their current circumstances appear incongruous.

As for an anticipated direction of change, the notion that BiH citizens should take their fate into their own hands emerges powerfully. A small majority is ready to abandon ethnic politics. Small majorities also think that politicians should decide on ways forward and that the government, rather than individuals, is responsible to provide. In the relationship between variables an underlying logic emerges. Beyond univariate results, factor analysis shows that 'big change' and an end to ethnic politics are related. Respondents also say that corruption must end. At the same time it appears that whatever the direction of change, the injustices of the war need to be addressed. In this sense, reconciling the population with the outcomes of the war appears as part of any viable future scenario. Politics and politicians and not citizens' action are seen as the vehicle for the implementation of change. It is possible to argue that there is a contradiction between the notion that people take their fate in their own hands and the idea that control over change be left to the political world. It appears that most respondents understand intellectually that change is needed but are reluctant to abandon the 'delivery van' of the administrative-centralist socialist legacy. Nevertheless, factor analysis also demonstrates

that there is latent *sui generis* energy in the direction-of-change variables, which policy makers may choose to release and channel.

Eight in ten respondents are not aware of current endeavours to change the constitution. However, virtually all of those who are actually aware agree that such change is a good idea. Independent of awareness of the ongoing constitutional reform process, there is a high demand for change. Overwhelmingly, people want to change the political structures in BiH (in excess of seven in ten); half of the population rejects the current constitution (DPA) as ineffective. Unity presents itself as a multi-source theme in this survey: for example, the second policy priority after socio-economic concerns is to unify BiH. Most of those who are aware of current undertakings to change BiH's constitution spontaneously say they wish to unify the country or abolish the Entities. Overall, it is thus clear that a majority aspires to a new political structure for BiH.

Centralised political structures emerge as superior alternatives to current arrangements. Dividing the country, establishing three Entities or a Yugoslavia Mark II are virtually unacceptable and are not predicted as likely outcomes. Prima facie, it is thus purely a matter of deciding which centralised option attracts most support and least opposition; i.e. the least divisive outcome. The federal alternative (centralised state with strong regions) outpaces other models, prominently including the current status quo. On aggregated scores a centralised BiH with strong regions gathers most support and is opposed by hardly anyone (<3%). A federal BiH thus appears least likely to entrench any significant minority, though regression analysis shows that the sources of support for the federal model are in part determined by religious affiliation and identity. Nevertheless, the federal alternative also does well in terms of envisaged likelihood of outcome. In fact, very few respondents think it is unlikely to come about. Opponents to the federal option are no more likely to resort to violence than the rest of the sample. Affluent federal democracies are the country-models many respondents aspire to and most are familiar with federalism from the Yugoslavia-era.

However, the importance of religious affiliation and identity in regression analyses involving institutional, political and constitutional variables suggests that any changes to the political structure of BiH are potentially divisive. Especially people who have exclusive identities ('the 504') may well turn out to be a significant risk. They may be a small minority in the sample but, nevertheless, they could represent several hundred thousand adult BiH residents. This is particularly important since 'the 504' are twice as likely to resort to violence for political ends. Any endeavours to realise the majority's aspirations to change constitutional arrangements would have to take into account possible reactions from 'the 504'. It should also be remembered that respondents who have an exclusive identity are much less likely to aspire to EU membership than primary identifiers.

A strong future-orientation informs attitudes towards the international impact on BiH. Overall, it appears that international influence is accepted as a part of the BiH system of governance. After all, seven in ten respondents insist that BiH's future lies with the EU. There is also a strong demand for the EU to influence the future of BiH; significantly fewer choose the UN or the OHR. However, neither the EU nor other international organisations are seen to be responsible for realising people's short-term policy priorities.

Many respondents who mention a country-model for BiH choose either Switzerland or Germany. At the same time Germany (after Serbia) is not invited to be involved in BiH's future. Conversely, some say the US should be involved but America is not chosen as a country-model. Interesting is the absence of successful transition countries such as

Poland, the Slovak or Czech Republics or Hungary from the list of country-models. Critically, the modal category (around 30%) says that BiH needs no model but should follow an endogenous path. This once more suggests the presence of *sui generis* energy. At the same time the overwhelming commitment to a supra-national idea may indicate low confidence in domestic structures. Overall, there is a powerful belief that BiH's future is grounded in European integration. Respondents seem to look for a solution to structural problems by expressing their desire for BiH to join the EU. They seem to identify the EU as an effective vehicle for incorporating transitional societies into a family of relatively successful systems.

With the exception of the EU, respondents make virtually no distinctions between international organisations. They are generally mistrusted. However, while many respondents believe all international organisations are corrupt, neither the UN nor the OHR are singled out as particularly corrupt. At the same time, the UN does not necessarily emerge as an organisation with a distinct brand. Its trust and stay-or-go scores are very close to those of the OHR. The latter is widely known to be wound up in the near future. There is currently no comfortable majority in support of a continued UN-presence in BiH. In fact, a large minority would like to see the UN leave in the near future (four in ten). A similar proportion feels the UN mandate should end if and when BiH joins the European Union. At present, the UN is not necessarily seen as part of BiH's long-term future. The support for a continued UN presence is virtually independent of rational economic and policy-driven considerations but features strong effects from religious affiliation, Entity and identity. Correspondence analysis shows that 'UN-stay' is a theme which clusters with primary BiH identity, constitutional change, returnees and unification issues.

Nevertheless, for the moment there remains a popular mandate to remain by six in ten and respondents give the UN direction in its policy priorities: Human rights, an improvement in living standards and the fight against corruption are key. There is no clear explanation in the survey for the prominence of human rights in UN-role assignments. At the quantitative level it appears that human rights are a surrogate for other issues. As for less important policy aims, not many respondents wish to see the UN involved in BiH politics at any level or in the education system, which overall they say works well. There is also little demand for the UN to help the weak to get a say. Net support for return and sustainable return is marginal. Neither returnees nor non-returnees articulate return policy as a top priority; they too opt for economic progress and anti-corruption policies. It is quite clear that continued support for returnees and the integration of non-returnees is unlikely to yield high returns on investment.

Four in ten respondents say they experienced forced migration. 25.4% of the total sample qualify as IDPs, 14.1% as refugees. More than six in ten displaced respondents have returned to their old neighbourhoods. Purely at the quantitative level, return has been a success, as a majority returned, partially reversing one of the effects of the war. There is only a minor effect from perceived standard of living on displacement and return status. Residence, age and employment have moderate effects. Income, life satisfaction, subjective health and education do not feature at all. This shows that neither returnees nor non-returnees are outside the economic mainstream. Returnees and non-returnees do not emerge as special-needs groups. There is also no evidence that they differ significantly from other sections of society or from majority opinion. Whenever displacement status has an effect on other variables it tends to be moderate or weak: displacement status does not emerge as a critical predictor for the outcome of interest in any dependent variable. Here lies another major achievement of return: displacement did not expel migrants from the mainstream.

Attitudes to people who suffered forced migration are supportive. There is a sense of compassion and solidarity. Most people say that the legal basis for return should be preserved. They broadly support policies which assist returnees and to a lesser degree the integration of non-returnees. At the same time, people claim that assistance-delivery-systems are corrupt. Interestingly, attitudes do not differ much between displaced and non-displaced respondents. In principle, respondents agree with the continuation of return: morally, legally and operationally. However, support for returnees loses out when exposed to the competition of other possible UN-policy areas. Even the potential beneficiaries of such policies no longer prioritise them.

When it comes to the Diaspora, economic themes dominate. BiH citizens who once fled and are now making a living abroad are predominantly perceived as a potential economic asset to BiH. Respondents are clear that a returning Diaspora would have a positive impact on the country. The Diaspora is not outside a 'community of sufferers' and its long-term return is seen as natural. Still, for the moment and for economic reasons they should stay abroad but eventually return home.

Should the Diaspora return, respondents clearly see the socio-economic advantages such as capital investment, skills transfer and job-creation, though the idea of a positive cultural impact ('make BiH more civilised') is rejected. Return is not perceived as a threat to jobs or local businesses. At the same time, respondents are also clear that the integration of a returning Diaspora may provide both attitudinal and cultural challenges. Returning the Diaspora is not a short-term aim but surfaces as a long-term aspiration.

BiH emerges as a TV nation. There is significant trust in public service TV and only a very small minority cite media other than TV as trusted sources for news. Around one in ten turn to Croatian TV for news. Neither the Internet nor magazines play a role at all. TV thus powerfully presents itself as the right platform for primary releases. There are some important sectional differences though. Trust in public service TV is greater among FBiH residents and Muslims. People who do not discuss political matters are less likely to read a paper. Respondents who have exclusive identities are more likely to read a paper on a weekly basis. For this reason, print may well be a valuable resource for secondary releases, especially for those which aim to penetrate a broader range of groups in BiH society.

The correspondence analysis provides a multi-dimensional view of key data, though it does not allow predictions from the sample to the population. Key findings include the identification of two cross-cutting dimensions: The first incorporates multiple ideas including optimism/pessimism, young/old and an economic dimension. The second represents a political dimension. In addition to cross-cutting dimensions, there are four principal clusters and 'Middle-Bosnia'³. 'The 504' feature as a minority far removed from 'Middle-Bosnia'. This illustrates the distance between the mainstream and people who have exclusive identities, and separatist and no-change agendas.

Returnees/non-returnees are somewhat outside of 'Middle-Bosnia' but not far removed. Whatever distance there is, it is more likely to be demographic and attitudinal rather than economic.

³ This is not a geographical reference but intended to convey the middle of BiH society strictly socio-economically and attitudinally. Comparable terms may include 'Middle-England' or 'Middle-America'

Section 2

Conclusions to the Focus Group Research

2.1 Overall Observations

The research team was to discover that groups in BiH differed in a number of ways from their experiences with focus groups in other societies. Overall, in BiH there was more discipline and less lively discussion. On a range of issues, moderators encountered fewer problems with controlling fervent contributions than with stimulating debate. Some topics received few coherent responses while other issues evoked some interesting dialogues and a great deal of analysable material. Groups containing young people were especially different in the sense that the passion which often prevails in youth groups in other Central and Eastern European settings was largely absent. In particular, questions about politics delivered few new insights, as young people seemed generally uninterested.

In this context it should not be forgotten that the original idea for researching migrants in BiH dates back a few years. In the meantime the world has changed around the research and in many groups there was the underlying belief that this enquiry was late. In some cases discussants said so quite openly. At the same time, the focus group discussions offer insights into the outcomes of past policy implementation and provide a number of pointers for future interventions. Most of all, they give direct advice to future policy design and provide policy-makers with the chance to fine tune their current priorities according to what recipients say is important to them.

As outlined above, when this research commenced, it was anticipated that major differences would emerge between males and females, minority and majority returnees and that there would be important variations across geographical locations. In the event, the major differences were return status and age.

2.2 Returnees and Non-Returnees

The first major difference between returnees and non-returnees lies in the motivations for return or staying in the host community. Returnees base their decision on emotive factors like nostalgia and 'going home' while non-returnees appear more self-directed and are guided by rational considerations such as income, opportunities and education. Not all the decisions to return are entirely voluntary; some discussants say that eviction and a lack of funds left them with no alternative but return. Others sought to lose the stigma of being a displaced person in return. It is also the case that the duration of displacement is related to the decision to stay. An interesting finding is that the lure of potential assistance played no significant part in the decision to return; most people were simply not aware of help. On the whole, discussants do not make a distinction between push and pull factors and the gains and losses of return or staying.

While integration did not present itself as a problem for either group the way it was accomplished discriminated between returnees and non-returnees. In short, the non-returnees appear to have solved one central problem of all displaced persons that of integrating into, and being accepted by, the host community. Some say that they were actually accepted in the host community from the early stages of displacement.

Many returnees - especially older cohorts - on the other hand, attempt to reclaim the lives they once had, and the failure to do so is a cause of disappointment. At the same time the economic preconditions and especially the lack of work opportunities inhibit the search for

a durable solution. This suggests that a significant number of returnees are finding it difficult to abandon whatever certainties they found in their previous arrangements until such time that the uncertainties of the present and the foreseeable future are confronted.

An important finding from this research is that group return is more successful than individual return. This is so because it maximises the chances of more or less immediate reintegration since it implies that a level of cohesion already exists in the returning group. Indeed the wish to return is often arrived at after group discussion and mutual support in the decision to return.

The overall picture is one in which returnees acknowledge that they received adequate assistance to restart their lives, however, the conditions necessary to achieve an acceptable livelihood have yet to materialise. They expect continued support particularly in securing employment and/or help by way of capital equipment, which would enable them to earn a living. Discussants from rural areas seek assistance in the form of farm machinery, livestock and the creation of markets for their output. Whilst generally happy with the quantity of assistance they received returnees are critical of the inequity they perceived in its distribution and the quality of the materials and workmanship. Many hold local authorities responsible for the unfair and corrupt administration of assistance. International organisations however, are not associated with corruption. Inequity in the distribution of assistance not only challenges conceptions of social justice but, in addition, atomises recipients and undermines cohesion in the community. There was also some dissatisfaction with the delays in the assistance process but these did not appear critical to outcomes.

In fact, delays also illustrate that some discussants would wait for months if not years for institutional assistance rather than solve pressing problems with their own initiative. External support appears to create or continue dependency on institutional assistance. It appears that institutional support for returnees presents itself as a post-script to the provider mentality; a hallmark of the administrative-centralist days of Yugoslavia. Dependency was a consistent underlying theme in returnee groups, and on a few occasions dependency and the resultant lack of motivation were openly discussed.

Non-returnees appear more self-reliant and self-directed than returnees. With the exception of food parcels, they neither asked for nor received assistance and have little history of external support. They would welcome assistance in training and retraining and are more likely to support initiatives which would enhance their labour market participation. In other words, non-returnees would prefer an enhancement of their marketable skills to capital equipment and the creation of markets for produce.

There are no reports of active or systematic obstruction to return and this can be clearly seen as one important aspect of the successful implementation of the return process in BiH, and, at this level, a beneficial outcome of the Dayton Peace Accord.

2.3 Common Focus on Employment and the Young

Although major differences exist between returnees and non-returnees, they share a common view that there is an acute need for creating employment opportunities. This concern was raised by groups across the country; young and old, men and women, returnees and non-returnees. Having a job is not simply a desirable end in itself, but is also a necessary precondition for the realisation of core aspirations in other areas of life. In addition, employment is central to the success of the return process. Sustainable return and integration appeared virtually synonymous with paid work. Infrastructural improvements and public services matter less. The research thus provides support for a redirection of policy-making from the area of return to measures, which secure livelihoods irrespective of displacement status.

There is support in all age groups for investment in young people. There is a popular perception that the future of BiH lies in the young. Despite the relative disengagement amongst younger discussants, many are aware of their potential but feel constrained. They believe that older generations, the media and other societal structures stand as obstacles in their development and involvement in society. In a way, they have difficulty in recognising themselves in BiH society and feel unable to make a greater contribution to the country until their core concerns have been addressed. At the same time, as a critical finding of this research, they look to institutional initiatives to provide solutions to their problems.

One major challenge to future policy-making is mobilising young people. Although there are clear signs that they want to be included, they lack the knowledge, and perhaps the initiative to achieve this. The channels of self-realisation remain obscure. Many seek support in developing skills and knowledge particularly in vocational areas. Some claim that they lack the funds to further their educational qualifications. Leaving aside the debate over the merits of the Bologna-reforms, generally, they are content with current standards of education, but simply say that they have a financial problem with access. Some are very clear that educational opportunities abroad could make an important difference to their lives.

Young people are more likely to seek support for new business start-ups, older generations favour development of more communal structures e.g. re-opening factories, and re-starting agricultural cooperatives in rural areas. Broadly speaking, younger participants were more likely to ask for assistance with self-employment; older cohorts sought secure employment.

In terms of questions related to displacement and return, politics and constitutional reform, young people either tend to reflect the opinions of their parents or base their opinions on ascribed aspects of their lives such as their religion. However, when responding to questions, which directly affect them like jobs, education and money, they differ significantly from the older discussants in their views and there is little doubt that there are important differences between generations.

In contrast with older cohorts, young discussants were the only ones who point out that BiH is a transition country rather than just a post-conflict society. This is a critical finding and suggests that younger cohorts are likely to be more open to policies which aim to catalyse transformation. At the same time they are the only group who also feel excluded.

The political world is not perceived as effective in solving the problems of young people. Attitudes to politics are predominantly under-informed and embryonic. Only a few discussants see recent improvements. Low trust and low efficacy are the hallmarks of the relationship between young citizens and the BiH system of governance.

2.4 Policy Considerations – UN

Generally, international organisations including the UN and NGOs are seen as responsible for contributions to progress in BiH and there is support for the continuation of their work.

At the same time, there is a general lack of information on the mandate, current policies and achievements of the UN in BiH. People do not necessarily associate the UN with development activity. There is a disconnection between the UN and the people they actually support. Only very few mention the UN's contributions to peace-keeping, humanitarian aid and the work associated with the UNHCR. A few mention the UNDP but only have a vague idea of its activities; mentioning its support of large projects e.g. dairies.

There are five key areas where the UN can help or improve:

- Job creation
- Provision of capital equipment such as livestock and machinery especially in rural areas
- Support in developing markets and channels
- Greater transparency and accountability in its dealings
- Improvements in public relations and communication

Young people encourage future-oriented entrepreneurial models and seek improvements in their marketable skills. Older discussants look to more past-oriented collective structures.

More public awareness of the organisational structure and policies of the UN and its affiliates emerges as a key remedy. Many of the younger participants feel that the UN could raise public awareness of its activities through the media, particularly television. Some think that communication would be improved if the UN abandoned administrative concepts (e.g. 'sustainable return', 'sustainable integration') in favour of everyday language. The UN is advised to make their efforts more transparent by documenting and publicising the results of their programmes.

In all groups corruption was one of the favourite topics and people shared stories of corruption. In the end, however, there are relatively few concrete examples of personal encounters with corruption and a tendency to relay second-hand accounts. There are very few suggestions that the UN itself is corrupt.

2.5 Advice - Head of UN

Much of the advice given to the UN as an organisation is reflected in the advice to Ms McNab the UN's Resident Representative in BiH. She is perceived as a figure of authority, who has the ability to make things happen. This is in contrast to perceptions about local officials who are considered corrupt in their dealings. In a way, the Head of the UN is assigned a 'watchdog' role to curb the improper spending of funds.

However, in many ways advice is more specific. There is a feeling that the Head of the UN is removed from everyday life because of her role. Many advise her to make direct contact with local people which would enable her to appreciate their immediate concerns. She is ascribed a role in facilitating policies on employment and influencing decision-making to this end. She is also accorded a role in skills enhancement and providing resources to propel new business initiatives. This is voiced especially by younger discussants.

It is felt that if the Head of the UN encouraged more transparency in spending, then perceptions of corruption in its distribution through local channels would be diminished. She is perceived as a guardian against corruption amongst local officials.

All in all, discussants encourage the Head of the UN to be more visible in her dealings and inform people about the actual mandate and policies of the UN and its affiliate organisations. Discussants seemed eager to receive more information, and for this reason asked for greater transparency. Beyond direct contact with recipients, TV is mentioned as an effective platform for public relations initiatives.

2.6 Advice - Minister for Human Rights and Refugees

Advice to the Minister of the MHRR was the last theme in the discussion guide and discussants were notably less forthcoming. Most of the advice they had was already given to the Head of the UN. In addition, critical attitudes to the political world may have contaminated policy advice to the Minister. Critical comments include the idea that the MHRR be wound up, not least of all to signal closure to return policies. Also, discussants remind the Minister of political promises, which they now wish to see realised. Comments on the Minister and the MHRR may not be accurate representations but transfigured ideas about the perceived shortcomings of the BiH system of governance.

However, there are some similarities in the advice given to both officials. Most importantly direct contact and measures to combat unemployment are common advice areas. The fact that many discussants repeatedly invite officials to visit may suggest a perceived remoteness of public figures. Consequently, discussants encourage the Minister to circumvent Municipalities in his dealings, and establish direct relationships with the local level. Where the Minister visits, e.g. in Kotorsko, positive attitudes emerge.

One distinct role assigned to the Minister is in the area of equal rights. Neither the UN nor the Head of UN were in any significant way identified with this assignment. The Minister however, is seen as someone who can safeguard equality.

Section 3

Interface Between Qualitative and Quantitative Research Instruments

A questionnaire survey differs fundamentally from focus groups in the methodologies it uses and the information it provides. A quantitative survey, which is based on a random selection of respondents, represents the population from which the sample was drawn within known margins of error. On the other hand, discussants in focus groups represent little more than themselves. In fact, another 20 groups could have delivered different outcomes. However, focus groups are indispensable for drilling down in particular thematic areas. They are also very useful as group dynamics can surface themes and ideas, sometimes through intense discussion, which other research instruments cannot deliver in quite the same way.

The research at hand has the relative certainty of a large and representative sample. However, some aspects in the analysis of the quantitative data remain ambiguous. In some cases, qualitative data can provide further insights and contextualisation. In addition, where findings in the quantitative survey are broadly confirmed by the discussants in the focus groups, greater analytical weight is added.

- The responses to the quantitative survey make clear that displaced people deserve assistance, that the post-war agreements, which are the legal base for return, should remain and that displaced people should be able to return wherever they choose. Furthermore, respondents agree that displaced people are worse off than others, even if they have received assistance. At the same time, respondents claim that the assistance-delivery system is corrupt. Overall, there is strong agreement that the return process was 'right'. In all of these points, the focus groups echoed the quantitative data
- Returnees and non-returnees in the focus groups, and both displaced and non-displaced respondents to the survey questionnaire are asking to solve the issue of unemployment. It therefore follows that strategies for reducing unemployment are universal and not restricted to displaced people. In both instruments there appears to be the belief that unemployment is essentially a structural problem, which requires state intervention before individual initiatives can be successful
- Continued support especially designed to assist returnees was not a policy priority in either instrument. In the quantitative survey, the UN was advised to assist with human rights, improve living standards and fight corruption. While human rights did not really feature, the focus groups talked extensively about economic progress and an end to corruption. It appears that a continuation of return policies has reached the point of diminishing returns. Even the people who could benefit from continuation of such policies no longer prioritise them
- In both instruments it is clear that return in itself was a success. The quantitative survey shows that a majority of displaced persons was able to return to their old homes and neighbourhoods. In terms of policy interventions which assisted returnees, discussants in the focus groups say that they were helped. While there are concerns about the equity of assistance distribution, corruption and the quality of some of the materials and services, discussants do say that the overall quantity of the assistance met their expectations. In sum, both instruments appear to confirm that return policies were essentially right and fundamentally a success

- Neither research instrument provides any evidence that displaced people are excluded from mainstream society and economy. In fact, here lies another major achievement of return policies: return did not expel migrants from the mainstream economy and society. The young however, say they feel excluded in a number of ways
- Young people emerge as a key consideration in both instruments. In the quantitative survey young people are described as the key strength of BiH, in the focus groups discussants of all ages stress that investment in the young generation is critical for the revival of BiH. At the same time the quantitative survey shows that people between 18 and 30 are least likely to take an interest in politics, many other measures suggest that most young people are outside of the political process. Politics does not emerge as something which young people identify as a vehicle for realising their ideas. The focus groups powerfully underline this, as young discussants appear challenged by serious discussions about political matters. They say that an intergenerational conflict, the administration and the media inhibit their contributions to BiH society. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the quantitative survey shows that around two thirds of the under-30s would like to leave BiH. From both instruments it emerges that the young people of BiH have a low commitment to their country. Their ability to make a meaningful difference to society remains restricted. Perhaps as a result, young people would rather rely on external motivational triggers than use their initiative to change things
- Education is not seen as a problem in either instrument. The survey shows that it is not an important policy aim and the focus groups clarify that access to education is a problem where young people do not have sufficient funds
- In both the survey and in the groups, there is strong belief that the state, the government or institutions are responsible for solving people's problems. Rarely do people look for solutions within themselves. This belief in 'Big Government' appears as a post-script to the provider mentality of socialist Yugoslavia
- In the quantitative survey the role of the UN appears ambiguous. The modal category wants the UN to deal with human rights, an issue which does not appear to be a problem. In the groups, neither the UN nor its Head are given the role of the guardian over rights. That role is reserved for the MHRR Minister. Many discussants appear confused about the UN, its mandate and its policies. There seems to be a lack of accurate information which may well have contaminated trust scores. From the few comments about the UN's role in the focus groups it emerges that UN activity is associated with the humanitarian interventions during and immediately after the war. This association may well be the source of human rights role assignments for the UN. In any case, there may be a risk in basing policy initiatives on manifestations which require further clarification
- The relatively low esteem expressed for the Minister of the MHRR in the focus groups may be a reflection on a wider notion of mistrust directed at the over-arching political structures and especially at the State government in Sarajevo: less than one quarter trust the State government. Therefore, comments on the Minister may not be accurate representations of the facts but may well suffer from response contamination
- Corruption appears as over-estimated in both the qualitative and the quantitative surveys. Discussants in the focus groups cherish an opportunity to talk about corruption, yet their contributions remain at the descriptive level and are mostly second-hand. In the quantitative survey there is a large gap between beliefs in

corruption and actual recent experiences. In terms of identifying the levels where corruption takes place, discussants in the focus groups are altogether more specific in identifying corrupt processes and people, than were respondents in the questionnaire survey. In the latter corruption is perceived as virtually ubiquitous. In the focus groups corruption was overwhelmingly attributed to local intermediaries and IOs were broadly exempt. This finding provides a clue to solving the apparent contradiction in the quantitative report since it suggests that IOs, the providers of assistance in the first instance, are implicated by association with intermediaries. This is consistent with a finding in the survey that the UN is yet to distinguish itself from other organisations and actors

- Finally, the survey asks in which areas respondents experienced corruption in the past twelve months. Overall there are few responses. However, the modal category mentions corruption in the health service. This is consistent with the findings from the focus groups where discussants mention that they have to pay when accessing health services although they are furnished with health cards

Section 4

Lessons Learned

In particular the qualitative research yields a number of lessons which may be helpful in planning and implementing similar interventions. There is no attempt to underestimate the specificity of the situation in BiH ⁴.

Lessons learned have little meaning unless they include ideas about improving things; some therefore feature in policy advice.

- Any intervention which aims to assist migrants should be based on timely fact-based research. This makes implementation more efficient and channels the right assistance to the right people. If an application of random methods is not possible, snow-balling ⁵ may serve as an appropriate system to recruit respondents within migrant communities
- Research should also accompany any longer-term intervention to monitor and precisely identify the point at which diminishing returns on investment set in. In addition, research can identify key messages which are likely to be of value to the return process and which potential recipients decode in a uniform manner
- Early interventions need to have durable solutions as their finite aim. Beyond policies which restart lives through reconstruction and capital equipment, sustainability is key. Sustainability of return/integration and paid work are virtually congruous and are a precondition for making return and integration a lasting success
- In addition to paid work, capital equipment such as machinery, tools and livestock are of limited value unless there are channels for marketing the produce. It appears pertinent to explore opportunities for marketing and distribution before furnishing recipients with capital equipment
- Timing is important. The focus groups clearly show that the desire to return decreases with time. It appears that targeting assistance to migrants early in the process could be beneficial for higher rates of return
- Many young people feel left out. This should be given special consideration in the design of return policies
- Communication appears as mission-critical. The communication of the availability of assistance to potential returnees early in the process can be an important trigger for return
- Also, policy implementation requires efficient communication in order to help recipients understand the goals and overall coherence of the mission. In addition, communicating achievements reduces remoteness of funding institutions and helps with both brand building and brand fit
- There is confusion about terminology. It appears that the use of everyday language instead of administrative concepts is advantageous

⁴ However, the authors are familiar with a similar intervention where UNHCR returned mostly Kurdish migrants to areas in what is now known as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region

⁵ Snow-balling is a method where one respondent (seed) gives the contact names of a maximum of four other people he/she knows who fulfil the selection criteria. The four contacts provide another four names and so on

- Remoteness is a problem in the relationship between funders and recipients. Senior figures in funding agencies should meet with recipients at regular intervals. Direct communication can help reduce remoteness and be of mutual benefit. The use of the media, especially TV, can proliferate key messages and communicate how funds are being spent and who is receiving them
- Intermediaries are seen as a problem and their involvement should be kept to a minimum. Greater reliance on direct intervention could help prevent the contamination of brand images by perceptions of corruption and inequity in assistance distribution. Where intermediaries are indispensable, their actions require close monitoring. In fact, if local people understand how much is being spent, they would be able to complement monitoring with their own observations
- There appears to be a problem with decision-making. Discussants in the focus groups claim that decisions made by local officials were not always beneficial. A limitation of the discretion of local officials could be appropriate
- The lack of quality of assistance, mainly in construction materials and standards of workmanship, is perceived to be problematic. Funder quality control should be an integral part of any intervention
- There are economies of scale in group-return. It appears that the encouragement of group dynamics in return as well as group-based assistance could support more efficient policy implementation
- Perceived inequity in the distribution of assistance can violate conceptions of social justice and challenges community solidarity. The allocation of assistance in similar cases could benefit from closer monitoring
- Education plays an important role in the decision to return. Consequently, early improvements to education and long-term access, especially to vocational and tertiary education, are key
- Integration in host communities emerges as a viable alternative to return. While the decision to return is ultimately made by the displaced, it may be equally beneficial to dedicate significant assistance to the integration of non-returnees. This is especially important in areas where natural internal migration includes elements of urbanisation
- Institutional assistance can lead to dependency. This is especially true in post-socialist countries. Policy implementation should insist that institutional assistance is matched with individual effort

Section 5

Policy Advice

This survey provides a range of pointers for future policy design. Actionable policy advice focuses on recommendations which, from the perspective of the data, appear realisable. On the basis of the findings this Section maps out broader development areas. Once actual policy priorities have been identified, further data analysis can yield important insights. In particular, the segmentation of data in order to identify sub-populations and target groups will be supported by the relatively large sample size.

The survey maps out two key long-term aspirations of the BiH population:

- 1 - Joining the EU and inviting the EU to help shape the future of BiH
- 2 - Constitutional change and a new political structure

The research also shows quite clearly that before long-term aspirations can be realised, short- and mid-term policies are needed to prepare the ground. Not least of all, the potential risks associated with constitutional changes require particular attention.

The research team identified four short to mid-term development areas

- 1 Economic progress, employment opportunities and SMEs ⁶
- 2 A comprehensive package for the young
- 3 Reconciliation and social integration
- 4 Communication, trust, fighting corruption and civic engagement

The advice below is cross-cutting as elements of it are likely to be of value in a range of areas. Media initiatives and further research play roles in most of them.

1 Economic progress, employment opportunities and SMEs

The study shows that economic concerns dominate. Given the importance of these issues, it appears unlikely that progress can be made in BiH unless there is economic development and more employment. Moreover, it is quite possible that the observed sectional divisions would lose some of their saliency if economic concerns were reduced. Critically however, continued or new dependencies on institutional assistance need to be avoided.

Overall economic development and national interventions which stimulate an increase in employment go beyond the scope of this study and will require macro-economic initiatives. However, there are three policy ideas which emerge directly from the study:

1.1 Employment - New business initiatives

Employment opportunities should not be coterminous with paid work. In particular, young people in the focus groups asked for assistance in setting up businesses; training, easier access to credit, and grants for small businesses. In the literature, the critical importance of SMEs for economic transition is well documented ⁷. LEDU in Northern Ireland may serve as an example of how government-led well-funded SME development can assist both the

⁶ Small and medium-sized enterprises

⁷ Cf. e.g. Working Paper No 30 by Nicholas Stern, Chief Economist at the EBRD, *The Future of Economic Transition*, July 1998. Also cf. Smallbone, D. and Welter, F.; *Institutional Development and Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies*; Belfast, June 2003

reduction of sectional division and overall economic progress⁸. The following ideas may help support policy design:

- Conduct a research programme to explore viable initiatives in other societies. This may prominently include other transition economies and Ireland both North and South. Apart from the fact that Northern Ireland is noted for its successes in leveraging SME-activity in reducing sectional divisions, the Republic of Ireland has experienced recent rapid economic growth which was significantly supported by SMEs
- Conduct a research programme to evaluate the current conditions in BiH for SME and co-operative start up. This could include the legal framework, registration procedures, taxation, domestic markets and export potential. On the basis of this research the various political institutions of BiH could be advised
- Engage in dialogue with government. BiH government agencies may decide to provide tax breaks and simplified procedures for registering and starting businesses. In addition, the government of BiH may decide to enhance its capacity in state-support for companies such as the creation of a dedicated Ministry or an expansion in the capacity of the Chambers of Commerce
- Engage in dialogue with banks in order to build partnerships in support of SME start-ups
- All support requires some form of reciprocity, set targets or shared-risk schemes. For example, a grant to start a marketing co-operative can only be awarded if the funder receives shares in the profits. This way additional resources for supporting other initiatives can be mobilised and losses from bad loans could partly be recovered. Alternatively, funders could agree fixed turnover or profit targets with the recipients. Loans should be paid out on the basis of shared risk
- Broadcast TV programmes in support of SME and co-operative start-ups. BiH emerges as a TV nation. It thus appears appropriate to utilise TV as a platform for stimulating greater entrepreneurial spirit and a more developed sense of competition. In particular, non-fictional formats could award prizes for best business idea. This could be combined with viewer call-ins and support from banks which award loans and start-up capital to the winners
- Provide local training in business start-ups. This could include seminars to highlight the personal qualities needed to be in business. This would encourage suitable candidates and discourage those who prefer working in employment. Additional curricula could include marketing, accountancy, banking, legal matters, personnel and the compilation of viable business plans. It may be possible to invite experienced business people to visit local areas to hold workshops in order to educate interested parties about life in business
- Develop a system for business angels. Business angels help young companies and co-operatives to succeed and grow. Policy-makers may consider requesting experienced (or retired) business people to accompany start-up businesses in their critical phases of growth. In return, business angels could receive a shareholding and/or a non-executive directorship to make their assistance lucrative

⁸ <http://www.startingabusinessinireland.com/dirledu.htm>

- Guarantee bank loans. Rather than providing direct loans, funders may decide to guarantee bank loans in support of SME start-ups. This way, funders would place the responsibility for evaluating the viability of applicants' business plans on qualified banking experts. In addition, risk could be shared between funders and banks

1.2 Local co-operatives to market and distribute produce

In the focus groups it became apparent that economic development prominently includes the creation of markets and distribution systems for agricultural produce and other products. Continued investment in capital equipment for rural dwellers, such as machinery and livestock, is unlikely to be profitable unless the channels for effective marketisation are established. It also emerged that there are the embryonic foundations of greater levels of social organisation in support of improved livelihoods. Co-operative initiatives could be leveraged in order to increase economic activity at the local level and provide an opportunity for local people to help themselves.

The research team suggests the following:

- Further explore the potential for marketing and distribution channels. In order to make assistance in capital equipment viable, channels require immediate attention. Moreover, it is unlikely that economic activity can be successful and reliance on imports can be reduced unless domestic channels in BiH are further developed
- Commission an expertise which outlines the current situation and makes recommendations regarding an expansion and extension of channel activity. In addition, training for local producers may help them use existing or new channels efficiently
- Stimulate greater collective economic action by local producers
- Select a limited number of locations where pilot projects for co-operative marketing are likely to succeed. The marketisation and distribution of agricultural produce by local co-operatives, e.g. collectively producing, distributing and selling food products in nearby commercial hubs, may provide the scope for a viable start
- Explore branding as part of a localisation strategy. For example Vlasic cheese is widely recognised for its taste. Its marketing potential is therefore increased. Co-operative producers in other areas of BiH could be educated in identifying strengths in their products and be guided in marketing them accordingly

1.3 Returning the Diaspora

In the context of policy advice, the return of the Diaspora is essentially treated as an economic theme. The research team follows the respondents to the quantitative survey who highlight the economic dimension of Diaspora return.

The OHR estimates that there are currently 1.3 million BiH citizens who live and work abroad⁹. While dedicated research is required to profile the Diaspora both demographically and economically, its return could have a multiplier effect on economic activity in BiH. It is envisaged that a returning Diaspora would bring capital, expertise and energy. In the short-term, they are the most likely source of inward investment, especially at grass-root level.

⁹ OHR Press Release 13 April 2007

Before a policy initiative should commence the following may need to be considered:

- A research programme which:
 - Systematically targets BiH citizens who have already returned from abroad and have started their own businesses. These respondents could be important for an examination of the opportunities and obstacles they experienced. Their accounts would also be critical for the design of instruments in subsequent research components
 - Locates concentrations of the BiH Diaspora. Countries which may be included are Canada, Sweden, Germany, Austria and the United States
 - Snow-balling¹⁰ may be an appropriate method for recruiting respondents to the survey
 - Alternatively, members of the Diaspora who are visiting BiH on vacation could be intercepted at border-crossings and airport arrivals and be invited to participate in interviews
 - Estimates the ability of members of the Diaspora to invest in BiH and segments the data for lucrative targets
 - Profiles push and pull factors
 - Suggests ways to convince members of the Diaspora to return to BiH
 - Establishes areas where groups of returnees can settle and support each other
 - Explores BiH government for its ability to implement pro-return policies. This could be achieved through a legal and economic analysis and in-depth interviews with decision-makers
 - Suggests a suitable timeframe for the implementation of policy
- In addition to thorough research the following may be integral part of any policy design:
 - A tax regime which favours returnees
 - Public investment to complement direct investment by the returning Diaspora
 - Simplified laws of incorporation
 - Government coaches to help the returning Diaspora to integrate and invest profitably. Such coaches could be recruited from persons with a Diaspora background
 - A government institution such as a dedicated Ministry to attract, guide and support returning Diaspora
 - Assurances that returning Diaspora will not lose their residency status in host countries if they return to BiH

2 Provide a comprehensive package for the young

One key finding of the research is the near universal desire to invest in the young. The young are perceived as the greatest strength of BiH. At the same time the mobilisation of young people emerges as a key challenge. In fact, the overwhelming desire for selective out-migration by the young indicates that it is paramount to create conditions in BiH which are likely to convince its young citizens to remain in the country.

However, in the study young people appear to require external stimuli as they are not confident to initiate change under their own aegis. It therefore follows to propose a dedicated research programme which helps identify the parameters of non-engagement and ways for building confidence and realising potential. Specifically, research which explains the obstacles and opportunities which confront young cohorts in contemporary

¹⁰ Snow-balling is a method where one respondent (seed) gives the contact names of a maximum of four other people he/she knows who fulfil the selection criteria. The four contacts provide another four names and so on

BiH is likely to pinpoint measures which may help young people to apply their energy constructively.

2.1 Business initiatives for the young

In addition to ideas developed for stimulating greater entrepreneurship among the general public, this research identifies a number of pointers which could benefit younger cohorts. Young participants in discussion groups suggest individual, future-oriented entrepreneurial models to solve some of their economic problems. This strongly suggests that new businesses are most likely to succeed if younger cohorts are given privileged access to the resources which help build SMEs. At the same time, both research instruments show that while young people are aware of their potential and ability to change things, they often lack the triggers that lead to concrete action. Most of the policy ideas outlined above are likely to be of importance for young business start-ups.

- Educate young people about the importance of self-employment. The research team advises policy-makers to explore the possibility of targeting schools and tertiary education establishments with experienced figures from commerce as well as young successful entrepreneurs. In addition, an outline of the abilities and skills necessary for career in business could be discussed to help young people to gauge if they are likely to succeed. In addition, seminars for discussing concrete business ideas may complement this intervention.

2.2 Enhancements to marketable skills

In the focus groups, young participants were keen to discuss measures which are likely to enhance their ability to participate in the labour market. It appears that in addition to education, there is a need to provide more occupational training and to increase the overall professional competence of young BiH citizens.

- The research team suggests expanding current endeavours of placing young people in industry for a limited period of time. This way, young people can learn skills which are likely to increase their employment potential. For companies such placements are a good opportunity for optimising their recruitment strategy. At the same time, seminars run by representatives of different industrial sectors could introduce young people to the required skills. This measure could complement industrial placements and establish direct contact between job-seekers and hiring companies
- There appears to be a demand for skill transfer guided by professional trainers. To this end the research team suggests an expansion of certified vocational courses. Such courses could initially be run by experienced trainers from EU-countries and be translated by local staff

2.3 Grants and loans to meet the auxiliary cost of education

Young discussants in the focus groups insist that access to tertiary and vocational training can be challenging because of the auxiliary cost such as subsistence, travel and materials.

- To this end it appears appropriate to support young people with grants and loans. However, it appears equally appropriate to make grants conditional on the completion of the course and above-average achievement

2.4 Education abroad

Education abroad is often sought by young people in the focus groups. While it is not clear that exchange programmes will work in all instances, it may well be the case that placing

young BiH citizens in education programmes abroad is a viable alternative. The ILO centre in Turin, Italy may serve as an illustration.

- The research team suggests placing BiH students in other European universities and colleges for a period of one academic year
- Vocational training courses abroad could be operated in much the same way as academic placements

2.5 More room for the young in the media

Young people in focus groups say they feel under-represented in the media. Their specific concerns tend not to be addressed.

- It may prove mutually beneficial to invite BiH media editors and representatives of youth organisations to a conference which would enhance awareness of youth-specific themes and help editors to market their output to younger cohorts in a more efficient manner

2.6 Support for collective youth action at local level including political activity

Both the survey and the focus groups show that young people are largely outside of the political process. Young people especially have difficulty in identifying politics as a vehicle for realising their aspirations. Many of their political ideas are spontaneous and emotive rather than based on facts. At the same time the organisation of youth-interests appears under-developed. It is not inconceivable that greater social organisation of young people may stimulate their initiative and help them voice their concerns more effectively. Initially however, it appears that young cohorts would benefit from seminars in civic engagement.

- Recruit and train facilitators who visit local youth centres in order to stimulate and organise youth activity
- Run seminars in civic engagement. Such seminars could explain the political structure and actors of BiH, introduce participants to constitutional reform issues and discuss ways for young people to realise their aspirations through an involvement in the political process
- Explore the possibility of networking youth centres and similar organisations in order to provide an institutional framework for motivating the young. In addition, such endeavours may help proliferate activity and be an important contribution to both networking and social cohesion among the young

3 Reconciliation and social integration

Given the low level of social trust and sectional divisions between different religious affiliates and identities, efforts should be directed at improving social cohesion. In addition, respondents to the quantitative survey are clear that addressing the injustices of the war is an integral component in any change scenario. At the same time the data demonstrate that a continued prosecution of war criminals is very unlikely to address perceived injustices.

3.1 Reconciliation Commission

Measures which aim to reduce social divisions are likely to be beneficial for overall social cohesion in BiH. Social progress appears challenged unless sectional divisions are reduced.

- To this end, the research team recommends to explore the possibility of formally establishing a Reconciliation Commission. The South African Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 may serve as a possible source of inspiration
- Any efforts in reconciliation should ensure that the concerns of people who have an exclusive identity are sufficiently addressed

3.2 Research and integration of exclusive identifiers

People who have an exclusive identity ('the 504') emerge as a key challenge to civic incorporation. It appears unlikely that BiH society as a whole can move forward if this involves the risk of further alienating this minority. Integration policies are unlikely to thrive unless the grievances of this group are fully understood and appropriately addressed. It is thus critical to find ways of narrowing the gap between 'the 504' and the BiH mainstream. This prominently includes an understanding for the objective and attitudinal differences between exclusive identifiers and the mainstream, but also where common ground exists.

- 'The 504' need further dedicated data analysis of the existing material as well as further research. The analysis of the existing data requires a systematic comparison between respondents who have an exclusive identity and other categories. An initial analytical task could be to profile 'the 504' more accurately along demographic, socio-economic and residential lines. Such an analysis could explore both differences between 'the 504' and the mainstream as well as areas of agreement as potential starting points for policy designs. In addition, a dedicated cross-sectional comparative analysis of general attitudes, trust scores and political variables may deliver important pointers for an integration policy and assess the potential risk which this group poses to constitutional change and the idea of BiH's EU membership
- Respondents who have an exclusive identity tend to be more trusting towards the police. Any policy, which is likely to have a significant effect on the way the police delivers law enforcement, is likely to be met with scepticism
- Respondents who have an exclusive identity are also less likely to perceive the EU as a long-term aspiration. It therefore follows to suggest that 'the 504' need to experience the advantages of the EU. Young people from families where exclusive identities dominate could be given an opportunity to visit EU-countries for an extended period of time

4 Communication, Trust, Fighting Corruption and Civic Engagement

In both the survey and the focus groups respondents do not appear to have accurate information in a range of areas. This is especially true for the work of international organisations, corruption and politics. Interest in politics is low. On this basis it is unlikely that voters have fully internalised the intricacies of BiH politics and the scope for civic involvement in political processes. Overall, there appears to be a chasm between objective circumstances and their subjective reproduction by the population.

4.1 TV and print as platforms for civic education

The data show that there is a pressing need to fight perceptions of corruption and build trust in institutions. The fight against beliefs in corruption appears as salient in fighting corruption in itself. This fight could have significant side-effects such as improving the low esteem for BiH as a country and low political interest, as well as developing greater trust in political institutions and international organisations. The following may be of value:

- TV programmes which compare popular beliefs with facts in order to point out any inconsistencies. Survey research results may be a good source for outlining widespread beliefs such as the ones regarding the extent and pervasiveness of corruption. Similarly, widespread popular negativity about the situation in BiH could be adjusted to more realistic levels by presenting the corresponding facts
- Media texts which explain the functions of institutions and add transparency to spending practices
- Further development of investigative journalism which targets corrupt processes
- Across most of Europe the dissemination of survey results is an established method of public information. Broadcasting research findings can be an important contributor to the formation of fact-based opinions. In particular, an understanding of majority opinion could provide the goal-posts for viewers to gauge their own position

Political participation requires encouragement. There should be an opportunity for the people of BiH to explore the intricacies of important issues through deliberation. Overall, there appears to be a need to go beyond predominantly plebiscitary modes to some level of participative input. In order to strengthen citizen's voices in governance, the research team suggests the following:

- Deliberative democracy as an idea to support local-level interventions: *'deliberation is an approach to decision-making that involves an informed public, thinking critically together and discussing options from multiple points of view. It encourages enlarged perspectives, opinions, and understandings and can result in better decisions and policies'*¹¹. To this end the research team suggests that policy-makers explore the possibility of recruiting and training Facilitators who target particular local areas, secure venues, invite citizens and moderate discussions on issues of concern. Such issues may well include constitutional ones
- Use TV to broaden the impact. Some local discussions could be recorded and broadcast on TV in order to broaden the reach of the measure and stimulate debate at the national level. Alternatively, a new TV format could present live debates and lead to subsequent local debates on similar topics
- Feed outcomes of discussions to policy-makers at regular intervals. This way policy-makers have access to a monitoring tool which keeps them up-to-date with public opinion

¹¹ <http://www.deliberative-democracy.net/>

Annex

Table 1.3.1 - Cross-Tabulation in Percent - Situation in BiH in 1 Year's Time and Age

	<30	>30
Much better	5.3	2.1
Somewhat better	44.9	36.4
About the same	44.0	48.8
Somewhat worse	5.1	10.2
Much worse	0.7	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0

Valid N = 3,023

Table 1.3.2 - Cross-Tabulation in Percent - Leaving BiH and age-cohorts

	Tito-era	Post-Tito	War	Post-war
Yes	22.3	48.9	54.6	62.6
No	77.7	51.1	45.4	37.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Valid N = 3,522

Table 1.3.3 - Cross-Tabulation in Percent - Improving visa regulations and age cohorts

	Priority	Not priority
Tito-era	10.6	89.4
Post-Tito	17.4	82.6
War	19.6	80.4
Post-war	19.9	80.1
Total	14.7	85.3

Valid N = 3,580

Table 1.4.1 - Recoded Variable Names with Values

Original Variable Name	Recoded Variable Name	Recoded Values
Q1 - Taking all things together, would you say you are?	r1: Life Satisfaction	0 = Not satisfied/Other 1 = Satisfied
Q3 - All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...?	r3: Health	0 = Other 1 = Very good/good
Q7 - Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?	r7: Social Fairness	0 = Take advantage/Other 1 = Be fair
Q9c - What do you expect your household's standard of living to be about one year from now?	r9c: Standard of Living	0 = Below average/Other 1 = Above average
Q10 - If given an opportunity, would you leave BiH and live somewhere else?	r10: Leaving BiH	0 = No 1 = Yes
Q12 - How interested would you say you are in politics?	r12: Political Interest	0 = No interest/Other 1 = Interest
Q14 - Did you vote in the last general election on 1 October 2006?	r14: Non-Voting/Voting	0 = Voting 1 = Non voting
Q19_1 - There is a certain amount of political power at different levels of government in BiH. I am going to read the different levels of government available in your area. Please tell me which level you would like to have most power - State Level	r19a_rec: Political Power	0 = Other 1 = State level
Q30 - All in all, and everything considered, do you think the DPA has worked for BiH or not?	r30: Has DPA Worked?	0 = No 1 = Yes
Q45a - When do you think the involvement of the UN in BiH should end or should it be involved in BiH for many years to come?	r45a_rec: UN to Leave	0 = UN stay 1 = UN Leave
Q63 - What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?	r63: Education	1 = Low Education 2 = Mid Education 3 = High Education
Q64 - Which of the following best describes your own current employment status?	r64: Employment	1 = Employed 2 = Unemployed
Q64 - Which of the following best describes your own current employment status?	r64_rec: Employment Status	1 = Employed 2 = Unemployed 3 = Inactive
Q68a - What is your monthly net household income in KM? (How much money do you actually receive each month?) By net household income I mean all the cash incomes of your household	r68a: Income (KM) Categorised	1 = Low (<300) 2 = Mid (301-1000) 3 = High (>1001)
Q55 - How often do you follow the news, on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?	r55: Following the news	0 = Other 1 = Weekly
Q59 - Could you please tell me your age?	r59_tito: Socialisation cohort	1 = Tito-Era 2 = Post-Tito 3 = War 4 = Post-war
Q70 - What is your religion?	r70: Religion	1 = Roman Catholic 2 = Christian Orthodox 3 = Other 4 = Muslim

Q48/51- Have you ever been displaced? By displacement I mean fleeing or leaving your home to avoid violence; Have you returned to the village/neighbourhood where you were originally displaced from or not?	disp_ret: Displacement and Return Status	1 = Returnee 2 = Non-returnee 3 = Non-displaced
Q61ab - Which of the following best describes you? (Above all, I am a citizen of BiH; Above all, I am a Bosniak, Croat, Serb; Other)	Rr61ab: Identity	1 = Exclusive identity 2 = Dual identity 3 = Primary BiH identity
Region/Canton/District	Ent: Entity	1 = FBiH 2 = Republika Srpska 3 = Brcko
q38a_1: Future structure of BiH - Recreate Yugoslavia	yug38a_1: Recreate Yugoslavia support	0 = Other 1 = Recreate Yugoslavia
Q38a_2 - Future structure of BiH - Centralised state	cen38a_2: Centralised state support	0 = Other 1 = Centralised state
Q38a_3 - Future structure of BiH - Centralised with strong regions	fed38a_3: Federal state support	0 = Other 1 = Federal state
q38a_4: Future structure of BiH - As is	as_is38a_4: Keep country as is support	0 = Other 1 = Keep country as is
q38a_5: Future structure of BiH - Three entities	new_ent38a_5: Three entities support	0 = Other 1 = Three entities
q38a_6: Future structure of BiH - Dividing into independent states	div_ind38a_6: Dividing into independent states support	0 = Other 1 = Divide into independent states
q38a_7: Future structure of BiH - Dividing and joining neighbours	div_join38a_7: Dividing and joining neighbours support	0 = Other 1 = Divide and join neighbours
Q17a_1 - I am going to read some ideas about priorities for BiH for the next 12 months. Please tell me which one is your first priority, your second priority and your third priority - Ensuring that BiH finally grows into unified country	r17a_1: Aim - Growing BiH into one country	1 = Priority 2 = Not priority
Q23 - Some people say that there is a lot of corruption by officials in BiH, others think there is little or none. How about you, what do you think?	r23_rec: Official Corruption	0 = Other 1 = Corrupt
Q24 - At what level do you think official corruption predominantly happens?	r24_rec: State level corruption	0 = Other 1 = State level
Q25 - How about corruption among international organisations such as the EU, the UN, the OHR, and NGOs/international relief organisations?	r25: IO Corruption	0 = Other 1 = Corrupt
Q35 - Irrespective of what you think may be possible from today's perspective: ideally, what or where should BiH be in twenty year's time?	r35: BiH in 20 Years	0 = Other 1 = (In) EU
Q46a - Irrespective of what you said about the timing of the UN's involvement, which of the following should be the role of the UN in BiH? - Ensure that human rights are observed	r46a2: UN Role - Human rights	0 = Other 1 = Priority
Q40 - Are you aware of any plans to change the constitution of BiH?	r40: Awareness constitutional change	0 = No 1 = Yes
Q13_1 - I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it - Talking with other people about politics	r13_1: Political action - Talking politics with other People	0 = Other 1 = No

Q13_2 - I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it - Voting at elections	r13_2: Political action - Voting	0 = Other 1 = No
Q13_6 - I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it - Using violence or force if it becomes necessary	r13_6: Political action - Using violence or force	0 = Other 1 = Yes
Q32B - What is your expectation for how things overall in BiH will be in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?	r32b_rec: Overall situation in BiH in one year's time	1= Better 2 = Worse 3 = Same
Q22 - Some people think that the system of government in BiH is too complicated and should be changed. Others say it is about right. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?	r22: System too complicated	0 = Other 1 = Complicated – should be changed
Q37 - Considering everything, which country could serve as a model for BiH in the coming years?	r37_rec: Slovenia only	0 = Other 1 = Slovenia
Q8A - All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? ? If '1' on this scale means you are "completely dissatisfied", and '10' means you are "completely satisfied", where would you position your level of satisfaction with your life as a whole?	r8a: Satisfaction - Overall life situation	1 = Low Overall 2 = Middle Overall 3 = High Overall
Q8C - Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that they have no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where '1' means "none at all" and '10' means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.	r8c: Free choice	1 = Low-Free 2 = Middle-Free 3 = High-Free
Q38A - Irrespective of what you may think is possible at this time, in an ideal world, which structure should this country have in future? I am going to read out some choices twice so you will remember them more easily. Please listen carefully and tell me which one is your first choice, your second and your third choice.	r38a_rec: Future structure	1 = Unify BiH 2 = BiH as is 3 = BiH other 4 = Divide BiH
Q32A - Compared to a year ago, are things overall in BiH much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?	r32a: Situation BiH - Compared to one year ago	1 = Better-now 2 = Same-now 3 = Worse-now
Q32B - What is your expectation for how things overall in BiH will be in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?	r32b: Situation BiH – Expected in one year	1= Better-future 2 = Same-future 3 = Worse-future
Q57 – Which of the following papers do you read regularly (once or more than once a week)	r57_rec: Frequency of newspaper reading	1 = Reading regularly 2 = Not reading

Q12 - How interested would you say you are in politics?	r12_rec: Political Interest	1 = Interest 2 = No interest
Q36 - How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the left; '10' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.	r36b: Who decides - Politicians vs. people?	1 = Politicians 2 = People
Q36 - How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the left; '10' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.	r36e_1: Big change vs. no change	1 = Big change 2 = No change
Q38B - Irrespective of what you may think is possible at this time, in an ideal world, which structure for this country is not a choice at all? I am going to read out some choices twice so you will remember them more easily. Please listen carefully and tell me which one is not a choice at all. – Federal state	r38b_fed: Federal state no choice at all	0 = Else 1 = Federal state no choice at all
Q45A - When do you think the involvement of the UN in BiH should end or should it be involved in BiH for many years to come?	r45arec: UN to Stay	0 = Other 1 = UN stay
Q46A - Irrespective of what you said about the timing of the UN's involvement, which of the following should be the role of the UN in BiH? Please tell me which of the following should be the most important role, the second most important, and the third most important.	r46a_2HR: Promote human rights first priority only	0 = Other 1 = Priority
Q61B – [only ask if respondent indicated 'B to D' in Q61A] As well as thinking of yourself as a [Bosniak, Croat, Serb] do you also think of yourself as being a citizen of the whole of BiH?	r61b: Identity rec	0 = Other 1 = Only exclusive identity
Q23 - Some people say that there is a lot of corruption by officials in BiH, others think there is little or none. How about you, what do you think?	r23_rec1: Official corruption	1= All/Most 2 = Half 3 = A few/None
Q20_1 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them - State government in Sarajevo	r20_1: Trust - State Government in Sarajevo	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_2 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them - UN	r20_2 : Trust - UN	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_3 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them - Police	r20_3: Trust - Police	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_4 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them - EU	r20_4: Trust EU	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_5 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – Entity government	r20_5: Trust Entity Government	0 = Other 1 = Trust

Q20_6 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – OHR	r20_6: Trust OHR	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_7 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – EUFOR	r20_7: Trust EUFOR	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_8 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them - FTV and/or RTRS	r20_8 : Trust Media	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_9 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – Political parties	r20_9: Trust - Political parties	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_10 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – Courts	r20_10: Trust - Courts	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q20_11 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them – Municipal authority	r20_11: Trust Municipal Authority	0 = Other 1 = Trust
Q36 - <i>How would you place your views on this scale? ‘1’ means you “agree completely” with the statement on the left; ‘10’ means you “agree completely” with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.</i>	r36e_1re: Big change vs. no change	0 = No change 1 = Big change
Q2A - Compared to a year ago, overall are things in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?	r2a: Overall situation in life compared to one year ago	1 = Better 2 = Same 3 = Worse
Q2B - <i>What is your expectation for how things in your life will be overall in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?</i>	r2b: Overall situation in life expected in one year time	1 = Better 2 = Same 3 = Worse



Oxford Research International

Survey Questionnaire

Q1 - Taking all things together, would you say you are: [WVS V11]

Very happy	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Quite happy	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Not very happy	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Not at all happy	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please read and ✓ tick one only

Q2A - Compared to a year ago, overall are things in your life much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?**Q2B - What is your expectation for how things in your life will be overall in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?**

	Q2A	Q2B
Much better [now]	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Somewhat better	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
About the same	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Somewhat worse	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
Much worse	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only in each column

Q3 - All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is... [WVS V12]

Very good	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q5
Good	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q5
Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	» go to Q4
Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	» go to Q4
Very poor	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	» go to Q4
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q5

Please read out reversing order for alternate contacts. Please ✓ tick one only

[Ask those who replied 'fair', 'poor' or 'very poor' in Q3]

Q4 – In the past 12 months, have you experienced any of the following? If you have experienced none of them please tell me so

The need to take tablets for controlling your blood pressure	<input type="checkbox"/> _01
Back pain on 3 occasions or more	<input type="checkbox"/> _02
Pain in your back to the extent that you found difficulty in walking	<input type="checkbox"/> _03
Weight gain of more than 3 kg	<input type="checkbox"/> _04
Without dieting, a weight loss of more than 3 kg	<input type="checkbox"/> _05
The need to consult with a doctor on more than 3 occasions	<input type="checkbox"/> _06
Worrying thoughts which kept coming back	<input type="checkbox"/> _07
Periods of unhappiness which was hard to control	<input type="checkbox"/> _08
Problems with your heart	<input type="checkbox"/> _09
Feeling tired for no apparent reason	<input type="checkbox"/> _10
Experienced none of them	<input type="checkbox"/> _11
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please read out and ✓✓ tick all that apply or ✓ tick 'experienced none of them'. If 'experienced none of them' is ticked nothing else is ticked

Q5 – In the past 7 days, on average, how many minutes did it take you to fall asleep after you decided to go to sleep?

Minutes

Please write minutes

Q6 - Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people? [WVS V25]

Most people can be trusted	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
You have to be very careful in dealing with people	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q7 - Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? [WVS V26]

Would take advantage	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Would try to be fair	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q8A - All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? ? If '1' on this scale means you are "completely dissatisfied", and '10' means you are "completely satisfied", where would you position your level of satisfaction with your life as a whole? Please use this card to help with your answer. [WVS V81]

Q8B - How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If '1' on this scale means you are "completely dissatisfied", and '10' means you are "completely satisfied", where would you position your level of satisfaction with your household's financial situation? [WVS V80]

Q8C - Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that they have no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where '1' means "none at all" and '10' means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. [WVS V82]

Q8A	Dissatisfied									Satisfied	No answer [Do not read]
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> _1	2 <input type="checkbox"/> _2	3 <input type="checkbox"/> _3	4 <input type="checkbox"/> _4	5 <input type="checkbox"/> _5	6 <input type="checkbox"/> _6	7 <input type="checkbox"/> _7	8 <input type="checkbox"/> _8	9 <input type="checkbox"/> _9	10 <input type="checkbox"/> _10	<input type="checkbox"/> _99
Q8B	Dissatisfied									Satisfied	
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> _1	2 <input type="checkbox"/> _2	3 <input type="checkbox"/> _3	4 <input type="checkbox"/> _4	5 <input type="checkbox"/> _5	6 <input type="checkbox"/> _6	7 <input type="checkbox"/> _7	8 <input type="checkbox"/> _8	9 <input type="checkbox"/> _9	10 <input type="checkbox"/> _10	<input type="checkbox"/> _99
Q8C	None at all									A great deal	
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> _1	2 <input type="checkbox"/> _2	3 <input type="checkbox"/> _3	4 <input type="checkbox"/> _4	5 <input type="checkbox"/> _5	6 <input type="checkbox"/> _6	7 <input type="checkbox"/> _7	8 <input type="checkbox"/> _8	9 <input type="checkbox"/> _9	10 <input type="checkbox"/> _10	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please use show card Q8AtoC and ✓ tick one only in each row

Q9A - How would you judge your household's standard of living compared with other households in your community?

Q9B - What was your household's standard of living about one year ago?

Q9C - What do you expect your household's standard of living to be about one year from now?

	Q9A	Q9B	Q9C
A lot below average	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
A bit below average	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Average	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
A bit above average	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
A lot above average	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only in each column

Q10 - If given an opportunity, would you leave BiH and live somewhere else? [EWSC20V]

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
No	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q11A - I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the [village/neighbourhood] where you live. How would you rate the following using very good, quite good, quite bad or very bad?

Please read out items in rotating order (i.e. start each interview with a new item). ✓ Tick '1' for 'very good', '2' for 'quite good', '3' for 'quite bad', '4' for 'very bad' or '9' for 'no answer' in the column for Q11A. Please use 'village' in rural and 'neighbourhood' in urban areas

Q11B - Compared to a year ago, would you say [start with first rotated item in Q11A] is much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Please ✓ tick '1' for 'much better now', '2' for 'somewhat better', '3' for 'about the same', '4' for 'somewhat worse', '5' for 'much worse' or '9' for 'no answer' in the column for Q11B

Q11C - What is your expectation for [start with first rotated item in Q11A] a year from now, do you expect it to be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Please ✓ tick '1' for 'much better', '2' for 'somewhat better', '3' for 'about the same', '4' for 'somewhat worse', '5' for 'much worse' or '9' for 'no answer' in the column for Q11C

Tick start			Q11A Today	Q11B 1 year ago	Q11C In 1 year's time
	1	The availability of any kind of job	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9
	2	The availability of secure jobs	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9
	3	The availability of medical care	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9
	4	Local government services (such as registry (matični ured), building and business permits, water, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9
	5	Your family's protection from crime	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9
	6	The availability of education	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9	<input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 9

Q12 - How interested would you say you are in politics? [WVS E023]

Very interested	<input type="checkbox"/> 1
Somewhat interested	<input type="checkbox"/> 2
Not very interested	<input type="checkbox"/> 3
Not at all interested	<input type="checkbox"/> 4
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> 9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q13 - Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it

	Have done	Might do	Would never do	No answer [Do not read]
1. Talking with other people about politics	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
2. Voting at elections	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
3. Joining a political party	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
4. Joining a citizens' action group	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
5. Taking action such as demonstrating	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9
6. Using violence or force if it becomes necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 9

Please read and use show card Q13 and ✓ tick one in each row

Q14 - Did you vote in the last general election on 1 October 2006?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	» go to Q16
No	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	» go to Q15
No answer	<input type="checkbox"/> 9	» go to Q16

Please ✓ tick one only. If the respondent replies 'no' please go to Q15, otherwise skip Q15 and go to Q16

[Ask those who replied 'no' in Q14]

Q15 - Why did you choose not to vote in the general election on 1 October 2006?

I was not around and could not get to my polling station	<input type="checkbox"/> _01
I was incapacitated (unable to go because of an illness, disability or other incapacity)	<input type="checkbox"/> _02
I had no transport	<input type="checkbox"/> _03
I was too busy with other things that day	<input type="checkbox"/> _04
Someone suggested that I should not vote	<input type="checkbox"/> _05
I found it difficult to choose a party to represent my views	<input type="checkbox"/> _06
I think our political parties are out of touch with the realities of this country	<input type="checkbox"/> _07
I do not like the political system in this country and I do not want to support it	<input type="checkbox"/> _08
I do not think my vote could change anything	<input type="checkbox"/> _09
Voting is something I never really considered	<input type="checkbox"/> _10
Voting is quite complicated and I find it hard to understand	<input type="checkbox"/> _11
Other [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _98
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please ✓ tick one only

Q16A - If there were an election tomorrow, please tell me which party you would vote for in a national election i.e. at State level.

Q16B - And if tomorrow there were an election in your Entity/Brcko, which party would you vote for?

Party Name	Q16A National	Q16B Entity/Brcko
Refused [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _98	<input type="checkbox"/> _98
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please do not prompt parties, check the party code list for Q16A and Q16B and write the names of the party(ies) mentioned by the respondent in the space provided. If the respondent is unwilling to answer, please ✓ tick 'Refused'. If the respondent gives no answer, please ✓ tick 'no answer'. Please make clear that 'national election' means elections at the State level and 'Entity/Brcko' refers to the Entity/Brcko where the respondent is registered to vote

Q17A - I am going to read some ideas about priorities for BiH for the next 12 months. I will read them twice so you can remember more easily. Please tell me which one is your first priority, your second priority and your third priority. If you need me to read them again at any time, please just ask.

Please read twice, rotate items and write '1' for the first priority, '2' for the second, and '3' for the third in the column for Q17A. Please re-read if requested

Q17B - Also, please tell me which one you think is no priority at all.

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q17B. Please read all those not chosen in Q17A or ✓ tick 'no answer'. Please re-read if requested

Tick star t			Q17A. Priorities 1-3	Q17B. No priority at all
	1	Ensuring that BiH finally grows into unified country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
	2	Bringing home BiH citizens who live abroad	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
	3	Improving the infrastructure (electricity, water supply, telephone, roads, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
	4	Ensuring that most people in this country can make a decent living	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
	5	Ensuring that people in BiH regain full control over running the country without much interference from outsiders	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
	6	Ensuring that BiH could not be attacked from the outside	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _6
	7	Keeping corruption at bay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _7
	8	Negotiating better visa regulations for BiH citizens wishing to travel abroad	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _8
	9	Removing landmines from around the country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _9
	10	Dealing with war criminals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _10
	11	Improving the education system	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _11
		No answer [Do not read]	-	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

[Ask those who mentioned at least one priority in Q17A]

Q18A - Who should take care of [read out first priority mentioned in Q17A]? **Please mention only one**

Q18B - Who should take care of [read out second priority mentioned in Q17A]? **Please mention only one**

Q18C - Who should take care of [read out third priority mentioned in Q17A]? **Please mention only one**

No answer
[Do not read]

A. First priority: _____

☐₉₉

B. Second priority: _____

☐₉₉

C. Third priority: _____

☐₉₉

Please write verbatim. If the respondent gives no answer, please ✓ tick 'No answer'. Please check consistency with previous question Q17A: answers should be given only for priorities mentioned by the respondent

Q19 - There is a certain amount of political power at different levels of government in BiH. I am going to read the different levels of government available in your area. Please tell me which level you would like to have most power, followed by second and third [not in Brcko] **choice**

	Choices 1-3
State level	<input type="checkbox"/>
Entity level [do not read in Brcko]	<input type="checkbox"/>
Canton level [do not read in RS and Brcko]	<input type="checkbox"/>
Municipal level	<input type="checkbox"/>
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please '1' for the first priority, '2' for the second, and '3' for the third [not in Brcko] in the column for Q19, or ✓ tick 'no answer'

Q20 - I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

Tick start			A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	No answer [Do not read]
	1	State government in Sarajevo	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	2	United Nations	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	3	Police	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	4	EU	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	5	Government in RS/Federation	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	6	OHR	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	7	EUFOR	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	8	FTV and/or RTRS	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	9	Political parties	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	10	The courts	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
	11	Your municipal authority	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please read out each institution in rotating order (i.e. start each interview with a new statement) and ✓ tick one in each row

Q21 - Some people say that most government officials are in office because they are the best people for the job. Others say most government officials assume positions because they have friends and/or family in the right places. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Government officials get into their positions because ...

Most are the best people for the job	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
Some are the best people for the job, while others assume position because they have friends and family in the right places	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
Most have friends/family in the right places	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please read out each statement and ✓ tick one only

[Ask all]

Q22 - Some people think that the system of government in BiH is too complicated and should be changed. Others say it is about right. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

The system of government is ...

Too complicated and should be changed	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Perhaps complicated but there is no urgent need to change things	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
About right and does not need much change	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please read out each statement and ✓ tick one only

Q23 - Some people say that there is a lot of corruption by officials in BiH, others think there is little or none. How about you, what do you think?

I am not interested in any corruption in business, just among officials

Practically all officials in BiH are corrupt	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q24
Most are corrupt but a few are not	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q24
About half and half	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	» go to Q24
A few are corrupt, most are not	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	» go to Q24
Practically none of the officials in BiH are corrupt	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	» go to Q25
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q24

Please ✓ tick one only. Please ensure the respondent concentrates on official corruption. Those who did not reply 'practically none of the officials in BiH are corrupt' please go to Q24. All others please skip Q24 and go to Q25

[Ask those who did not reply 'practically none of the officials in BiH are corrupt' in previous question]

Q24 - At what level do you think official corruption predominantly happens?

State level	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Entity level	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Municipal level	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Local community level	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
At all levels, no real difference	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please read out reversing order for alternate contacts. Please ✓ tick one only

Q25 - How about corruption among international organisations such as the EU, the UN, the OHR, and NGOs/international relief organisations?

Practically all international organisations are corrupt	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q26
Most are corrupt but a few are not	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q26
About half and half	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	» go to Q26
A few are corrupt, most are not	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	» go to Q26
Practically none of the international organisations are corrupt	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	» go to Q27
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q26

Please ✓ tick one. Please ensure the respondent concentrates on corruption among international organisations. Those who did not reply 'practically none of the international organisations are corrupt' please go to Q26. All others please skip Q26 and go to Q27

[Ask those who did not reply 'practically none of the international organisations are corrupt' in previous question]

Q26 - In which of the following organisations do you think corruption predominantly happens?

EU	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
NGOs/International relief organisations	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
OHR	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
UN (incl. UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, UNESCO, UNFPA, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
All international organisations, no real difference	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please read out reversing order for alternate contacts. Please ✓ tick one only

Q27 - Irrespective of how widespread you think corruption may be, in the past year or so, did you experience corruption, for example that an official or health worker asked you for money, a gift or a favour? If there was no such incident in the past year, please tell me so

No, there was no such incident in the past year	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Yes, accessing health services	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, with the police	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, with customs officials	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, accessing local government services (e.g. registry (matični ured), building and business permits, water, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, when trying to obtain employment or a contract for work from an official	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, another type of incident when dealing with an official	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓✓ tick all that apply. Please ensure respondent concentrates on the past year. Please observe logic of the response set: if 'no, there was no such incident in the past year' or 'no answer' is ticked, nothing else is ticked

Q28 - Let us now talk about corruption in the private sector. Were you asked to pay, make a gift or do a favour for someone in business in the past year or so? If there was no such incident in the past year, please tell me so

No, there was no such incident in the past year	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Yes, when trying to get a job	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Yes, when trying to get business	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓✓ tick all that apply. Please ensure respondent concentrates on the past year. Please observe logic of the response set: if 'no, there was no such incident in the past year' is ticked, nothing else is ticked

Q29 - Are you aware of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA)?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q30
No	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q31
No answer	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q31

Please ✓ tick one only. If the respondent replies 'yes' please go to Q30, otherwise skip Q30 and go to Q31

[Ask those who replied 'yes' in Q29]

Q30 - All in all, and everything considered, do you think the DPA has worked for BiH or not?

Has worked for BiH	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Has not worked for BiH	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
No answer	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q31 - Overall, how would you say things are going in BiH as a country these days – very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?

Very good	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Quite good	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Quite bad	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Very bad	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q32A - Compared to a year ago, are things overall in BiH much better now, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

Q32B - What is your expectation for how things overall in BiH will be in a year from now? Will they be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse?

	Q32A	Q32B
Much better <i>[now]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Somewhat better	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
About the same	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Somewhat worse	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
Much worse	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
No answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only in each column

Q33 - What do you think is the main strength of BiH?

Please give me one single answer

☐_99 No answer *[Do not read]*

Please insist on single response and write verbatim or ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q34 - And what do you think is its main weakness?

☐_99 No answer *[Do not read]*

Please insist on single response and write verbatim or ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q35 - Irrespective of what you think may be possible from today's perspective: ideally, what or where should BiH be in twenty year's time?

You may give me any answer you can think of

☐_99 No answer *[Do not read]*

Please insist on single response and write verbatim or ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q36 - How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the left; '10' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

LEFT People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves [WVS E037] □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	RIGHT The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for □ ₁₀	read/No answer [Do not □ ₉₉
Our elected representatives should decide on a way ahead for the country □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Ordinary citizens should have a say on a way forward □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
BiH citizens should wait and see what the outside world will decide for its future □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	BiH citizens should take their future in their own hands □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
We need to make sure that any injustice created by the war is finally put right □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	The war happened so many years ago. We just need to move on from here □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
This country needs big change now □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	This country is as it is and does not need much change □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
Our politicians should continue making their decisions according to ethnic principles □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Our politicians should stop making their decisions according to ethnic principles □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
Corruption is a way of life and we need to live with it □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Corruption is crippling BiH and we must get rid of it urgently □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉

Please use showcard Q36/Q47 and read each statement indicating 'Left' and 'Right'. Please ✓ tick one only in each row

Q37 - Considering everything, which country could serve as a model for BiH in the coming years? If you think BiH needs no model, please tell me so

Country [from code list]:	□□□
BiH needs no model	□ ₉₉₈
No answer [Do not read]	□ ₉₉₉

Please do not prompt country names. Please write the code corresponding to the country mentioned by the respondent. If respondent mentions more than one country, explain that only one country is to be mentioned. If the respondent says that BiH needs no model, please ✓ tick 'BiH needs no model'. If the respondent gives no answer, please ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q38A - Irrespective of what you may think is possible at this time, in an ideal world, which structure should this country have in future? I am going to read out some choices twice so you will remember them more easily. Please listen carefully and tell me which one is your first choice, your second and your third choice. If you want me to read them again at any time, please just ask

Please rotate items and write '1' for the first choice, '2' for the second, and '3' for the third in the column for Q38A. Please re-read if requested

Q38B - Also, please tell me which one you think is not a choice at all.

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q38B. Please read all those not chosen in Q38A. Please re-read if requested

Q38C - Irrespective of any choices you gave me before, which option do you think is most likely to actually happen?

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q38C. Please re-read if requested

Q38D - Also, please tell me which one you think will never happen

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q38D. Please read all those not chosen in Q38C. Please re-read if requested

Tick start			A	B	C	D
	1	A new country which is joined by as many countries of ex-Yugoslavia as possible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
	2	One unified country with central government in Sarajevo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
	3	One unified country with central government in Sarajevo with strong regions (BiH)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
	4	As is, two Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄
	5	Three Entities with their respective governments and a state government in Sarajevo	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅
	6	Dividing the country into separate independent states	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆
	7	Dividing the country into areas some of which could join neighbouring countries	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₇	<input type="checkbox"/> ₇	<input type="checkbox"/> ₇
	-	No answer [Do not read]	-	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Q39A - Which of the following countries and organisations should have most influence on the future of BiH, which one is second and which one is third? If you think there should be no influence because people in BiH will decide, please tell me so

Please rotate items and write '1' for the most influential, '2' for the second, and '3' for the third in the column for Q39A or ✓ tick 'Difficult to say or 'No influence, people in BiH will decide' and ✓ tick nothing in Q39B

Q39B - Also, please tell me which one you think will have no influence at all.

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q39B. Please ✓ tick nothing if respondent said 'No influence, people in BiH will decide' or 'Difficult to say' in Q39A. If respondent asks, please read all those not chosen in Q39A

Tick start			Q39A. Most influence 1-3	Q39B. None at all
	1	UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
	2	US	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
	3	OHR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
	4	EU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄
	5	Serbia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₅
	6	Croatia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₆
	7	Germany	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> ₇
		No influence, people in BiH will decide	<input type="checkbox"/> ₈	-
		No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

[Ask all]

Q40 - Are you aware of any plans to change the constitution of BiH?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	» go to Q41
No	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	» go to Q43
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	» go to Q43

Please ✓ tick one only. If the respondent replies 'yes' please go to Q41, otherwise skip Q41 and Q42 and go to Q43

[Ask only those who replied 'yes' in the previous question]

Q41 - Do you think the constitution should actually be changed or should things be kept as they are?

The BiH constitution should be changed	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
Things should be left as they are	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please ✓ tick one only

[Ask only those who replied 'yes' in Q40]

Q42 - Irrespective of whether you think constitutional reform is necessary; what do you think is the single most important thing constitutional change can deliver to BiH?

Please give me one single answer

☐₉₉ No answer [Do not read]

Please insist on single response and write verbatim or ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q43 - There are different views about people from BiH who now live abroad. We have collected some statements; for each, please tell me if you very much agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or entirely disagree

Those who now live abroad:	Very much agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Entirely disagree	No answer [Do not read]
Left when we all suffered; they might find it difficult to be accepted back here	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
What they earn abroad can be sent to their family here; they should stay abroad	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
When they come back they can make an important difference to life in this country	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Have better lives abroad, why would they want to come back?	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Whatever the case may be, people from BiH belong here and should come home	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please read each statement in turn and ✓ tick one only in each row

Q44 - Irrespective of whether you think people from BiH who live abroad should come home, for each of the following statements, please tell me if you very much agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or entirely disagree

If those who now live abroad come home, they will:	Very much agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Entirely disagree	No answer [Do not read]
Take our jobs	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Bring their savings	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Behave as if they feel superior	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Make BiH more civilised	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Make life tougher for local businesses	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Bring back the skills they acquired abroad	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Find it hard to fit in with our ways	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉
Create employment	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please read each statement and ✓ tick one only in each row

Q45A - When do you think the involvement of the UN in BiH should end or should it be involved in BiH for many years to come?

Q45B - How about the OHR?

	Q45A - UN	Q45B - OHR
It should stop its involvement now	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁
It should be involved in BiH for many years to come	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂	<input type="checkbox"/> ₂
It should stop its involvement within one year	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃	<input type="checkbox"/> ₃
It should stop its involvement if and when BiH joins the EU	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄	<input type="checkbox"/> ₄
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉

Please ✓ tick one only

Q46A - Irrespective of what you said about the timing of the UN's involvement, which of the following should be the role of the UN in BiH? Please tell me which of the following should be the most important role, the second most important, and the third most important. I will read out the options twice so you will be able to remember them more easily. If you need me to read them out again at any point, please just ask

Please read out items twice in rotating order (i.e. start each interview with a new item). Please write '1' for the most important, '2' for the second, and '3' for the third in the column for Q46A. Please re-read if requested

Q46B - Also, please tell me which is the least important role for the UN.

Please ✓ tick one only in the column for Q46B. Please re-read if requested

Tick start			Q46A Roles 1-3	Q46B Least import.
	1	Ensure that returnees are integrated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _01
	2	Ensure that human rights are observed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _02
	3	Concentrate on returning displaced people to their homes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _03
	4	Ensure that corruption is kept at bay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _04
	5	Assist BiH authorities in planning the country's development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _05
	6	Ensure that people in BiH can make a decent living	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _06
	7	Ensure that BiH politicians follow the law	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _07
	8	Make sure weaker people in the community also get a say	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _08
	9	Help municipalities become more efficient in their work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _09
	10	Help improve education in this area	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> _10
	-	No answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Q47 - There are different opinions about displacement and return of people as an effect of the war. We have collected opposing opinions which are sometimes expressed. How would you place your views on this scale? '1' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the left; '10' means you "agree completely" with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

LEFT We should follow the post-war agreements and continue assisting all those who wish to return to do so □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	RIGHT The whole displacement and return issue should be left where it is right now. What has happened has happened □ ₁₀	No answer [Do not read] □ ₉₉
Those who chose not to return should receive assistance for integrating wherever they are now □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Those who chose not to return in the past are now responsible for their own future □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
If people returned with assistance from the government/international community they should now be able to look after themselves □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	People who returned deserve assistance to help them settle into their community □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
The way assistance was paid to people who returned was often corrupted □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Overall, the assistance process was honest □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
Many people who were assisted in their return often found themselves better off than people who were never displaced □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Despite any assistance received, most returnees are still worse off □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
It is better if the displaced stay wherever they are now □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	The displaced should be welcome wherever they choose to return to □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉
Overall, the idea of returning displaced people to their former homes was right □ ₁	□ ₂	□ ₃	□ ₄	□ ₅	□ ₆	□ ₇	□ ₈	□ ₉	Overall, the idea was wrong □ ₁₀	□ ₉₉

Please use show card Q36/Q47 and read each statement indicating 'Left' and 'Right'. Please ✓ tick one only in each row

Q48 - Have you ever been displaced? By displacement I mean fleeing or leaving your home to avoid violence.

Yes	□ ₁	» go to Q49
No	□ ₂	» go to Q55
No answer [do not read]	□ ₉	» go to Q55

Please ✓ tick one only. Those who reply 'yes' got to Q49. All others skip Q49 to Q54 and go to Q55

[Ask those who replied 'yes' in Q48]

Q49 - During your displacement did you move once or more than once?

Moved once	□ ₁	» go to Q50A
Moved more than once, namely:	□ Times	» go to Q50B
No answer [do not read]	□ ₉	» go to Q51

Please ✓ tick or write number of multiple displacements. Those who replied 'moved once' go to 50A 'moved more than once' go to Q50B. 'No answer' go to Q51

[Ask only those who did not reply 'no answer' in Q49. Those who replied 'moved once' go to Q50A 'moved more than once' go to Q50B]

Q50A - Please tell me where you went

Please ✓ tick one only

Q50B - For each time you moved, please tell me where you went

Please ✓✓ tick all that apply. Please ✓ tick only once for each location type irrespective of the numbers of displacements to this location type

Location type	Q50A ✓ tick one	Q50B ✓✓ tick all that apply
Within this BiH Entity	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
To another Entity within BiH	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Within the territory of the former Yugoslavia	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Abroad, outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
No answer [do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

[Ask all displaced, i.e. those who answered 'yes' to Q48]

Q51 – Have you returned to the village/neighbourhood where you were originally displaced from or not?

Returned	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Not returned	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only. Please use 'village' in rural and 'neighbourhood' in urban areas

[Ask those who answered 'yes' to Q48]

Q52 – In the place where you live now, is your ethnic group in a majority or minority or is there a balance?

Majority	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Minority	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Balance	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

[Please do not ask this question]

Q53

[Please do not ask this question]

Q54

Q55 – How often do you follow the news, on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? [WVS E150]

Every day	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q56
Several times a week	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q56
Once or twice a week	<input type="checkbox"/> _3	» go to Q56
Less often	<input type="checkbox"/> _4	» go to Q56
Never	<input type="checkbox"/> _5	» go to Q57
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q56

Please ✓ tick one only

[Ask those who did not reply 'Never' in Q55]

Q56 – Which newspaper, magazine radio or television programme or Internet site do you trust most for news?

Please give me one single answer

☐_99 No answer [Do not read]

Please insist on single response and write verbatim or ✓ tick 'No answer'

Q57 – Which of the following papers do you read regularly (once or more than once a week)

Blic	<input type="checkbox"/> _01
Dnevni Avaz	<input type="checkbox"/> _02
Glas Srpski	<input type="checkbox"/> _03
Nezavisne Novine	<input type="checkbox"/> _04
Oslobođenje	<input type="checkbox"/> _05
San	<input type="checkbox"/> _06
Slobodna Dalmacija	<input type="checkbox"/> _07
Večernje Novosti	<input type="checkbox"/> _08
Večernji List	<input type="checkbox"/> _09
Do not read a paper regularly	<input type="checkbox"/> _98
Other/No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please ✓ tick one only and ensure the respondent only cites one paper s/he reads at least once a week

[Please do not ask]

Q58 – Gender

Male	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Female	<input type="checkbox"/> _2

Please ✓ tick one only

Q59 – Could you please tell me your age?

Please write age in years	<input type="text"/>
Refused	<input type="checkbox"/> _999

Please write age or ✓ tick 'refused' and write estimated age

Q60 – What is your marital status?

Single (never married)	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Married/Living with partner	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Separated/Divorced	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Widowed	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
Refused [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q61A – Which of the following best describes you. Just call out one of the letters on this card [WVSG015]

Q61B – [only ask if respondent indicated 'B to D' in Q61A]

As well as thinking of yourself as a [Bosniak, Croat, Serb] do you also think of yourself as being a citizen of the whole of BiH?

		Q61A		Q61B	
A	Above all, I am a citizen of BiH	<input type="checkbox"/> _1	» go to Q62	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
B, C, D	Above all, I am a Bosniak, Croat, Serb	<input type="checkbox"/> _2	» go to Q61B	No	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
	Other	<input type="checkbox"/> _8	» go to Q62	No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9
	Refused [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9	» go to Q62		

Use showcard Q61 and ✓ tick one only

Q62 – How many people live in this household including yourself?

Please write in No. of HH members

Lodgers and guests are included as long as they have been in the household for at least 6 months and wash their laundry and/or eat with the family

Q63 – What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?

No formal education	<input type="checkbox"/> _1
Some primary school	<input type="checkbox"/> _2
Completed primary school	<input type="checkbox"/> _3
Some secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> _4
Completed secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> _5
Some university/higher level	<input type="checkbox"/> _6
Complete university	<input type="checkbox"/> _7
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _9

Please ✓ tick one only

Q64 – Which of the following best describes your own current employment status?

Employed full-time (regular not casual employment)	<input type="checkbox"/> _01
Employed part-time (regular not casual employment)	<input type="checkbox"/> _02
Employed casually (whenever there is an opportunity for employment; not part-time)	<input type="checkbox"/> _03
Self-employed (own account/private business)	<input type="checkbox"/> _04
Unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/> _05
Retired	<input type="checkbox"/> _06
Looking after the home (homemaker)	<input type="checkbox"/> _07
Unable to work (disabled, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> _08
In education	<input type="checkbox"/> _09
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99

Please ✓ tick one only

Q65 – If you have ever worked or are currently working who do/did you work for? If you have never worked please tell me so

Civil service or public sector	<input type="checkbox"/> _01	» go to Q66
Public sector/state-owned enterprise	<input type="checkbox"/> _02	» go to Q66
Private sector enterprise	<input type="checkbox"/> _03	» go to Q66
International organisation	<input type="checkbox"/> _04	» go to Q66
International company	<input type="checkbox"/> _05	» go to Q66
Producer- or service-cooperative	<input type="checkbox"/> _06	» go to Q66
Work in someone else's home	<input type="checkbox"/> _07	» go to Q66
Own account worker/self employed (as before)	<input type="checkbox"/> _08	» go to Q66
Never worked	<input type="checkbox"/> _09	» go to Q67
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> _99	» go to Q66

Please ✓ tick one only in each column. Those who replied 'never worked' go to Q67. All others go to Q66

[Ask all who ever worked]

Q66 – If you have ever worked or are currently working, which of the following best describes your own current or last main job?

Traditional professional occupations Such as: teacher, nurse, physiotherapist, social worker, welfare officer, artist, musician, trainer, police or army officer (sergeant or above)	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₁
Clerical and intermediate occupations Such as: secretary, personal assistant, clerical worker, office clerk, call centre agent, nursing auxiliary, nursery nurse	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₂
Senior managers or administrators Such as: finance manager, chief executive (usually responsible for planning, organising, and co-ordinating work and for finance)	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₃
Middle or junior managers Such as: office manager, retail manager, bank manager, restaurant manager, warehouse manager, bar owner	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₄
New professional occupations Such as: accountant, solicitor, medical practitioner, scientist, civil/mechanical engineer, software designer	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₅
Technical and craft occupations Such as: motor mechanic, fitter, inspector, plumber, printer, tool maker, electrician, gardener, train driver	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₆
Semi-routine manual and service occupations Such as: postal worker, machine operator, security guard, army soldier below sergeant, caretaker, farm worker, catering assistant, receptionist, sales assistant	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₇
Routine manual and service occupations Such as: vehicle driver, cleaner, porter, packer, sewing machinist, messenger, labourer, waiter/waitress, bar staff	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₈
Farmer with own land (leased, profit sharing or owned)	<input type="checkbox"/> ₀₉
Farm worker without own land	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁₀
Other	<input type="checkbox"/> ₁₁
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉₉

Please ✓ tick one only

Q67 – Households spend their money on different things. I would like to ask you about the expenditure in this household in a normal month. Approximately how many KM do you spend in the following expenditure areas?

If you are not sure what I mean by normal month, think of this year and take a monthly average of your expenditure

Food and beverages	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Clothing and footwear	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Housing, energy, water	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Household goods / durables	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Medicine and medical services	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Communication and transport	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Cultural, educational and leisure expenses	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Other commodities and services	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Savings	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Total	» <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
No answer	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉₉

Please enter amount in KM next to each expenditure area or ✓ tick 'no answer'. If necessary, respondent may consult with another household member to calculate. Once answers are obtained, helpers should be asked to wait elsewhere for the remainder of the questionnaire

Q68A – What is your monthly net household income in KM? (How much money do you actually receive each month?) By net household income I mean all the cash incomes of your household, i.e. the income achieved by all members of this household after taxes, social security and health insurance payments have been deducted.

	Amount	
Income in KM	<input type="text"/>	→ go to Q69
Refused [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₈	→ go to Q68B
No answer [Do not read]	<input type="checkbox"/> ₉	→ go to Q68B

Please enter income in the space provided in KM. Please check against expenditure in Q67. If the respondent mentioned a monthly net household income please skip Q68B and go to Q69. If the respondent refuses to answer, please tick 'Refused' but do not read it out and go to Q68B. If the

respondent gives no answer, tick 'No answer' but do not read it out and go to Q68B.

[Ask respondents who did not answer Q68A]

Q68B – Into which of the following categories does your monthly net household income fall?

Up to 100 KM	F	□ ₀₁
101-200 KM	C	□ ₀₂
201-300 KM	A	□ ₀₃
301-500 KM	G	□ ₀₄
501-1000 KM	D	□ ₀₅
1001-1500 KM	E	□ ₀₆
1501-2000 KM	H	□ ₀₇
More than 2001 KM	B	□ ₀₈
No answer [Do not read]		□ ₉₉
Refused [Do not read]		□ ₉₈

Please use showcard Q68B and ✓ tick the letter corresponding with income bracket. Please check against expenditure in Q67. If the respondent gives no answer, please ✓ tick 'No answer' but do not read it out. If the respondent refuses to answer, please ✓ tick 'Refused' but do not read it out. Read showcard content to illiterate respondents

Q69A - Which of the following are sources of income for this home?

Please ✓✓ tick all that apply.

Q69B - Which source of income is most important for this home?

By most important I mean the one which contributes most to this home

Please ✓ tick one only

	69A ✓✓ tick all that apply	69B ✓ tick one
Earnings from employment	□ ₁	□ ₀₁
Earnings from self-employment	□ ₁	□ ₀₂
Selling food we produce	□ ₁	□ ₀₃
Pension	□ ₁	□ ₀₄
Unemployment benefit	□ ₁	□ ₀₅
Invalidity/sickness or disabled benefit(s)	□ ₁	□ ₀₆
Other state benefit or credit	□ ₁	□ ₀₇
Interest from savings or investments	□ ₁	□ ₀₈
Student grant/bursary or loans	□ ₁	□ ₀₉
Remittance from family/friends in BiH	□ ₁	□ ₁₀
Remittance from family/friends abroad	□ ₁	□ ₁₁
Bartering goods and services (not involving money)	□ ₁	□ ₁₂
Other	□ ₁	□ ₁₃
No answer [Do not read]	□ ₉	□ ₉₉

Q70 - What is your religion? If you do not wish to say, please tell me so?

Roman Catholic	□ ₁
Christian Orthodox	□ ₂
Other Christian	□ ₃
Muslim	□ ₄
Jewish	□ ₅
Agnostic	□ ₆
Other	□ ₇
Refused [Do not read]	□ ₉

Please ✓ tick one only